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Every year billions of animals are routinely killed for humans to eat. The exact 
number of lives taken, and the amount of pain and suffering inflicted on animals 
at the hands of humans is unimaginable. In total, the ill treatment of animals 
by humans, and the apathy shown by the public towards their plight represents 
a widespread inequality. Interestingly, some humans are oppressed in ways 
that reflect human-animal inequality in the meat industry. For example, drug 
addicts are routinely persecuted by the state despite needing help, and 
workers in developing countries such as Bangladesh are exploited in the 
production of cheap clothing for the developed world. In a similar way to 
human-animal inequality, both drug addicts and sweatshop workers are 
systematically oppressed and the public are indifferent to their suffering. 
However, the magnitude of human-animal inequality is arguably worse as they 
are routinely slaughtered at the end of a short, grueling life.  Because of this, 
we thought that support for human-animal inequality would be foundationally 
connected to human inequalities, such that challenging human supremacy 
would reduce support for human-animal inequality, and would subsequently 
cause a reduction in support for human inequalities. To test our hypotheses, 
participants wrote a short paragraph that challenged either (a) human 
supremacy over animals, (b) supremacy over drug addicts, or (c) a control 
condition. We then measured support for various inequalities. Overall, we 
found that support for human-animal inequality was related to support for 
human inequality, however, it was not foundational. Whilst people that were 
indifferent to the suffering of animals were also likely to be indifferent to the 
suffering of humans, the indifference towards animals was not the best 
predictor of indifference towards human suffering. In addition, we found no 
strong evidence that challenging human supremacy reduces support for either 
the human-animal or human inequalities. This highlights the difficulties we face 





Around the world, human-animal inequality is widespread; the meat industry 
alone slaughters billions of animals each year. Some human groups face 
similar inequalities.  For example, drug addicts are routinely persecuted by the 
state despite needing help, and workers in developing countries such as 
Bangladesh are exploited to produce cheap clothing for the developed world. 
In a similar way to human-animal inequality, both drug addicts and sweatshop 
workers are systematically oppressed and most people are indifferent to their 
suffering. However, the magnitude of human-animal inequality is arguably 
greater as they are routinely slaughtered at the end of a short, grueling life.  
Because of this, we wanted to determine whether human-animal inequality is 
foundational to inequality between human groups. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that challenging human supremacy over animals would reduce 
support for human-animal inequality, and would subsequently cause a 
reduction in support for human inequalities. To test our hypothesis, we 
employed a self-persuasion task that challenged either (a) human supremacy 
over animals, (b) non-addict supremacy over drug addicts, or (c) a control 
condition. We found consistent evidence that support for human-animal 
inequality and human inequalities were strongly correlated. However, we found 
no robust evidence that challenging human supremacy reduces support for 
either the human-animal or human inequalities. This research illustrates the 
difficulties we face when designing interventions aimed at reducing 
supremacist beliefs. Further, it highlights the challenges we face as a society, 





The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether human-animal 
inequality is foundational to human inequalities.  
The three introductory chapters of this thesis provide a thorough 
overview of the psychology of human-animal relations, and the connection 
between human-animal relations and human relations. Chapter 1 provides a 
broad overview of the psychology of human-animal relations; chapter 2 
explores the psychological theories that have been applied to human-animal 
relations; and chapter 3 suggests that human-animal inequality may be 
foundational to human inequalities.  
More specifically, chapter 1 focusses on human-animal relations in the 
United Kingdom (UK). We will cover a broad range of human-animal relations, 
including both positive and negative, and provide a comprehensive overview 
of the empirical psychological research available. We describe direct positive 
relations such as pet ownership, and veterinary medicine, and indirect positive 
relations such as the UK public donating money to animal welfare charities and 
people who watch wildlife documentaries.  
In the second half of chapter 1 we describe direct negative human-
animal relations such as people who work in the animal agriculture industry, 
and indirect negative human-animal relations such as people who purchase 
meat from the animal agriculture industry. We describe the limited research 
that is known about the psychological consequences of directly killing animals 
for a living. The consumption of meat is then given as the example of indirect 
negative human-animal relations. In this section, we draw on the theory of the 
meat paradox to explain how people can both love and eat animals. We 
conclude chapter 1 by suggesting that in total human-animal relations 
constitute a widespread inequality, in which humans are afforded moral 
concern, the right to life, and are protected by the law. Most animals that 
humans interact with (e.g., farmed animals), however, are subject to the most 
violent and brutal treatment at the hands of humans; are beyond the realm of 
moral concern; and are not afforded even the basic right to life. 
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In chapter 2, we turn our focus towards the psychological theories that 
have been applied to human-animal relations. We first describe how 
attachment theory has been used to explain relations between pet animals and 
their owners. We then describe Social Identity Theory and Terror Management 
Theory that reveal how we think about social categories and death and the 
impact this has on human-animal relations. We will show how the literature on 
stereotyping and prejudice has informed our understanding of human-animal 
relations, and how human-animal relations has in turn advanced the 
stereotype and prejudice literature. System Justification Theory is discussed 
which reveals the possible role of justifications in the exploitation of animals 
and we provide a Cognitive Dissonance Model of explaining morally 
troublesome human-animal relations. We conclude chapter 2 by suggesting 
that while the psychological theories that have examined human-animal 
relations have made important advancements they fall short of answering 
whether human-animal inequality is foundational to human inequalities.   
In chapter 3, we turn our attention towards the psychological 
consequences of being indifferent to human-animal inequality, and provide our 
novel contribution to the literature. The two novel contributions of this thesis 
include 1) extending the scope of human outgroups thought to be associated 
with human-animal inequality, and 2) examining whether human-animal 
inequality is foundational to human inequalities.  
To discuss the first novel contribution, the current literature on human-
animal relations is provided which reveals it is limited to how perceptions of 
animals are related to active prejudice towards national human outgroups (e.g. 
racism). This thesis adds to the literature by showing how human-animal 
relations are related to passive indifference to the suffering of two human 
groups. The two groups used in the current research are drug addicts in the 
UK, and sweatshop workers in Bangladesh. We illustrate how these two 
inequalities function and how they are conceptually similar to human-animal 
inequality. We argue that the psychological mechanisms that help people 
reduce dissonance arising from harming animals are the same psychological 
mechanisms that help people reduce dissonance about other morally 
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troublesome inequalities such as the persecution of drug addicts in the UK and 
the exploitation of developing world labour. We see these two inequalities as 
examples of a wider psychological phenomenon whereby good people 
indirectly perpetuate harmful inequalities in society.  
We conclude chapter 3, and therefore the introduction of this thesis, by 
providing the second novel contribution of this thesis that is to consider 
whether human-animal inequality is foundational to human inequalities.  
Specifically, we reason that human-animal inequality would be foundational to 
inequality between humans because meat consumption requires animals to be 
killed, whereas inequality between human groups (such as the exploitation of 
developing world human labour) does not. We then discuss that if human-
animal inequality is foundational to human inequalities, then reducing support 





Chapter One: The Psychology of Human-Animal Relations 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
The psychology of human-animal relations is a very new field of enquiry. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the most common human-
animal relations in the UK, accompanied by the most relevant empirical 
psychological research known about those relations. Human animal relations 
can be separated into positive and negative relations, based upon whether the 
treatment of animals by humans is positive or negative. The sections on 
positive and negative human-animal relationships are comprised of direct and 
indirect relations. Direct relations are those such as interacting with one’s pet, 
whereas donating money to an animal welfare would be an example of indirect 
relations. The purpose of outlining both the compassionate and the dark sides 
of human-animal relations is to show the ambivalence that characterises them. 
Juxtaposing the compassionate treatment of pet animals with the harmful 
treatment of meat animals is important because it paints a realistic picture of 
human-animal relations; they are not all good or all bad. We want to show that 
human-animal inequality does not simply reflect a form of prejudice (i.e. 
speciesism), which the most relevant psychological theories reduce it to (see 
chapter 2). Human-animal inequality is a much more nuanced subject than 
prejudice, and therefore requires a broad theoretical framework to fully 
appreciate the psychology behind human-animal inequality (See chapter 3). 
We begin this chapter by discussing the positive human-animal relations, 
before reviewing the negative side of human-animal relations. 
1.2 Positive Human-Animal Relations 
We provide an overview of positive human-animal relations beginning 
with the direct human-animal relationships between pets, their owners, and 
vets. In the second part of this section on positive human-animal relations, we 
give an overview of the indirect ways which people indirectly relate positively 
to animals, using the examples of charitable donations to animal welfare 
organisations, and people’s interest in watching wildlife documentaries. 
1.2.1 Direct positive human-animal relations: Pets and Vets. From 
the pets children grow up with, the veterinary surgeons (vets) who look after 
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those animals to the zoos we visit, and the birds or small mammals such as 
squirrels that live in UK cities, there are many different ways we interact directly 
and positively towards animals. In this section, we just focus on the most 
common form of positive direct human animal relations in the UK: the relations 
between pets and their owners, and between pets and the vets who look after 
them.  
Pet ownership. Pet ownership in the UK is characterised by a large 
and well looked after population of cats and dogs, living in urban areas, who 
receive regular food, shelter, and medical treatment (Murray, Gruffydd-Jones, 
Roberts, & Browne, 2015). For a sense of the scale of pet ownership today in 
the UK, one in two households has at least one cat or dog (Aegerter, Fouracre, 
& Smith, 2017). More specifically, one in three households in the UK has at 
least one pet dog; one in four has at least one pet cat; and one in eight has at 
least one pet fish (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 2017; Murray, Gruffydd-Jones, 
Roberts, & Browne, 2015). To look at this in another way, across the UK, there 
are around 12 million dogs and 10 million cats (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 
2017). People in the UK own a lot of pets, and pet ownership around the 
Western world shows a similar pattern with Sweden, Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Spain, Belgium, Australia, Canada and the USA showing similar, if 
not greater, levels of pet ownership (Global Growth From Knowledge, 2016; 
Murray, Gruffydd-Jones, Roberts, & Browne, 2015). In the East, pet ownership 
is lower in countries such as China (25% own a dog, 10% own a cat), Japan 
(17% own a dog, 14% own a cat), Hong Kong (14% own a dog, 10% own a 
cat), and South Korea (20% own a dog, 6% own a cat) (Global Growth From 
Knowledge, 2016). 
In the UK, for the most part, pets are very well looked after, and treated 
with care by their owners. For example, each year UK pet owners spend on 
average £1000 on each dog, and £500 on each cat, totalling £15 billion on pet 
expenses  (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 2017). Further, there is no evidence 
of a measurable population of stray dogs in the UK, with almost all dogs in the 
UK either housed with private pet owners, or housed by animal welfare 
organisations (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 2017). However, there is a small 
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population of stray (receiving some care) or feral cats (receiving no care) that 
live on the streets. The population of cats in the UK that do not have a home 
but receive constant food or medical attention (i.e. stray) is estimated to be 
around 1.5 million. Around 5000 of those 1.5 million cats are feral, and 
experience no contact with humans whatsoever (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 
2017). Despite this, pet ownership in the UK is characterised by a large 
population of cats and dogs who are well looked after, and have regular access 
to shelter, food and medical attention (Aegerter, Fouracre, & Smith, 2017; 
Murray, Gruffydd-Jones, Roberts, & Browne, 2015).  
Psychological consequences of pet ownership. Just as pet animals 
in the UK largely benefit from the pet industry, research suggests that there 
are largely positive psychological effects for humans living with pet animals. 
Pet ownership has been positively associated with both developmental and 
health outcomes. Developmentally, the relation between pets and pet owners 
can be thought of and measured in terms of psychological attachment. Pets 
can serve as attachment figures for humans (Kurdek L. A., 2008; Kurdek L. A., 
2009); attachment to pets can be reliably measured (Johnson, Garrity, & 
Stallones, 1992); attachment style can be assessed using the “strange 
situation” with dogs and their owners (Marinelli, Adamelli, Normando, & Bono, 
2007); and anxious attachment to pets is associated with psychological stress 
(Zilcha-Mano, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2011). Attachment to pets is also 
associated with increased satisfaction with pet behaviour (Serpell, 1996), and 
children’s well-being (Paul & Serpell, 1996). There is also some correlational 
work showing that witnessing animal abuse in childhood is associated with 
violence against animals in later life (Hensley, Tallichet, & Dutkiewicz, 2012), 
however, these studies are all correlational and retrospective and so caution 
should be taken in interpreting these findings. Moreover, in a recent review of 
the psychology of human animal relations, the authors suggest that the 
positive impact of pet ownership on pet owners could be moderated by how 
central of a role pets play in people’s lives (Amiot & Bastian, 2014). For 
instance, if people are living alone with just their pet animal, that animal is likely 
to have a greater positive effect on the owner than if the owner was living in a 
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happily-functioning family home whereby the other humans in the house 
provide greater emotional support and social connection (Amiot & Bastian, 
2014). Nonetheless, the research on pet ownership suggests there is a largely 
positive effect of living with pet animals.  
The research on the health benefits of pet ownership is more mixed, 
with some studies showing positive benefits of pet ownership, and some 
studies showing negative costs for pet ownership. Looking at physical health, 
a study by Friedmann, Katcher, Lynch, and Thomas (1980) found that among 
92 heart attack victims, after one year, 28% of pet owners had survived, 
compared to 6% of nonpet owners. However, a more recent study found that 
among 424 heart attack victims, 22% of pet owners were likely to die or suffer 
remissions, compared with 14% of nonpet owners (Parker, et al., 2010). In 
addition, research has shown both positive and negative effects of pets’ ability 
to buffer against stress. For example, in an experimental study, hypertensive 
stock brokers were assigned to either a pet or a no-pet condition; 6 months 
later, participants with a pet had a smaller increase in blood pressure during a 
stressful task than nonpet participants (Allen, Shykoff, & Izzo, 2001). However, 
this finding was not found in ealrier work (Straatman, Hanson, Edenburg, & 
Mol, 1997).  
The empirical evidence for the impact of pet ownership on mental health 
is also mixed, with studies reporting both positive and negative effects. For 
instance, a recent systematic review of seventeen quantitative studies found 
positive, negative and neutral impacts of pet ownership on mental well being 
(Brooks, et al., 2018). In a two study paper, Zilcho-Mano, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 
(2012) reported that (1) pet ownership was associated with greater aspirations 
and higher feelings of self-efficacy when the pet was physically or cognitively 
present, and (2) feelings of attachment to one’s pets reduced blood pressure 
during a stressful event when adult pet owner’s pet is present. However, there 
is also research detailing the negative aspects of pet ownership, particularly 
for people with diagnosed mental disorders, or when the pet was a financial 
burden or when the animal was unruly and difficult to look after (Brooks, et al., 
2018). In short, living with pet animals can come with developmental and 
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health benefits, however, these benefits are more pronounced in people who 
already lack social relationships with humans (Pachana, Ford, Andrew, & 
Dobson, 2005; Peretti, 151-156). 
Pets and Vets. The psychological impact of interacting with pets in a 
veterinary capacity is also mixed: there is good evidence that being a vet is 
accompanied by a myriad of both positive and negative experiences. 
Undoubtedly, many vets have a satisfying career and thoroughly enjoy working 
with animals (Batchelor & McKeegan, 2012). However, because vets deal with 
many sick pet animals, vets are often faced with difficult decisions surrounding 
the treatment of their patients (the animals), such as when pet owners insist 
on continuing treatment, despite poor animal welfare, solely to maintain the 
animal’s life. Vets can find these dilemmas very stressful, and this is part of 
the reason why vets can experience poorer well-being and mental health 
compared to other professions, such as doctors (Batchelor & McKeegan, 
2012). For example, the ethical dilemma of whether a sick animal should be 
put down is a constant part of a vets work which can be not only stressful 
during working hours, but can also bring feelings of grief and loss that continue 
at home (Batchelor & McKeegan, 2012). The stress and grief of treating and 
euthanizing sick animals, coupled with long working hours and poor work-life 
balance, can lead to increased levels of drug and alcohol problems among 
vets, and poorer mental wellbeing (Platt, Hawton, & Mellanby, 2010).  
Unfortunately, occupational stress and poorer mental wellbeing, 
coupled with vets’ expertise in euthanasia of animals and drug administration 
contributes to vets being the profession most at risk of suicide (Tran, Crane, & 
Phillips, 2014). Vets have a suicide rate four times higher than the general 
population, and twice as high as other health professionals, highlights the 
unique impact that working with animals can have on wellbeing (Bartram & 
Baldwin, 2010). While many vets undoubtedly get a lot of satisfaction and 
enjoyment from working with and helping animals, the evidence also suggests 
that working with animals can have an impact so negative that it effects their 
will to live. This very unfortunate association between working with sick 
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animals and suicide illustrates vets’ tragically strong human connection to the 
animals they care for.  
Looking at the psychology of both pets and vets shows that human 
animal relations can have a significant psychological impact on people 
(Friedmann, Katcher, Lynch, & Thomas, 1980). How we interact with animals 
can have a profound impact on our health and well-being for both the good 
and the bad. Pet owners and vets go to great lengths, financial and 
emotionally, to look after and treat animals (Amiot & Bastian, 2014). In addition, 
pets for many are part of the family; people get to know the rich inner lives of 
their pet animals and realise their animals have their own personalities and 
preferences (Amiot & Bastian, 2014). In short, pet owners and vets care a lot 
about pet animals in the UK. It is thought to be morally and legally wrong to 
harm pet animals in the UK, with tough laws protecting pet animals and people 
sent to prison for violating these laws (UK Parliament, 2019). The strong 
concern for the welfare of some animals in the UK is also evident in indirect 
human-animal relations such as in the large number of charitable donations 
made to animal welfare charities and the UK’s interest in wildlife 
documentaries. 
1.2.2 Indirect positive human-animal relations: donations and 
documentaries. Positive human-animal relations can also take an indirect 
shape through charitable donations and watching documentaries about 
animals and human-animal relations. We therefore divide this section into two 
smaller subsections; donations and documentaries. 
Donations. Overall, the UK ranks 11th in the world (7th in the world when 
looking at a 5-year trend) in the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) world giving 
index for the most charitable country, with 64% of Brits having reported giving 
money to charity in 2016 (Charities Aid Foundation, 2019). Each year, 
inhabitants of the UK give around £10 billion to charities, with £80 million (8%) 
going to animal welfare charities. This pattern of charitable donations to animal 
welfare charities reflects the literature on pet ownership; a significant portion 
of the UK population care deeply about the welfare of some animals.  
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In a 2017 study (N = 4028) which asked UK participants which 
charitable causes they had given to in the past 4 weeks, animal welfare 
charities were the second highest recipients of charitable donations (24%), 
second only to medical research (26%) (Charities Aid Foundation, 2019). 
Moreover, those same participants gave more money to charities that seek to 
improve the welfare of animals, than to charities aimed at children or young 
people (23%), hospitals (23%), or overseas aid and disaster relief (23%). In 
the same study, looking at the proportion of donations given in the past 4 
weeks, only religious organisations, and overseas aid and disaster relief 
received a higher portion of donations (19% and 12% respectively); medical 
research, hospitals and animal welfare charities received the same amount 
(8% of total donations in) (Charities Aid Foundation, 2019). In that same 4 
week period, animal welfare charities received more money than charities for 
children and young people (7%), homeless people (7%), physical and mental 
health (6%), conservation and the environment (5%), disabled people (%5), 
the elderly (3%), or education (2%) (Charities Aid Foundation, 2019).  
There is little empirical psychological research on why people choose 
to donate to animal welfare over other competing human organisations. The 
little research conducted suggests that women (Neumayr & Handy, 2017); 
people who are more empathetic (Bennett, 2003); more left wing (Neumayer, 
2004); more responsive and protective of others (Sargeant, Ford, & Hudson, 
2008); and who have low religious attendance (Neumayr & Handy, 2017) are 
more likely to give to animal welfare charities than human charities. When 
people do donate to animal charities, one study has shown that using negative 
imagery of a dog in a shelter (guilt appeal) is more effective than using positive 
imagery of a happy dog (warmth appeal) on intention to donate money and 
time to an animal welfare organisation (Haynes, Thornton, & Jones, 2004).  
In summary, people in the UK care greatly about the welfare of cats and 
dogs, donating approximately £80 million annually to animal welfare charities. 
Further, it is striking that people choose to donate significantly more money to 
animal welfare charities than they do to human charities such as those that 
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care for children, the elderly, or the homeless. Beyond moral concern for the 
welfare of pets, people are also interested in wildlife and marine animals. 
Documentaries. From children’s books, such as Winnie the Pooh and 
Peter Rabbit, to the BBC’s The Planet Series (a comprehensive TV docuseries 
on wildlife presented by Sir David Attenborough, including Blue Planet, Frozen 
Planet and Planet Earth), people are fascinated and awe struck by wildlife and 
nature. There are many different examples of TV shows on animals that detail 
our interest in animal life, however, we focus on the recent 2017 documentary 
series by Sir David Attenborough, Blue Planet II, to illustrate people’s interest 
in wild animals. Blue Planet II, sequel to The Blue Planet, debuted in the UK 
in October 2017 and was watched by over 14 million people – one in five Brits 
(BBC , 2018) . Blue Planet II not only received numerous awards, winning Best 
Sound and Best Photography at the 2018 British Academy Television Craft 
Awards, but was also the most watched TV show of 2017 (BBC , 2018). That 
is, more people tuned in to watch an educational documentary about marine 
life, over any other TV screening of news, sports, fashion, or reality-TV. While 
Blue Planet II had amazing footage of marine life, it was also a documentary 
series aimed at ocean conservation, and the impact that human life is having 
on the ocean (e.g., plastic waste in the ocean, the bleaching of coral reefs). Sir 
David Attenborough discussed the negative impact humans are having on the 
earth’s oceans, and urged viewers to change their behaviour to help save the 
marine life as we know it. Considering Blue Planet II was an educational 
documentary series about the wonders of life in the oceans and the ways in 
which humans are harming them, the UK public clearly are fascinated by, and 
care about, the welfare of some animals in addition to pets. 
 
1.3 Negative Human-Animal Relations 
Just as there are different positive human-animal relations, there are 
also many different negative human-animal relations. For the remainder of this 
chapter, we provide an overview of direct negative human-animal relations 
beginning with the animal agriculture industry. In the second part of this 
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section, we give an overview of the indirect negative relationships people have 
with animals, using the example of meat consumption. 
1.3.1 Direct negative human animal relations: the animal 
agriculture industry. There are myriad ways in which humans directly harm 
animals, and together these constitute a widespread inequality. Humans tend 
to harm animals for one of four reasons; for food, fun, fashion, or science 
(Piazza, Cooper, & Slater-Johnson, 2019). In the UK, people harm animals for 
food in the meat and dairy industry. Animals are harmed for fun and 
entertainment in the horse/dog racing industry, in foxhunting, and in zoos and 
aquariums. People harm animals in the fashion industry e.g., leather, wool, fur, 
and people also harm animals for science in medical testing (Piazza, Cooper, 
& Slater-Johnson, 2019; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). While there are 
unfortunately many examples of the ways in which humans harm animals, this 
thesis focuses on the animal agriculture industry as an example of direct 
negative human-animal relations as it is the largest and most widespread way 
in which humans exploit animals (Intensive Farming in The UK by Numbers, 
2019).  
Animal Agriculture Industry. The animal agriculture industry is where 
the most harm is done to animals both in the UK, and around the world (Pig 
Welfare, 2019). This is primarily due to the large number of animals that are 
killed for food, but also due to the extensive suffering they experience 
throughout their lives (UK Government, 2019). The animals most commonly 
farmed in the UK for food are cows, pigs, sheep, and chickens, which together 
contribute over £8 billion to the UK economy annually (British Meat Processors 
Association, 2019). Every year, the UK kills about 2.5 million cows, 10 million 
pigs, 14 million sheep, 800 million fish, and 1 billion birds (e.g., ducks and 
chickens) (Humane Slaughter Association, 2019). To put those numbers into 
perspective, killing two billion animals each year is equivalent to killing 5.5 
million animals every single day, or killing the entire population of the UK (66 
million) every 12 days. 
While there are many people involved in the animal agriculture industry, 
just a small minority work in slaughterhouses (British Meat Processors 
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Association, 2019). Further, within slaughterhouses only one or two people are 
usually responsible for stunning and killing the animals (Humane Slaughter 
Association, 2014). Indeed, there are many people involved in the animal 
agriculture industry who do not personally harm the animals. Farmers who rear 
animals, and truck drivers who transport animals, can be kind and decent 
people who look after the animals as best they can while they are under their 
care. Even farmers that work on factory farms, and subject animals to harsh 
treatment, do not necessarily have strong negative attitudes towards animals, 
they are likely simply trying to make a living. We believe that most people 
involved in animal agriculture do not hate animals and are not motivated to 
hurt them. Instead, they are likely trying to earn money and so their financial 
position in the marketplace is more likely the motivation behind their behaviour 
than prejudice or speciesism.  
While the killing of animals in the UK is a grotesque example of the dark 
side that humans possess, the people (overwhelmingly men) who work in 
slaughterhouses are themselves often victims of the animal agriculture 
industry (MacNair, 2002). The working conditions in an average 
slaughterhouse are generally very grim. Surely, few (if any) young men grow 
up with the aspiration to spend their working days killing animals. In addition 
to the violent act of killing, the smell of blood, and the sounds of heavy 
machinery, the squealing pains of suffering animals surely weigh heavy on the 
shoulders of slaughterhouse workers. Perhaps then, it is not surprising that 
meat-processing plants find it difficult to recruit people to work in these 
conditions. Of the 75,000 people who work in slaughterhouses and meat 
processing plants in the UK, less than 30% are UK nationals (British Meat 
Processors Association, 2019). The remainder of the workforce is comprised 
largely of EU nationals - 69% of slaughterhouse and meat processing workers. 
By their own admission, the British Meat Processors Association (2019) note: 
“The common barrier to British people taking up roles in meat 
processing is an unwillingness to work in what is perceived to be a 
challenging environment. Most people, while they eat meat, find it 
difficult to work in its production partly because of the obvious aversion 
to the slaughter process” (Meat Industry Workforce, 2019). 
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Considering the violent nature of the work, there is very little research 
on the psychological consequences for people who kill animals for a living. In 
a recent study using 10,605 Danish workers, it was reported that compared to 
43 other occupations, slaughterhouse workers had greater alcohol 
consumption, felt less rested in the morning after a day’s work, were less likely 
to feel able to be working that job in 2 years’ time, had lower work attendance 
due to sickness and days off, and had the lowest level of meaning from their 
work (Baran, Rogelberg, & Clausen, 2016). Other studies have found an 
association between working in meat processing factories and 
slaughterhouses, and the consumption of the highly addictive drug 
methamphetamine (Hendrix & Dollar, 2018), and excessive cigarette smoking 
(which subsequently results in an increased risk of lung cancer) (Kristensen & 
Lynge, 1993). In addition to increased drug consumption and cigarette use, 
slaughterhouse workers show increased anger, anxiety, and psychotism 
(aggressive and interpersonal hostility) (Emhan, Yildiz, Bez, & Kingir, 2012), 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Victor & Barnard, 2016), and excessive 
absenteeism as a coping strategy (Kristensen, 1991) when compared with 
other professions. There are also numerous physical dangers involved when 
working in slaughterhouses, such as cuts from knives, falls on slippery floors, 
sore muscles and tendinitis from repetitive daily use (Dillard, 2008). Further, 
these negative occupational consequences are not restricted to those who 
work within slaughterhouses, as people who work with animals before they 
arrive at the slaughterhouse, such as farmers and truck drivers, are also at risk 
of adverse psychological consequences (Malmberg, Hawton, & Simkin, 1997). 
In this section, we have described the largest direct negative human-
animal relationship; the animal agriculture industry. We described the high 
number of animals killed in the UK each year, and the few studies which have 
explored the psychological consequences of directly killing animals. While 
research on slaughterhouse workers is an important aspect of the psychology 
of human animal relations, it is also a very rare one. There are perhaps only a 
few hundred people in the UK who kill animals in slaughterhouses, yet there 
are millions of British people who benefit from this, and eat the meat of those 
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animals. Importantly, most meat eaters could not bring themselves to kill 
animals (Dillard, 2008), and so rely on others to do this for them. This group of 
individuals who like animals and do not want to harm them, but also pay others 
to kill animals on their behalf make up the vast majority of the UK public, and 
are the group we turn to for the remainder of this chapter. 
1.3.2 Indirect negative human animal relations: The meat paradox. 
The psychological tension between strongly caring for some animals (e.g., 
dogs), and being indifferent towards others (e.g., pigs), has been termed the 
meat paradox, and is the focus of this section. Most people in the UK eat meat, 
but most people have never, and will never have to, kill an animal to eat that 
meat. People in the UK often purchase their meat from supermarkets that is 
free from any bones, skin or blood – meat is, free from reminders of the meats 
origin (Kunst & Hohle, 2016). Alternatively, people consume meat at cafes and 
restaurants, which has additionally been cooked, seasoned and presented in 
a palatable fashion (Kunst & Hohle, 2016). For most people in the UK, meat is 
both psychologically and geographically removed from its origins as a living 
animal, and what happens to animals during this the process is absent for most 
meat eaters. In fact, most people in the UK have positive feelings towards 
animals as outlined in Section 1.2. As discussed previously, people donate 
money to animal welfare charities and regularly watch wildlife documentaries 
about the world and its animal inhabitants. In addition, people are also 
interested in animals in the wild, and people are fascinated and awestruck by 
animality as can be seen in the 30 million people visiting Irish and British zoos 
and aquariums each year (British and Irish Association of Zoos and 
Aquariums, 2019) (Whitworth, 2012). This fascination and moral concern for 
some animals is sharply contrasted with the UK’s indifference toward the plight 
of other animals, such as the farmyard animals and fish that suffer in the animal 
agriculture industry. In contrast to the scant psychological research of directly 
harming animals (e.g., on people who work in slaughterhouses), there is a 
wealth of knowledge about the psychological consequences of indirectly 
harming animals (e.g., eating meat). The research on the psychology of eating 
meat fits into three categories: the eaten (animals), the eaters (meat eaters), 
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and the eating (the act of eating). There are psychological consequences of 
eating meat for each of these groups; that is, perceptions of meat animals, 
perceptions of humans, and perceptions of meat eating. We will discuss each 
of these three groups in turn.  
The eaten (animals). Technically all animals are edible and yet the UK 
diet of meat is comprised largely of three animals; cows, pigs, and chickens 
(British Meat Processors Association, 2019). The reason for this is twofold. 
Firstly, farmers over millennia have selected animals for docility, meaning that 
herbivorous mammals such as cows and pigs can be kept in herds together, 
and are largely not dangerous to the people who farm them (Darwin, 2004). 
Secondly, possessing a mind or the capacity to suffer is a key characteristic 
required for attributing moral concern to others (Bentham, 1789). Because 
humans have evolved to afford moral concern to entities which possess 
humanity (Plous, 1993), or a complex mind, those animals which are dissimilar 
to humans and are deemed mindless (e.g., pigs) are considered edible whilst 
those deemed to have a complex mind are not (e.g. chimpanzees). In the UK, 
it is taboo and illegal to eat chimpanzees or dogs, even though chimpanzees 
and dogs are as edible as pigs (and are eaten without concern in other 
cultures). In this instance, chimpanzees are seen to be less edible because 
they pose more of a threat to farmers than pigs, are more like humans than 
pigs, and are deemed more intelligent than pigs (Ruby & Heine, 2012). 
Similarly, dogs are also more dangerous than pigs, are seen to be more similar 
to humans when domesticated, and are deemed more intelligent than pigs, 
(despite evidence illustrating that dogs and pigs have similar levels of 
intelligence) (Mendl, Held, & Byrne, 2010).  
There is empirical evidence that humans see meat animals as 
possessing less mind than animals that are not eaten, and that when classified 
as meat animals, people attribute a lesser mind to an animal. In one study, 
people were asked to rate the edibility and capacity for mind for 32 different 
animals (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012). The researchers found 
a strong negative relationship between mind attributions, whereby animals that 
are more intelligent are deemed less edible. The relationship between mind 
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attribution and edibility has been shown to be malleable to simple 
characterizations of animals as either meat animals or not. For example, in 
another study participants were given a novel animal (Bennetts Tree 
Kangaroo) and told that it either lived in the wild or was used as food 
(Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Compared to the animal that lived in 
the wild, participants saw the animal that was used as food as having less mind 
and afforded the animal less moral concern.  
Intergroup contact theory shows that, for humans under certain 
conditions, contact with a human outgroup can foster more positive outgroup 
perceptions, reduce dehumanization of the outgroup, and improve moral 
concern for the outgroup (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). In short, contact helps to 
reduce stereotypical and heuristic thinking, and people appreciate others as 
more ‘fully human’ after interacting with them. Recent research has shown that 
the positive consequences of intergroup contact can also be illustrated 
between humans and animal outgroups (Loughnan, Davies, Zaharieva, Kinga, 
& McLatchie, 2019). We took 50 people to Gorgie city farm in Edinburgh – a 
small petting zoo – and measured their perceptions of animals before and after 
the visit. Participants spent 30 minutes playing with different animals, and had 
close positive contact with meat animals such as sheep and pigs. We found 
that following contact with meat animals, participants thought the animals had 
more complex minds, attributed more moral concern to meat animals, showed 
a reduction in their justifications for eating meat, but fell short of showing a 
reduced commitment to eating meat. Like the geographical disconnection 
between the production and slaughter of animals in the UK, people also think 
about meat and animals somewhat independently – we could shift attitudes 
about animals, but not attitudes about meat consumption.  
We replicated these effects using an imagined contact paradigm (Crisp 
& Turner, 2009) in which participants imagined meeting a lamb at a petting zoo 
(as they had in the previous field study). We found the same results: compared 
to control condition participants that imagined a nature scene, participants that 
imagined having contact with a lamb thought lambs had more complex minds, 
attributed more moral concern to meat animals, showed a reduction in their 
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justifications for eating meat, but again fell short of showing a reduced 
commitment to eating meat. As before, this illustrated that perhaps people 
think of animals and meat consumption as being independent of one another. 
In sum, people think about meat animals in a motivated fashion; animals 
that we eat are conveniently seen as less mindful and less deserving of moral 
concern than animals that we do not eat (Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). And for 
most people, this occurs in the absence of actual knowledge about animal 
intelligence (Mendl, Held, & Byrne, 2010).  
The eaters (people). While our perceptions of animals changes as a 
function of whether those animals are exploited, there are also differences in 
the traits and characteristics of people who do and do not eat meat. Of course, 
people who eat meat and people who do not are not a dichotomous group; 
different people eat different amounts of meat; some people are conflicted 
about eating meat whereas others are not. However generally, those who tend 
to eat more meat tend to be more masculine, and observers also think that 
men who eat meat are more masculine (Rothgerber, 2013; Ruby & Heine, 
2011). Meat can be used by men to both signal and exercise masculinity and 
consequently meat is viewed as a masculine food choice (Rozin, Hormes, 
Faith, & Wansink, 2012). In addition, meat is also more commonly consumed 
by the political right, and by people that score higher in social dominance 
orientation (a measure of preference and support for human hierarchical 
inequality) (Dhont & Hodson, 2014). In short, hyper-masculinity, political 
conservatism and social dominance are traits associated with eating more 
meat, whereas femininity, political liberalism social egalitarianism are 
associated with eating less meat, or abstaining from eating meat altogether 
(e.g., vegetarianism and veganism). It is noteworthy that while eating meat is 
associated with hyper-masculine men and political conservatism, most 
politically left-leaning people, and most women in the UK also eat meat, albeit 
to a lesser degree. 
There are four key justifications that people routinely give to justify their 
meat eating behaviour – the four N’s. People say that it is (1) natural to eat 
meat (i.e., our ancestors ate meat), (2) necessary to eat meat (i.e., we need to 
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eat meat for health reasons), (3) normal (i.e., everyone eats meat), and (4) that 
it is nice to eat meat (i.e., meat is delicious) (Piazza, et al., 2015). The four N’s 
of meat eating justifications help people reduce the dissonance that arises 
from both wanting to care for and wanting to eat (and therefore kill) animals 
(Piazza, et al., 2015).  
The eating (meat consumption). Compared to the previous two 
sections on the eaten (animals) and the eaters (people), there is relatively less 
research on the psychology of eating meat. What is known is that following the 
consumption of meat, people are more likely to think that animals are less 
mindful and are less worried about their moral concern (Loughnan, Bastian, & 
Haslam, 2010). Further, in another study, even anticipating meat consumption 
led participants to see cows as less mindful and less worthy of moral concern 
(Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012). Taken together, these two 
studies provide initial evidence that people psychologically navigate the 
consumption of meat both before and after the fact.  
The product-production disconnection between meat and harming 
animals is an additional factor that influences meat consumption. Because 
most people who eat meat do not partake in the slaughter of animals, and 
because the processing of animals (farms, slaughterhouses and butchers) are 
paced on the outskirts of cities, most people can go their whole lives without 
having to come face to face with the origins of their meat  (Bastian & Loughnan, 
2017). Recent research exploring the connection between meat and its animal 
origins reported that participants were less likely to be empathetic towards 
animals killed for human consumption when the carcass was presented 
without a head, compared with when the head was still present. Further, 
participants were less likely to consume meat when paired with a visual of the 
living animal (i.e. the origins of the meat) (Kunst & Hohle, 2016; Kunst & 
Haugestad, 2018). In short, the physical act of eating meat has psychological 
consequences for our perceptions of and moral concern towards animals.  
1.4 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, we wanted to show both the good and the bad of human-
animal relations, the conflicting views about different animal species, and the 
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psychological gymnastics at work when we exploit animals. Indeed, human-
animal relations span the absolute best and worst of human behaviour. We 
began by describing the love and attention people give to their pet animals, 
their willingness to support charities, documentaries aimed at improving animal 
welfare, the legal protection given to pet animals, and the punishments people 
receive for harming pets in the UK. We illustrated how many people in the UK 
care deeply about the welfare of animals such as cats and dogs, and how 
empathetic and compassionate humans can be towards the plight of suffering 
animals, such as stray dogs.  
We then contrasted this compassion with the darker side of human-
animal relations. In the second half of this chapter, we presented examples of 
direct and indirect negative human animal relations. We used the meat 
industry as an example of direct negative human animal relations. We 
described the vast scale of the killing that occurs in the UK. We then discussed 
the slaughterhouse industry, and showed how only a small proportion of 
people that work with animals are also responsible for their killing. In addition, 
we discussed the few empirical studies that have examined the psychological 
impact of killing animals for a living. Finally, we gave an overview of the large 
body of work exploring the psychology of meat eating. We looked at the profile 
of those who are more likely to eat meat (e.g., hyper-masculine, conservative 
men), and those who are less likely to eat meat (left wing, egalitarian women). 
We then discussed the meat paradox, and how the psychology of eating meat 
involves seeing meat animals as mindless animals beyond the realm of moral 
concern.  
While this chapter has described human-animal relations and the 
psychological impact of these, there also exists a body of theoretical work that 
offers further psychological insights as to why these relations might exist in the 








Chapter Two: Psychological Theories of Human-Animal 
Relations  
2.1 Chapter Overview 
In the first chapter, we provided an overview of contemporary human-
animal relations in the UK. In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the 
psychological theories that have been applied to human-animal relations, and 
describe how each theory falls short of answering whether human-animal 
inequality is foundational to human inequalities. We first describe Social 
Identity Theory which reveals how we think about the social categories of 
‘animals’ and ‘humans’ has an impact on human-animal relations. We next 
show how the literature on stereotyping and prejudice has informed our 
understanding of human-animal relations, and how human-animal relations 
has in turn advanced the stereotype and prejudice literature. System 
Justification Theory is discussed which reveals the possible role of 
justifications in the exploitation of animals. We conclude the chapter with a 
Cognitive Dissonance Model of explaining morally troublesome human-animal 
relations. 
2.2 Social Identity Theory  
The social groups that we identify with, or distance ourselves from, in 
part define how we perceive ourselves and the social world around us (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986; Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979). According to Social 
Identity Theory (SIT), people seek out positive social identities that improve 
their self-esteem by seeing one’s ingroup in a more favourable light than other 
outgroups. Social Identity Theory is therefore an intergroup perspective by its 
very nature. Consequently, SIT is also relevant to human-animals relations. 
The terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’ create distinct social categories, and promote 
intergroup attitudes towards ‘humans’ and all other ‘animals’. For example, 
recent research by Amiot and Bastian (2017) has shown that people’s 
solidarity with animals in general is positively related to their moral concern for 
some animals. Conversely, emphasizing differences between humans and 
animals can foster group distinctiveness and facilitate dis-identification with 
animals (Amiot et al., 2017). In short, people’s attitudes towards the social 
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categories of ‘humans’ and ‘animals’ are relevant to people’s moral concern 
for animals, and underline the relevance of social identity theory and self-
categorization theory for human-animal relations.  
2.3 Stereotype Content Model 
A psychological theory that has gained significant attention in the past 
two decades is the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002). The SCM proposes that perceptions and treatment of others can 
be explained largely along the two dimensions of competence (efficacy, skill, 
creativity, confidence, and intelligence) and warmth (trustworthiness, sincerity, 
kindness, and friendliness) (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008). According to 
SCM, social groups and individual members of social groups tend to be seen 
to have either high or low levels of both competence and/or warmth. For 
example, drug addicts are seen to be low in both competence and warmth; 
stay-at-home mums are seen to be both high in both competence and warmth; 
Asians are seen to be high in competence but low in warmth; and the elderly 
are seen to be high in warmth but low in competence (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 
2008).  
The SCM has also recently been used to explore perceptions of animals 
along the same dimensions of warmth and competence. Research has shown 
that rats and mice are seen to be low in competence and low in warmth; pet 
animals such as cats and dogs are seen to be both high in warmth and high in 
competence; predator animals such as tigers are seen to be low in warmth but 
high in competence; and farm animals such as pigs are seen to be high in 
warmth but low in competence. These animal stereotypes are also predictive 
of behavioural reactions towards animals, in line with the Behaviour from 
Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map (BIAS Map) (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 
2007). Specifically, the Bias map suggests that the position of animals on the 
warmth dimension predicts whether the animal is protected (such as dogs 
because they are seen to be warm) or killed (such as foxes who are hunted). 
In addition, competent animals are thought to be worth preserving (e.g. 
elephants), whereas animals which are perceived to be incompetent (e.g. 
chickens) are treated with apathy and neglect by the public. The SCM has a 
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large body of empirical support from various labs around the world. For 
example, neuroimaging results show decreased activation in areas of the brain 
associated with social cognition, when participants are asked to think of people 
who are seen as low in both competence and warmth, such as drug addicts 
and the homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006).  
2.4 Speciesism and Dehumanization  
The psychological and philosophical prejudice literature has informed 
our understanding of human-animal relations. More than simply being similar 
to each other, racism and speciesism are conceptually identical (Singer P. , 
1995). Both racism and speciesism involve an intergroup ‘us versus them’ 
mentality; the distinctions between the ingroup and the outgroup are arbitrarily 
set by the oppressor. It is the oppressor who claims that (1) there is a 
difference between the two groups, and (2) that this difference is morally 
relevant. In the case of racism, the difference between the ingroup and the 
outgroup is often based on appearance (e.g., skin colour) and the behaviour 
of the outgroup (i.e., they are backwards, and we are not). Similarly, for 
speciesism, the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup is based 
upon appearance (i.e., they have wings) and the behaviour of the group (they 
fly, and we do not). Speciesism, like racism, represents motivated reasoning 
which both justifies and enables the ill treatment of other beings (humans or 
animals), allowing the oppressors to think of themselves in a positive light – 
they (humans or animals) do not matter because we are superior, and they are 
inferior. In addition, racism and speciesism are both forms of prejudice which 
involve hierarchical group thinking – we are superior and morally worthy, they 
are inferior and not morally worthy (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). In short, 
psychologists and philosophers have drawn on the human prejudice literature 
to shed light on the ill treatment of animals, which has in turn improved the 
prejudice and dehumanization literature.  
2.5 Right Wing Authoritarianism 
In addition to the specific prejudice of speciesism outlined in the 
prejudice literature, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been shown to 
relate to human-animal relations. RWA is an individual difference measure 
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capturing the extent to which people are conventional, aggressive towards 
social deviants, and submit to authority (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988). Right Wing 
Authoritarians tend to be prejudiced towards outgroup members and 
particularly towards members of groups which are perceived to be dangerous 
or dissident (Whitley, 1999). For example, research has shown that RWA is 
strongly associated with prejudice towards drug users and drug dealers, 
violent criminals, terrorists (i.e., dangerous groups), people who criticize 
authority, people who protest, prostitutes and feminists (i.e., dissident groups) 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Right Wing Authoritarians also tend to be prejudice 
towards African Americans, Native Americans, and women in general 
(Altemeyer, 1998). Prejudice towards these groups reflects right wing 
authoritarians’ worldview that the ingroup is competing with outgroups which 
threaten the social and moral fabric of society (Whitley, 1999). Research has 
also shown that people who are higher in RWA also support the exploitation of 
animals, and consume more meat than people who are lower in RWA. In 
addition, people higher in RWA also have more negative views of people who 
abstain from the meat-eating norm (e.g. vegetarians and vegans) and who 
therefore represent a challenge to the dominant meat-eating way of life.  
2.6 Social Dominance Orientation 
In addition to RWA, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is another 
individual difference measure of generalized prejudice that has informed 
research on human-animal relations. SDO captures the view that intergroup 
relations in society are inherently competitive. SDO also measures the 
preference for group-based hierarchy over egalitarianism, and the view that 
one’s ingroup should be superior to, and should dominate, outgroups (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). People who are 
higher in SDO tend to be prejudiced towards derogated outgroups such as 
unattractive people, racial outgroups, the mentally ill, immigrants, housewives, 
Arabs, and the unemployed (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Prejudice towards these 
groups reflects socially dominant peoples’ worldview that the ingroup is 
competing with outgroups in a zero-sum game of dominance and submission. 
SDO is a key social psychological theory and individual difference measure 
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which captures generalized prejudice towards human outgroups and is 
relevant to human-animal relations because animals are another ‘group’ that 
people who endorse SDO justify exploiting (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Caviola, 
Everett, & Faber, 2018; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). 
2.7 Interspecies Model of Prejudice 
Racism has been used throughout history to justify numerous atrocities, 
in numerous cultures (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). A core aspect of racism is 
dehumanization – the denial of humanity to people of other races (Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014). Racism and dehumanization have a long history together 
because prejudice towards racial outgroups has often been coupled with 
perceiving and treating human outgroups as less than human (Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014). Dehumanization is concerning due to its association with 
moral concern: we reserve morality and respect for those we classify as 
‘human’, and therefore perceiving or classifying other humans as non-human 
strips them of moral concern (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Racial 
dehumanization is therefore fundamentally tied to our perceptions and 
treatment of animals.  
Over the last decade, the Interspecies Model of Prejudice (IMP) has 
empirically shown that prejudice towards humans is related to prejudice 
towards animals: the more negatively someone thinks of animals, the more 
likely they are to hold negative views of human outgroups (Hodson, Kteily, & 
Hoffarth, 2014). Drawing on SIT, a core aspect of the IMP is the belief in a 
human-animal divide – the belief that humans are distinct from, and superior 
to animals (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). In their seminal research, 
Costello and Hodson (2009) found that undergraduate Canadian students’ 
beliefs that animals and humans were similar (i.e., rejecting the human-animal 
divide) was associated with immigrant humanization (i.e., seeing immigrants 
as more fully humans). That is, the less participants thought humans were 
distinct from animals (i.e., rejecting the human-animal divide), the less they 
dehumanized immigrants. In study 2 of the same paper, the authors 
manipulated human-animal similarity using editorials that either emphasized 
the similarities or emphasized the differences between humans and animals. 
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Having participants read editorials describing how animals were similar to 
humans resulted in greater immigrant humanization than participants that read 
about how humans were similar to animals, or the human-animal divide 
(Costello & Hodson, 2009).  
This research suggests that the framing of comparisons is incredibly 
important, whereby the humanization of animals (i.e. animals are similar to 
humans) could have a positive bearing on the perceptions of outgroups, whilst 
the dehumanization of humans (i.e. humans are similar to animals) might not.  
Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and Hodson (2012) replicated and extended this 
research and found that closing the human-animal divide by comparing 
animals to humans (but again not comparing humans to animals) improved 
Canadian undergraduates moral concern for marginalized outgroup members 
(Asians, Aboriginals, Black people, Muslims, and immigrants). Together, these 
first two studies reveal how closing the human-animal divide can have 
important benefits for seeing immigrants as more human, and for extending 
moral concern to numerous human outgroups who often experience prejudice 
(Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012).  
Additional research has shown that belief in the human-animal divide is 
present in children, and that ideological orientations usually used to consider 
human intergroup relations (such as social dominance orientation) are 
important predictors of animal attitudes. For example, Costello and Hodson 
(2014) found that beliefs in the human-animal divide are present among White 
Canadian children aged as young as 6-10 years old, and that their beliefs in 
the human-animal divide predicted dehumanization of Black children. In 
addition, the children’s’ parents level of SDO predicted the children’s 
dehumanization of other children indirectly through the child’s belief in the 
human-animal divide. This research shows neatly that the belief that humans 
are distinct from and separate to animals is developed from a young age in 
children. In addition, this research shows the impact that parents beliefs about 
human intergroup relations (as measured by SDO) can have on their children’s 
beliefs about human-animal relations (which in turn predicts dehumanization 
of outgroups).   
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Taken together, these three studies show that raising animals up to the 
status of humans can improve humanization of human outgroup members 
such as immigrants and racial outgroups. Conversely, drawing attention to the 
ways in which humans are animal-like does not improve immigrant 
humanization. Finally, these three studies show the ways in which drawing a 
line and putting humans above animals has negative consequences for how 
we think about human intergroup relations. Importantly, the IMP has both 
drawn on, and informed the human prejudice literature by showing that 
speciesism is psychological construct that can predict the dehumanization of 
humans.  
2.8 Social Dominance – Human Animal Relations Model 
Another psychological theory that has advanced our understanding of 
human-animal relations is the Social Dominance – Human Animal Relations 
Model (SD-HARM). While the IMP documents the association between the 
human-animal divide and outgroup dehumanization, the SD-HARM model 
shows that human-animal and human outgroup perceptions are best explained 
by individual differences in SDO. Dhont, Hodson, Costello, and MacInnis 
(2014) first illustrated this with Canadian undergraduates when they showed 
that speciesism was related to ethnic prejudice towards Black people, ethnic 
minorities, Aboriginals and Muslims. Importantly, they subsequently illustrated 
that this correlation was non-significant when controlling for individual 
differences in SDO. Importantly, alternative models such as ethnic prejudice 
explaining the link between speciesism and SDO were also tested and ruled 
out. That is, it was the group-based hierarchies in both speciesism and ethnic 
prejudice that share their roots in SDO.  
Extending their work, Dhont, Hodson, and Leite (2016) conducted three 
studies (in the UK, USA, and Belgium) that tested their SD-HARM model which 
posits that it is SDO in particular that best explains the link between speciesism 
and racism. They found in all three studies that SDO – as opposed to RWA – 
is the key factor connecting racism and speciesism. Dhont, Hodson, and Leite 
(2016) also conducted their own meta-analysis across their three studies 
providing additional support for their model. Taken together, the SD-HARM 
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shows empirically that attitudes towards animals and human outgroups may 
share a common origin in individual differences in SDO. However, the SD-
HARM model is not equipped to explain why people who are low in SDO, 
indeed people who are not racist nor prejudice, still participate in morally 
troublesome behaviour such as consuming meat. It is likely that the SD-HARM 
models prediction that reducing SDO will reduce racism and speciesism would 
work for people with pre-existing high levels of SDO, but not for people with 
pre-existing low levels of SDO who still consume meat and other morally 
troublesome products.  
2.9 System Justification Theory 
Another psychological theory that explains negative or unequal 
intergroup human relations – but that does not centre on active prejudice – is 
System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Whereas 
RWA and SDO posit that people hold worldviews that benefit the self and the 
ingroup, and which constitute outgroup prejudice (Altemeyer, 1988; Sidanius 
& Pratto, 2001), SJT posits that another key factor of unequal intergroup 
relations is the tendency for people to justify the status quo, irrespective of 
whether they benefit from it or not (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). SJT theorists 
argue that people are motivated to rationalise and justify their position in 
society and use System Justification to explain their (positive or negative) 
place in the world (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). SJT is therefore relevant to 
human-animal relations because people might use it to justify their 
participation in the widespread exploitation of animals. In two large samples 
(N = 1500; N = 2119), Hoffarth, Azevedo, and Jost (2019) found that system 
justification mediated the relationship between political conservatism and 
animal welfare attitudes, even after controlling for SDO. In study 2, they found 
that political liberalism was associated with support for animal welfare and less 
speciesist attitudes, and that system justification mediated these results. Due 
to the justifications people have for the exploitation of animals, System 
Justification Theory has provided a useful additional ideology which helps 
explain the relationship between human relations (e.g., political conservatism) 
and human-animal relations (e.g., animal welfare attitudes). Recently, Caviola, 
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Everett, & Faber (2018) found that speciesism was positively related to both 
racism and sexism in American participants. They replicated the IMP and SD-
HARM finding that speciesism was related to two key ideological constructs 
associated with prejudice of humans (SDO and RWA), however, they also 
revealed that speciesism was positively related to System Justification Theory.  
2.10 Cognitive Dissonance Model of human-animal relations  
The final theory we discuss in this chapter draws on Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) and provides the best psychological 
explanation for eating meat. In a recent paper, a novel theory about the 
psychology of eating meat was proposed. It describes how deep the product-
production disconnection goes, and how everyday people that think of 
themselves in a morally good light, are able to participate in the morally 
troublesome behaviour of eating meat (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). Because 
most people are motivated to see themselves in a good light, when concerns 
about the welfare of animals is brought up, meat eaters face a moral dilemma 
and experience cognitive dissonance due to their wanting to eat meat (which 
necessitates harming animals) but not wanting to harm animals (Festinger, 
1957). One way to reduce this dissonance is to stop eating meat. For most 
people, however, dissonance is reduced in (a combination of) four other ways.  
Firstly, people tend to reduce cognitive dissonance from meat eating by 
denying animals the capacity to suffer – if animals cannot feel pain in the way 
humans do, then their suffering does not matter as much (Piazza & Loughnan, 
2016). Second, people reduce dissonance by justifying their behaviour using 
the four N’s of meat eating; it’s (1) necessary, (2) natural, (3) normal and (4) 
nice (Piazza, et al., 2015). Thirdly, people justify their meat eating behaviour 
by emphasizing how responsible their meat eating is. They might limit their 
meat intake, or only eat certain types of meat (such as organic or free range, 
or alternatively only eat fish). In using these justifications, people begin to see 
their meat eating in a positive and moral light (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). In 
addition, stereotypes that people who do not eat meat (i.e. vegetarians and 
vegans) are weight conscious, feminine and liberal, serve to discredit the 
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alternative. That is, people are more hesitant to change their meat eating 
behaviours as the alternatives are not as socially desirable. 
The theory posited by Bastian and Loughnan (2017) is particularly 
interesting in that they outline how repeatedly reducing dissonance arising 
from eating meat can lead to an increase in the behaviour and can further 
embed meat eating into social norms. In effect, the immorality of meat eating 
begins to disappear (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). For instance, the more 
normalized meat eating is in a culture, the less time and effort people have to 
spend dwelling on whether eating meat is immoral at all, and subsequently the 
more meat eating becomes habitual and does not evoke dissonance. That is, 
meat eating becomes entrenched in culture and becomes normalized, as it has 
in the UK (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). 
While there is a psychological disconnect between product and 
production, there is also a geographical disconnect which helps take the moral 
pressure off consuming meat. While there are good economic reasons why 
animal farms reside in the outskirts of town, there is no logistical reason why a 
slaughterhouse could not be on the main street on a city centre (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017). Indeed, the animal agriculture industry is an extremely 
wealthy industry and could easily afford to pay rent on the most expensive 
streets in a town centre (British Meat Processors Association, 2019). This 
would also be good advertising for the meat processing companies, as people 
would become more familiar with them over time. Slaughterhouses are of 
course kept as far away from places that sell meat (such as cafés, restaurants, 
and butchers) as possible, and for good reason. The geographical distance 
promotes psychological disconnect between meat and its animal origins. That 
is, slaughterhouses are kept geographically away from the sale of meat, in the 
hope that slaughterhouses are kept psychologically away from meat too. The 
geographical and psychological distance between meat and slaughter is an 
essential and lucrative aspect of the meat industry because the distance 
makes it easier for meat eaters to buy and consume meat without feeling 
conflicted about the consequences of their behaviour. The Cognitive Dissonant 
Account of morally troublesome behaviour is a theory with strong exploratory 
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power and one that can be used to explain numerous morally troublesome 
behaviours beyond the scope of meat eating.  
2.11 Chapter Summary 
The psychological theories we have mentioned contribute to the 
literature on human-animal relations in different and complimentary ways. For 
example, Social Identity Theory can explain why people think favourably about 
their ingroup (humans) and more negatively towards the outgroup (animals). 
In addition, the Stereotype Content Model predicts warmth/ competence 
attributions of animals; the Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes 
map differentiates between active prejudice determined from perceiving 
animals as cold and passive indifference towards animals determined from 
seeing animals as incompetent. Theories of generalized prejudice can explain 
why people who are socially dominant or conservative support animal 
exploitation; the Interspecies Model of Prejudice shows that racial 
dehumanization is related to the human-animal divide; the Social Dominance 
Human Animal Relations Model suggests that individual differences in Social 
Dominance Orientation connect prejudicial human and human-animal 
perceptions. However, despite their contributions, no existing psychological 
theories can predict whether human-animal inequality is foundational to human 
inequalities.  
In addition, the psychological theories which draw connections between 
the treatment of animals and the treatment of people (IMP and the SD-HARM) 
both restrict their analyses of mistreatment of humans to discrimination of 
racial and religious outgroups in a national context. We maintain that there are 
broader ways of mistreating humans – beyond racial and religious 
discrimination – which may be connected to the mistreatment of animals. 
Accordingly, the third and final introductory chapter will provide an outline for 








Chapter Three: The foundation of inequality 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we discuss how there are human inequalities that may 
be related to the mistreatment of animals beyond the previously studied racial 
and religious discrimination. Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick’s (2008) BIAS Map 
suggests that perceptions of warmth predict whether people will be welcomed 
and protected, or alternatively, seen as competition and treated with hostility. 
In addition to warmth, those high in competence are thought to be worth 
respecting because of their social status. Conversely, those low in competence 
are treated with apathy and neglect; they are seen to have low social status 
and are not worth protecting. The BIAS Map differentiates between active 
prejudice determined from warmth (i.e. towards groups seen as cold and 
unwelcoming, such as immigrants), and passive indifference determined from 
competence (i.e. towards groups seen as incompetent and low in social status, 
such as drug addicts or the homeless).  
The previous psychological research on the connection between 
human-animal and human relations has only explored the relationship 
between human-animal relations and active human forms of prejudice. That is, 
active prejudice such as racism and prejudice towards religious outgroups in 
a national context. However, this chapter reveals that there are additional 
human relations, which are relevant to the study of human-animal relations, 
which take the form of passive indifference at both the national and 
international level. After providing two examples of passive human relations 
(the drug addict inequality and the Bangladesh inequality) which are similar to 
human-animal inequality, we then ask if both human-animal and human 
inequalities are conceptually similar. If so, is one foundational to the other? 
Finally, and crucially, we question whether reducing the foundational inequality 
could collapse the edifice of inequality itself. 
3.2 The Drug Addict Inequality 
Research shows that drug addicts are some of the most vulnerable and 
abused groups in the UK (Buchanan & Young, 2000). Drug addicts experience 
disproportionately more Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). For 
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example, during childhood they are more likely to have experienced physical, 
sexual or emotional abuse, neglect, and are more likely to have lived in a 
household experiencing domestic violence, incarceration or illicit drug use 
(Brewer, Catalano, Haggerty, Gainey, & Fleming, 1998). Despite this 
increased likelihood of childhood trauma, as a group, drug addicts are 
systematically persecuted by the state (Buchanan & Young, 2000) and 
dehumanized by the public (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In short, there 
is a widespread and systematic inequality between drug addicts and users, 
and those who consume legal drugs; an inequality that the Government 
promotes and the public is complicit in through their indifference to the plight 
of drug users and drug addicts (United Nations, 2005). In this section, we 
suggest that the widespread persecution and imprisonment of the drug 
addicted population constitutes a inequality similar to human-animal inequality 
outlined in chapter one. 
There are many different types of drugs available for consumption, from 
those that are widely available and socially acceptable (e.g. alcohol), through 
to those that are controlled substances (prescription drugs), to those that are 
illicit and frowned upon (e.g. cannabis). These drugs are categorized as either 
legal (e.g. alcohol) or illegal substances (e.g. cannabis), but not necessarily 
because of how troublesome for society or for users these drugs are (Nutt, 
King, & Phillips, 2010; UK Home Office, 2007). For example, research 
consistently shows that alcohol (legal) is more problematic for society in terms 
of consequences for both users and society, than any illegal drug including 
heroin, amphetamines, cannabis, and ecstasy (Nutt, King, & Phillips, 2010). 
The divide between legal and illegal drugs is therefore not informed by 
empirical research (Nutt, King, & Phillips, 2010). The arbitrary classification of 
drugs as legal or illegal, alongside the persecution of those in possession of 
such ‘illegal drugs’ reflects a concerted effort on the part of the government, 
the media, the licit drug industry (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry and the 
alcohol industry) to promote the regular ingestion of some drugs (e.g. alcohol 
or prescription drugs), while demonizing the use and the users of other drugs 
(e.g. cannabis, cocaine or heroin) (UK Government, 2019). While there is a 
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considerable government effort to stop illegal drug use in the UK, the 
government’s criminalization of drugs and attempt to curb drug use is relatively 
recent. People tried and even frequently used drugs in the UK throughout the 
20th century. However, it was not until the 1980s following the introduction of 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the de-industrialization of Britain’s labour 
intensive ship building and factory communities, and a switch from the upper 
to the lower classes taking drugs, that drugs actually became seen as a 
‘problem’ for the UK (Buchanan & Young, 2000; Waley, 2005). In fact, it was 
the upper echelons of society; doctors, dentists, academics, physicians, and 
aristocrats who first demanded the importation of cocaine into the UK in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries (Streetfield, 2002).  
While there can be positive effects of using illegal drugs, such as the 
pleasant effects of consuming drugs recreationally or the recent increase in 
cannabis use to manage chronic pain, drug addiction is associated with 
numerous negative mental and physical health outcomes (Weaver, et al., 
2003). For example, a systematic review found that the use of cannabis was 
dose-dependently associated with increased risk of psychotic symptoms 
(Moore, et al., 2007). Opiate users are at risk of developing blood-transmitted 
diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis, from sharing needles and having 
unprotected sex with infected drug users (Joe & Simpson, 1995; Zaric, Barnett, 
& Brandeau, 2000). Further, the cognitive impairment that can accompany 
drug use can impede decision-making and can cause aberrant behaviour 
(Wesley, Hanlon, & Porrino, 2011; Verharen, et al.). While those addicted to 
drugs may experience an array of ill mental and physical costs associated with 
their drug use, an unfortunate number of drug users also experience overdose-
related deaths. Taken together, drug use is at the heart of thousands of deaths 
each year. In 2015 for example, there were 3000 reported drug related deaths 
in the UK (90% heroin overdose; 74% male deaths), up 50% from the 2000 
deaths reported in 2006 (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction, 2019). There is also a significant crossover between drug addiction 
and homelessness, with many drug addicts also being homeless. It is likely 
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that both drug addiction leads to homelessness, and homelessness facilitates 
drug addiction (Galea & Vlahov, 2002). 
In brief, after continued and escalated use, drug users can become 
addicted to drugs and suffer a host of negative mental and physical health 
outcomes (Brewer, Catalano, Haggerty, Gainey, & Fleming, 1998). Drug 
addicts therefore constitute a vulnerable human population that need help and 
support from the state – however, this is far from how drug addicts are treated 
in the UK. Although an increasing number of scholars see drug addiction as a 
health problem, and the World Health Organisation and United Nations have 
recommended that it is treated as such (World Health Organization, 2017), the 
UK government continues to deal with drug addiction as if it were a criminal 
problem (Buchanan & Young, 2000). The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 are the main laws that regulate drug control in the 
UK. These laws distinguish between different classes of drugs (A, B, or C), 
each having different costs to people and society, and different legal penalties 
for possession or intent to supply the drug. The consequences for those caught 
in possession of these substances can include imprisonment. Ironically, being 
isolated from their normal social relationships in this way can lead to an 
increase in drug taking behaviour following release from prison (Buchanan & 
Young, 2000). Who then, are the drug addicts that police are imprisoning in 
their efforts to curb drug use in the UK?  
Both drug use and drug addiction are more common among males in 
the UK (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2019). For 
example, of the people seeking help for drug problems in England, 89% are 
male, and 74% of drug related hospital admissions are male (National Health 
Service, 2019). Beyond being male, there are additional individual differences, 
such as sensation seeking and impulsivity, that contribute to drug addiction in 
the UK (Le Bon, et al., 2004). More recently, Adverse Childhood Experiences 
(ACEs) such as living with an adult who uses drugs, experiencing neglect as 
a child, or being physically or sexually abused as a child, have all been shown 
to strongly predict the trajectory from recreational drug use to drug addiction 
(Dube S. R., et al., 2003; Gauffin, Vinnerljung, Fridell, Hesse, & Hjern, 2013; 
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Zarse, et al., 2019). The profile of the average drug addict; a vulnerable man 
that has likely experienced trauma and instability as a child, and has likely 
grown up in poor socio-economic circumstances. This is very different to the 
stereotype of the drug addict as a dangerous criminal that should be 
imprisoned (Buchanan & Young, 2000; House of Commons, 2018). Further, if 
drug addicts are using drugs to numb or comfort psychological pain 
experienced in their childhood, adolescence, or adult life (i.e. to self soothe), 
then they constitute a particularly vulnerable population who deserve to be 
treated with respect and dignity, not persecution and punishment.  
3.2.1 Dehumanization of drug addicts. Just as the government 
stereotypes drug addicts as criminals, the public tends to do the same. 
Research shows that people dehumanize drug addicts and drug dealers by 
seeing them as less than human, and therefore beyond the realm of moral 
concern. Research suggests that people stereotype drug dealers as cold and 
incompetent; they lack warm interpersonal skills and intelligence (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In short, drug addicts are seen to be less than 
human (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In fact in the research, participants 
thought that drug dealers were three standard deviations below the mean of 
all other groups on a measure of warmth, underscoring that drug dealers were 
identified as the most unfriendly, poor intentioned and untrustworthy target 
group, more so than homeless people, welfare recipients, Muslims, and Black 
people (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  
Following the research on the dehumanization of drug dealers, the 
dehumanization of drug addicts has been measured using fMRI techniques. 
This research revealed that images of drug addicts (and the homeless) failed 
to elicit activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area of the brain 
associated with social cognition (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In the same study, 
viewing pictures of drug addicts increased activation of the amygdala, 
suggesting that drug addicts not only fail to elicit social cognition, but 
additionally are seen to be disgusting (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Combined, this 
means that people in the UK see drug addicts as beyond the realm of moral 
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concern and therefore fail to recognise the plight of drug addicts, much like the 
apathy people have for farm animals in the UK. 
Additional research on social connection has found that, compared to a 
control condition, experimentally inducing people to feel socially connected to 
others leads to the dehumanization of drug addicts (Waytz & Epley, 2012). The 
research suggests that peoples’ attribution of mind towards drug addicts is in 
part related to how socially connected people feel, and the more people 
already feel connected to others, the less they feel the need to consider the 
minds and wellbeing of drug addicts. Other research has suggested that 
dehumanization of drug addicts is in part due to individual differences in 
motivation to avoid emotional exhaustion (Cameron, Harris, & Payne, 2016). 
In study 1, participants anticipated experiencing more emotional exhaustion 
from helping drug addicts compared to a homeless person, whereas study 2 
experimentally manipulated emotional exhaustion and found that higher 
anticipated emotional exhaustion (compared to a control condition) was 
associated with dehumanization of drug addicts (Cameron, Harris, & Payne, 
2016).  
Taken together, these studies first reveal that the public dehumanizes 
both drug dealers and drug addicts; seeing them as incompetent and 
untrustworthy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In addition, research into the 
dehumanization of drug addicts reveals that drug addicts do not elicit the same 
level of social cognition that is elicited by other human groups (Harris & Fiske, 
2006), and that the dehumanization of drug addicts is a form of motivated 
reasoning. People are more likely to dehumanize drug addicts when they 
already feel socially connected, and thus do not wish to seek out more social 
connections (Waytz & Epley, 2012), particularly when they feel as though 
connecting with drug addicts would be emotionally exhaustive (Cameron, 
Harris, & Payne, 2016). 
3.2.2 A concerted effort. We began this section on the drug addict 
inequality by differentiating between legal and illegal drugs, and giving an 
overview of the rates of illegal drug use in the UK. We then outlined the health 
and legal consequences of drug use in the UK and described those who are 
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most likely to become addicted to drugs. We also provided four empirical 
psychological studies that demonstrate the dehumanization of drug dealers 
and drug addicts. We now consider how each of the parts covered in the 
previous sections comprise the drug addict inequality. We do this by illustrating 
the concerted effort by numerous parties (such as the government and the 
media) to persecute drug addicts in the UK. Over the past half century, the UK 
government has declared and executed a war on drugs. The reality of that 
failed campaign has been countless deaths (from violent crime and from 
overdoes), increases in the UK prison population, increases in the number of 
people in the UK who consume illegal drugs and increases in the number of 
drug addicts in the UK. One may ask the question then, why does the UK 
government continue its pursuit of waging war on drug users and drug addicts? 
While a comprehensive answer to that question is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, what is clear is that this human inequality has great similarities with 
human-animal inequality we discussed earlier.   
Firstly, much like human-animal inequality, for most people the drug 
addict inequality is beyond the remit of their daily lives. While we may see a 
drug addict begging for money, or overdosed and unconscious on a UK 
pavement, for the most part, people can go through their day without 
witnessing the problem, never mind recognising the inequality. After all, a 
significant portion of the population (largely conservatives), tend to see drug 
addicts as a dangerous group of criminals, not a vulnerable group of people 
worthy of helping. The left leaning portion of the population is likely more 
sympathetic to drug addicts’ plight, as they are more sympathetic to animals’ 
plight, however sympathy only goes so far. For most people, on all sways of 
the political spectrum, drug addicts remain out of sight, and consequently out 
of mind. Just as most people do not stop and think about the suffering of 
animals, possible alternatives to that suffering, or how their behaviour 
contributes to that suffering; so too most people do not stop and think about 
the suffering of drug addicts, possible alternatives to that suffering, or how their 
behaviour contributes to that suffering. Unlike human-animal inequality 
whereby the consumption of animal products, such as meat, contributes to the 
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suffering of animals, it is peoples’ apathy and indifference towards the suffering 
of drug addicts, indeed their lack of behaviour, which perpetuates the drug 
addict inequality. 
Secondly, just as human-animal inequality is perpetuated by people 
who have a stake in the status quo (such as the meat industry), many people 
benefit from drug addict inequality. Specifically, some people in the legal drug 
industry (i.e., the pharmaceutical industry, and the alcohol industry) have 
extremely high stakes in keeping the classification of drugs just as they are. 
Because people purchase their legal drugs to provide the relief or comfort that 
might be otherwise provided by illegal drugs, the alcohol and pharmaceutical 
industries have a stake in maintaining the war on drugs. In addition, 
conservative governments are motivated to keep drug classification and drug 
laws as they are (if not stricter) to please conservative voters that are more 
likely to dehumanize and stereotype drug addicts as dangerous and unhelpful 
criminals that ‘are simply breaking the law and need to be punished’ 
(Altemeyer, 1981). Make no mistake, the drug addict inequality, much like 
human-animal inequality would be difficult to change in the UK. Nevertheless, 
the way we treat drug addicts – or more accurately how we as a society fail to 
properly care for drug addicts – constitutes a widespread inequality, whereby 
a vulnerable population are unjustifiably persecuted by the government, all the 
while the public stands back and does little to intervene. Indeed, as we saw in 
chapter one, people are more likely to donate money to sick cats and dogs in 
the UK than to humans that are addicted to drugs (Charities Aid Foundation, 
2019). 
3.3 The Bangladesh Inequality 
In the previous section, we illustrated how the persecution of drug 
addicts constitutes a widespread inequality that is similar to human-animal 
inequality. However, like the previous research connecting human and human-
animal relations, the drug addict inequality is also a national inequality. In 
extending the theorizing on human-animal relations, we now consider the ways 




Most, if not all, people in the developed Western world regularly 
consume products produced overseas, and more often than not, produced in 
developing countries. Usually, people are completely unaware of the 
production process of those products (Cadwalladr, 2019). For example, when 
we purchase clothing, mobile phones, computers, cars, or even when we fill 
up the fuel tank of our cars, we know little, if anything, about how that product 
came to be (Rank a Brand, 2019). Specifically, we do not know the suffering 
and harm required to produce the products we purchase (Transparency 
International, 2019). There are of course undoubtedly benefits along the way 
of production as well (such as providing employment), however, these are well 
considered in the literature on sustainable consumption (Siddiqi D. M., 2009). 
While there are many different examples of morally troublesome consumption, 
we use the example of the clothing industry in this thesis, with a focus on the 
Bangladesh clothing industry. The aim of this section is to illustrate the 
conceptual similarities between human-animal inequality and the inequality 
apparent in the Bangladeshi clothing industry. 
Like meat consumption that exploits animals, people can 
simultaneously think of themselves as morally good people, and can have 
positive attitudes towards foreigners, all the while indirectly exploiting third 
world labour (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). In this way, consuming morally 
troublesome products mirrors the meat paradox we outlined in chapter one. 
For example, both the consumption of clothing and meat can cause 
unnecessary suffering to millions of living beings (or billions in the case of the 
meat industry). Whilst animals in factory farms face poor, stressful conditions, 
the same is true for those who work in sweatshops: sweatshops are generally 
characterised by very unsavoury and unsanitary conditions, poor lighting, poor 
ventilation, and are generally stressful and very uncomfortable (Ahmed, 2004).  
Both the consumption of clothing and the consumption of meat is driven 
by developed countries around the world, such as the UK (War on Want: Sixty 
Years Fighting Global Poverty, 2019).Unlike direct forms of violence, the 
consumption of clothing and meat is not motivated by the hatred of the groups 
that will suffer. Instead, the industries continue to thrive due to passive 
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indifference (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). More specifically, because of the 
way in which the animal agriculture and the clothing industry operate, there is 
a concerted effort by the industries to shield the reality of the production of both 
meat and clothing from consumers; the product-production disconnect. 
However, unlike the psychology of meat eating, there is very little empirical 
psychological research on attitudes towards sweatshop workers, the 
psychological profile of people who purchase sweatshop clothing, or the 
psychology of purchasing and wearing sweatshop clothing.  
3.3.1 Fast Fashion. The fashion industry is the third largest industry in 
the world, behind the food and technology industries (Fashion Revolution, 
2019). Altogether, fashion is a £32 billion industry for the UK (UK Parliament, 
2019). People in the UK consume clothing at rates higher than anywhere else 
in Europe, and the UK fashion industry employs around one million people, 
largely working in retail clothing stores (UK Parliament, 2019). The way fashion 
is produced has changed in the past few decades. Once an industry 
characterized by the production of high quality garments made to last, the 
advent of fast fashion in the 1980’s saw the development of cheap, low quality 
garments, manufactured as fast as possible (hence the name ‘fast fashion’) 
(UK Parliament, 2019). This clothing is often purchased in the developed world 
(including the UK) with the intention of it only being worn a few times, or 
possibly only once, before being thrown away (Fashion Revolution, 2019). The 
production of fast fashion – or disposable fashion as it has also been termed 
– is particularly concerning due to the consequences it has on working 
conditions and the environment. Fast fashion is produced in sweatshops – 
textile manufacturing plants, usually producing clothes, shoes, and outdoor 
equipment such as tents and backpacks – often in developing countries where 
labour is plentiful and (perhaps unethically) cheap, land is inexpensive, and 
environmental and workers protections are either non-existent or not enforced 
(Fashion Revolution, 2019). While both the human and environmental 
consequences of the global fashion industry are concerning, we will focus on 
the human consequences; though environmental considerations are 
important, such as the amount of water used for farming cotton, or the 
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chemicals spilled into waterways from the dye in clothes (UK Parliament, 
2019), they are beyond the scope of this thesis. While there is a fair amount of 
research describing the positive benefits of sweatshop labour to developing 
nations, such as providing work for women, increasing GDP, providing 
innovation and economic development (Siddiqi D. M., 2009), the negative 
consequences of sweatshops are most relevant to this thesis. 
3.3.2 Bangladesh Clothing Production. The Bangladesh garment 
industry began manufacturing clothes for export in 1976, after Bangladesh 
(then East Pakistan) won its independence from Pakistan in 1971 (then West 
Pakistan) (War on Want: Sixty Years Fighting Global Poverty, 2019). Following 
the deregulation of markets, privatisation of industry, and the country opening 
up to foreign investment, the garment industry in Bangladesh skyrocketed. The 
industry currently stands at about 80% of total exports for the country, and 
today is the world’s second largest exporter of clothing, following China (The 
New York Times, 2019). In terms of numbers, there are approximately 5000 
sweatshops in Bangladesh. In terms of humans, approximately 3 million 
people (85% female) work in the garment industry, with the vast majority 
working in exploitative sweatshops. These women work long, 12-16 hour days, 
and often 6-7 days per week, for very little money. For example, the average 
monthly wage for a woman making clothes in Bangladesh (to be sold in the 
UK), is about £20-£30; this is even low compared to the local living wage.  
Many Bangladeshi women begin working in sweatshops at a young 
age, leaving school before their tenth birthday to support their families (UK 
Parliament, 2019). The early age of beginning work in Bangladesh contributes 
to the very low literacy level in sweatshop workers; in one study of 1000 
women, only 22% had finished secondary school (War on Want: Sixty Years 
Fighting Global Poverty, 2019). While some Bangladeshi children work in 
sweatshops to help their family financially, other young girls are kidnapped and 
trafficked into the fashion industry, a concern that the UK government is aware 
of (UK Parliament, 2019). In addition to poor working conditions, poor pay, and 
child slavery, Bangladeshi women and girls also face harassment and violence 
at work, with 70% reporting being sworn at during work; 40% being beaten or 
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hit in the face at work; 30% reporting being touched inappropriately at work; 
and 30% of women reporting threats of being forced to undress in front of their 
male bosses as a punishment. In summary, women working in sweatshops in 
Bangladesh work long, miserable hours, in hostile conditions, are subject to 
sexual and physical abuse, and are scared to leave for fear of their economic 
situation (Synder, 2010). The cramped working conditions in the Bangladeshi 
garment industry, alongside the industries negligence towards the welfare of 
the garment workers came to a head on the 24th April 2013, when a large 
building containing multiple sweatshops collapsed, killing 1134 people, and 
injuring a further 2500 people (UK Parliament, 2019). Just as alarming as the 
unfortunate deaths of these victims of the Bangladesh sweatshop industry, is 
that the sweatshops produced clothing that likely supplied the UK market (UK 
Parliament, 2019).  
The meat paradox revealed that we consume meat from animals we 
deem mindless and beyond the realm of moral concern. However, regarding 
the consumption of morally troublesome clothing from sweatshops, there has 
been no empirical psychological research on perceptions of sweatshop 
workers. It is therefore unknown whether people are conscious of where their 
clothing is made, or whether they are willing to consume clothing from 
countries whose inhabitants they can dehumanize. This could be an interesting 
line for future research but unfortunately was beyond the scope of this 
research. Of course, Bangladeshi people also consume clothes, and the UK 
also produces clothing (and even has its own history of sweatshops), but 
largely the clothing industry today is driven by consumption of clothing in the 
developed world, that was produced in developing nations (UK Parliament, 
2019). Given the scarcity of work on perceptions of people who produce 
sweatshop clothing, this thesis provides an important contribution by 
examining another group of vulnerable people in society whom are oppressed. 
3.3.3 UK Clothing Consumption. Due to the grey areas surrounding 
the definition of a sweatshop, there are no figures on the number of garments 
produced by sweatshops that are purchased in the UK. Similarly, the definition 
of a factory farm is elusive and as such the line between factory farmed meat 
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and ‘ethically sourced’ is blurred. As a result, there is no information available 
that breaks down meat consumption by source. This is not entirely 
unintentional, as it suits both industries for the customer to be unaware of the 
origin of the product they have purchased. Despite this, it is safe to say that 
the vast majority of clothing purchased and worn in the UK comes from 
sweatshops (UK Parliament, 2019). Consequently, it is useful to look at total 
consumption of clothing that gives an indication of sweatshop consumption. 
Women are the main drivers of the demand for sweatshop labour in terms of 
the number of items of garments purchased (Statista, 2019). In 2018, UK 
women purchased 1 billion items of clothing, comprised of 57 million jackets; 
183 million dresses; 203 million blouses; 201 million sweatshirts; and 321 
million pairs of trousers (Statista, 2019). In comparison, UK men, purchased 
half of what women purchased in 2018.  
Though we know that women consume more sweatshop clothing than 
men, there are also demographic and psychological characteristics that make 
people more likely to consume sweatshop clothing. For example, research in 
the fields of sustainability and decision making suggests that there are ‘socially 
responsible consumers’ who are interested in where their products come from, 
and whether they are fair trade or sustainably sourced. However, it is estimated 
that these consumers make up 30% of the population at most (Roberts 1995). 
These socially responsible consumers tend to be well-educated, middle aged 
with a high income, and can therefore afford to pay the higher prices that often 
accompany more ethically produced goods (Carrigan & Attalla 2001). Socially 
responsible consumers tend to have stronger feelings of obligation and 
accountability towards others, which can influence their purchasing decisions 
(Shaw and Clarke 1998). They also tend to be more liberal and more 
environmentally friendly, and believe that their individual choices have a 
prosocial impact (Roberts, 1995). They are also more altruistic (Koschate-
Fischer, Stefan, & Hoyer, 2012), more socially conscious (Auger, Devinney, 
Louviere, & Burke, 2008), and more concerned with child labour and fair wages 
(Öberseder et al. 2011). Because of their concern with production, socially 
responsible consumers are more likely to seek out information about clothing 
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companies to find out whether they are supplied by sweatshops (Cherrier, 
2007). 
However, while there is evidence that there exists a profile of the 
socially responsible consumer, there is no empirical evidence that illustrates 
to what extent socially responsible attitudes have a reliable impact on 
decisions to consume morally troublesome products (Beckmann, 2007). The 
literature shows that even socially responsible consumers still consider price, 
quality, and the style of products, and might still consider purchasing the 
‘unethical’ product, even if there was an ethical alternative. For instance, if the 
price or the style of the ethical product was unsuitable, or if they were 
unconvinced by retailers that say their clothing is ‘ethically produced’ (Mohr, 
Webb, & Harris, 2001). 
In the meat paradox, we described the psychological mechanisms that 
help people to reduce dissonance that arising from the consumption of meat. 
Similarly, there are psychological mechanisms that facilitate the purchase and 
consumption of morally troublesome products such as sweatshop clothing. 
Like the meat paradox, people who consume sweatshop clothing likely do so 
despite having no negative feelings towards the workers, and likely have a 
host of justifications at their disposal to reduce any dissonance that arises from 
consuming clothes produced in this unethical way. In addition, the 
consumption paradox is primarily reduced by the private sector, who do their 
best to make their customers feel good about their morally troublesome 
behaviour (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). We will now discuss how dissonance 
may be reduced by the individual, followed by how dissonance reduction is 
outsourced. 
Like the meat paradox, people likely hold a suite of psychological 
defence mechanisms to reduce the dissonance that arises from the morally 
troublesome consumption of fast fashion. However, there is no empirical 
research aimed at exploring the justifications people might give for consuming 
sweatshop clothing. Despite this, we can speculate as to what types of 
justifications people might give. We think that the justifications that people 
would use to purchase sweatshop clothing would concern the economic and 
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social benefits sweatshops can bring. For example, people are likely to 
reference the benefits that sweatshop factories could bring to national 
economies and the economic benefits that purchasing clothing would bring to 
the fashion industry in the UK. Further, people might argue that sweatshops 
can provide economic opportunities and the subsequent empowerment of 
women who work there, in addition to providing jobs for people working in the 
UK. Moreover, similar to the 4N’s which people commonly give to justify eating 
meat (Piazza, et al., 2015) (i.e., that eating meat is natural, normal, necessary, 
and nice), it is also likely that people would justify their consumption of 
sweatshop goods in a similar fashion. That is, they would likely say that 
purchasing sweatshop clothing is necessary and normal, and that having new 
clothes is nice (Campbell, 1997). 
For the everyday shopper, it is likely that industry and social norms 
alleviate the need for exercising dissonance reduction strategies, because 
modern society is set up in such a way that consumers do not have to 
experience dissonance in the first place. Whether someone is buying meat or 
shopping for clothes, the shops that sell these products are very careful in what 
they associate their products with at the time of purchase (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017). Both the sale of meat and the sale of clothes is associated 
with the happy consumer – in both clothing stores and supermarkets, you will 
find images of people consuming the products, but never the reality of 
production (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). Whereas industries like vegetable 
farmers, or ethical clothing manufactures would be proud of the production and 
processing of their goods, the clothing stores would never advertise the 
sweatshops, nor would the meat industry advertise the factory farms.  
3.3.4 Three caveats. There are three important differences between 
the consumption of clothes and the consumption of meat. In meat 
consumption, the animals are the product, and so while perceptions of meat 
and animals are psychologically disconnected, they are not completely 
removed, as most people know that beef comes from cows, pork comes from 
pigs, and poultry comes from chicken. It is noteworthy that we have names for 
meat products such as beef, pork and poultry so that we can talk about meat 
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without even mentioning the animal origins of the meat. However, with 
sweatshop clothing, the product and production may be even more 
psychologically disconnected. That is, if we buy clothing but do not look at the 
tags, then we have no idea what country produced that garment. 
Consequently, our perceptions of sweatshop workers in Bangladesh are likely 
to be psychologically distinct from our attitudes towards sweatshop clothing, 
perhaps even more so than the disconnect between attitudes towards animals 
and attitudes towards meat. For example, some people may not even be aware 
that Bangladesh produces clothing, let alone has numerous sweatshops that 
supply the fashion industry in the UK. Therefore, people do not need to 
dehumanize Bangladeshis or have prejudice towards them to justify harming 
them – they might not even realise they are doing it. They can purchase 
sweatshop clothing from Bangladesh without knowing anything about its 
origins, and thus without feeling morally conflicted at all.  
Clothing consumption is also different from meat consumption in that 
people are constantly wearing clothing in public, and so while meat eating 
happens for a short time during a meal, clothes are a constant in social life. 
Because clothing is so prevalent in society, even more so than meat, it is even 
easier for it to become normalized. However, we might always see clothing but 
we never see the factories. It is because of this disconnect between product 
and production, and because of the pervasiveness, that morally troublesome 
products like meat and clothing go unchecked on our moral radar. We think 
morally about stealing clothes, or borrowing clothes, or giving clothes to charity 
– all things that we may do ourselves - but because the factories are out of 
sight, the victims are out of mind for most of us, and we do not see purchasing 
sweatshop clothing as an immoral action. 
The third and perhaps redeeming feature of the UK fashion industry is 
that the UK parliament has acknowledged the damaging effects it can have, 
and the UK’s role in perpetuating that industry. In 2015, the UK signed up to 
the United Nations sustainable development goals, one of which (number 12) 
is to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. The UK 
government has called into question many large UK companies, and is vocal 
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about reducing the UK’s involvement in the sweatshop industry. Therefore, 
unlike the animal agriculture industry, the UK government has positioned itself 
as a critic of the fast fashion industry. Thus, the concerted effort to promote 
the global fashion industry is one promoted by the media, private sector, the 
consuming public of the UK, and the sweatshop owners overseas, but not the 
UK government. 
To sum, we have shown how conceptually similar the drug addict and 
Bangladeshi sweatshop inequalities are to human-animal inequality. We have 
given an overview of the drug addict inequality, and shown the ways in which 
the general public’s indifference to the persecution of drug addicts is similar to 
the public’s indifference to the exploitation of animals. We then gave an 
overview of the Bangladesh clothing industry and the Bangladeshi people who 
are exploited by that industry. Finally, we discussed the conceptual similarities 
between the indifference people have towards consuming sweatshop clothing, 
and the indifference people have towards consuming meat. We now spend the 
remainder of this chapter illustrating what these conceptual similarities might 
mean. 
3.4 The Foundation of Inequality 
It is possible that, beyond conceptual similarities between human-
animal and human inequalities, the psychological mechanisms driving these 
processes are the same or are overlapping. For example, both the drug addict 
inequality and human-animal inequality are left unchecked by an apathetic 
public who are indifferent to the suffering of these groups in the UK. In addition, 
both animals and drug addicts are groups of individuals that people would not 
normally harm directly, and we also maintain that we believe that people who 
are indifferent to the suffering of animals or drug addicts are often kind and 
considerate people in everyday life. Unfortunately, both animals and drug 
addicts are seen to be lacking humanity; they are seen to be mindless beings 
that are not worth thinking of, or helping; their suffering is not as important as 
our suffering.  
We have also shown how conceptually similar the Bangladesh 
sweatshop industry and the animal agriculture industry are, whereby both 
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industries involve the exploitation of vulnerable groups for the benefit of the 
business owners who profit, and the consumers who can purchase cheap 
products. We have shown that only a minority of people directly oppress both 
animals or sweatshop workers, and that the systems are perpetuated in large 
part by the indirect role that consumers play in demanding cheap products 
(meat and  clothing), and the indifference they have towards methods of 
production. We think that most people who consume sweatshop clothing are 
also kind and considerate people in everyday life, and that the consumption of 
those goods is not a reflection of prejudice, but indifference. In fact, we would 
expect to see the consumption of sweatshop clothing coupled with positive 
attitudes towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers – most people do not 
consume morally troublesome products because they have animosity towards 
those whose labour is exploited, but rather most people simply fail to consider 
them at all. We have also suggested that we believe consuming sweatshop 
clothing is only an example of a wider phenomenon of consuming morally 
troublesome products. Finally, we outlined how society is set up in such a way 
that consumers seldom experience dissonance from purchasing morally 
troublesome goods, and that clothing consumers, like meat eaters, likely have 
a suite of dissonance reduction strategies at their disposal.  
Beyond similarities, it is possible that the psychological processes 
behind the human-animal and human inequalities reinforce each other: if the 
lesson learnt from navigating the meat paradox is that preferences for meat 
are worth more than the life of an animal, what might this do for my preference 
in clothing? If I can justify an animal being killed just because I like the taste, 
then it is likely that I can rationalise leaving a drug addict passed out on the 
street without concern for their welfare: if I did not directly harm anyone then I 
am still a morally good person. The consequences of such a connection 
between these inequalities may be that the support for one inequality could 
inadvertently perpetuate the other. Previous research has shown that 
challenging the human-animal divide can reduce both speciesism and 
prejudice towards racial and religious outgroups. However, this previous 
research has not fully explored whether human-animal relations are 
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foundational to human relations because they have not tested their hypotheses 
in the alternative direction: examining whether challenging human inequality 
also has a positive impact on human-animal relations. 
Identifying the foundational inequality would be an important theoretical 
advance for the psychology of human-animal relations. There are many 
different academics, artists, activists, and many others who are trying to 
improve the welfare of vulnerable human populations – but what if their efforts 
are hindered by human-animal inequality; what if efforts to improve the moral 
concern towards vulnerable human populations are being eroded by the 
apathy we exercise when we consume animal products? Or perhaps the 
foundation of inequality could be our apathy towards humans? Is our apathy 
towards animals driven by our apathy towards vulnerable human populations? 
While each are plausible, we hypothesize that it is human-animal relations 
which are foundational to human inequalities because human-animal 
inequality is long-lasting, and the most violent inequality found all around the 
world.  
By foundational, we reasoned that people’s attitudes towards many 
inequalities would hinge off one central (or foundational) inequality that they 
use as a psychological reference for the level of care they give to various 
groups in society. In other words, the ‘foundational’ inequality could also mean 
a ‘guiding’ inequality which guides the relative level of concern for other 
inequalities on a hierarchy of concern. The foundational theory presupposes 
that attitudes towards various inequalities are connected, either in a cognitive 
network or cognitive hierarchy. Upon reflection, we appreciate that this was 
quite an assumption to make, and future research could in fact explore whether 
people do cognitively represent various inequalities in such a fashion. 
Nevertheless, if it is possible to identify that one inequality is 
foundational to other inequalities, then efforts to reduce systematic inequality 
can be better targeted. We then might see a domino effect whereby support 
for other inequalities are inadvertently reduced through the reduction of 
support for the foundational inequality. 
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We thought that the foundational hypothesis was a theoretically 
plausible one, and potentially better approach than the existing alternative of 
the SD-HARM model (Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). As outlined in Chapter 
2, the SD-HARM model proposes that the latent third variable of SDO is 
foundational to both animal and human forms of prejudice. However, we 
hypothesized that it is more likely that there is an inequality (i.e. human-animal 
inequality) which is foundational to other inequalities for 2 main reasons. First, 
as mentioned above, we hypothesized that support for inequalities were 
cognitively connected to each other in such a fashion that there would be one 
form of inequality which support for other inequality would hinge off. In other 
words, we hypothesized there would be a ‘guiding’ inequality which people use 
as a cognitive reference to infer their support for other inequalities. Secondly, 
we reasoned that the SD-HARM model is theoretically limited and cannot 
explain the behaviour of those people who are low in SDO and yet are still 
apathetic to the plight of others (such as drug addicts and sweatshop workers). 
It is important to note that those who are low SDO are a sizable portion of 
people for which the SD-HARM model does not accurately predict their 
concern for various forms of inequality. Therefore the SD-HARM’s blanket 
approach to inequality (i.e. using generalized prejudice as the key predictor) is 
limited in its usefulness because it simply does not explain why people who 
are not overtly prejudiced (e.g. low SDO people) still participate in widespread 
inequality such as the treatment of animals and drug addicts. However, we did 
acknowledge that SDO was an important variable to consider in this topic on 
human-animal and human inequalities. We therefore chose to measure SDO 
in all our studies so we could see the effect of the manipulations on support for 
inequality whilst holding constant individual differences in SDO. We chose to 
use SDO as a covariate instead of a moderator so that we could first identify 
whether the foundational effect was present when holding SDO constant. we 
simply wanted to first isolate the (any) effect of the manipulations on support 
for inequality as a first step in this line of research. We appreciate the 
usefulness of using SDO as a moderator and suggest that research could 
51 
  
benefit from examining SDO as a moderator in research on human-animal and 
human inequalities in the future. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
In this research, we have both correlational and experimental 
hypotheses. Using correlational analyses, we can determine whether people 
who support human inequalities are also likely to support other human, and 
human-animal inequalities. We expect that support for all the human and 
human-animal inequalities that we measure will be positively correlated. That 
is, people who are likely to be indifferent to the suffering of one human group 
are also likely to be indifferent to the suffering of another human group. In 
addition, people who are indifferent to the suffering of humans are also likely 
to be indifferent to the suffering of animals. Our foundational hypothesis will 
examine whether support for human-animal inequality is a better predictor of 
support for human inequalities, than other human inequalities. We think 
human-animal inequality will be foundational to human inequalities because of 
the severity of human-animal inequality: animals must be killed for meat, but 
people do not have to be killed to exploit their labour, and so human-animal 
inequality is inherently more violent.  
To further examine whether human-animal inequality is the foundational 
inequality, we also have an experimental foundational hypothesis. Because 
previous research has suggested that challenging people’s human supremacy 
beliefs could be a fruitful avenue to explore in human-animal relations research 
(Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014), we will challenge participants’ beliefs in 
human supremacy over animals, and then measure their endorsement of the 
human-animal and various human inequalities. We will also challenge 
participant’s beliefs in supremacy in a human population that is oppressed, 
and measure endorsement of the same human-animal and human 
inequalities. We will find empirical support for our experimental hypotheses if 
we find that challenging human supremacy can reduce the endorsement of 
both human-animal and human inequalities; and if we also find that challenging 
a form of human supremacy does not reduce endorsement of human-animal 
inequality. To be more specific, the pattern of results that would confirm the 
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hypothesis would be both: a) challenging human-animal supremacy would 
reduce support for both human-animal inequality and human inequalities; and 
b) challenging human-human supremacy may reduce support for that human 
inequality, but it would not also reduce support for human-animal inequality. 
However, we will not have found empirical support for our hypotheses 
if we find that challenging human supremacy can mitigate endorsement of 
human-animal inequality, or if challenging human supremacy over animals 
fails to reduce the endorsement for human-animal inequality. To be more 
specific, the pattern of results that would disconfirm the foundational 
hypothesis would be a) challenging human-animal supremacy may reduce 
support for human-animal inequality but it would not also reduce support for 
human inequalities; and b) challenging human-human supremacy would 
reduce support for that human inequality, and it would also reduce support for 
human-animal inequality. Further, the pattern of results reflecting neutral 
support for the foundational hypothesis would be the occurrence of either (a) 
or (b): 
a) challenging both human-animal and human-human supremacy 
translated to a downstream reduction in support for inequality (i.e. 
reducing human-animal supremacy reduced support for human-
human inequality AND reducing human-human supremacy reduced 
support for human-animal inequality). 
OR 
b) challenging neither human-animal nor human-human supremacy 
translated to a downstream reduction in support for inequality (i.e. 
reducing human-animal supremacy DID NOT reduce support for 
human-human inequality NOR DID reducing human-human 
supremacy reduce support for human-animal inequality). 
We used a pilot study to develop a measure of support for both human-







Chapter Four: Pilot Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, we present two pilot studies. The overall goal of chapter 4 
was three-fold. First, the pilot studies tested which human inequalities 
correlated most strongly with support for human-animal inequality. To do this 
we aimed to develop a scale which could be used to capture individual 
differences in the extent to which people endorse both human and human-
animal inequalities. The scale we developed in the pilot studies would then be 
used as the dependant variables in the subsequent experimental chapters (5-
8). 
Second, the pilot studies also tested the correlational foundational 
hypothesis. That is, we wanted to examine whether attitudes towards human-
animal inequality were foundational (stronger predictors than endorsement of 
other human inequalities) to human inequalities. Third, we wanted to compare 
the means and standard deviations of the subscales to identify human 
inequality which people had the least concern for. Doing so would identify the 
ideal human group to test our experimental foundational hypothesis in chapter 
4. 
There are existing published measures that we could have used in this 
thesis; however, we did not for the following reasons. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no published measure of endorsement for ‘inequalities’ for 
both humans and animals. Second, the existing measures of prejudice towards 
animals (e.g., speciesism measures; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016); women 
(e.g., sexism measures; Glick & Fiske, 1996); or racial groups (e.g., racism 
measures; Henry & Sears, 2002) are not comparable in that they use domain 
specific questions (Costello & Hodson, 2009). For example, a measure of 
speciesism reads, ‘The use of animals such as rabbits for testing the safety of 
cosmetics and household products is unnecessary and should be stopped” 
(Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016), whereas a measure of hostile sexism reads, 
“Feminists are making reasonable demands” (Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, 
these are not comparable measures as the former (the speciesism item) 
questions whether oppressing animals unnecessarily is justifiable, and the 
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latter (the hostile sexism item) questions how reasonable the claims of 
feminists are. Although these are both interesting items that are part of 
important measures, in determining whether human inequalities are correlated 
to human-animal inequality, it is important to be testing the inequalities at the 
same level of abstraction. We therefore wanted to develop a measure that 
could be adapted to both human-animal and human inequality. In short, we 
wanted the scale to be face-valid and unambiguous, relatively short in length, 
and able to capture people’s endorsement of various (human and human-
animal) inequalities.  
4.2 Pilot Study 1 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of pilot study 1 was two-fold. First, we wanted to examine 
whether the way people thought about human-animal inequality was 
comparable to the way they thought about human inequality. To do this we 
sought out to create a scale that captured participants’ endorsement of 
inequalities. Second, we also wanted to correlate these measures and 
examine whether human-animal inequality was a stronger predictor of human 
inequalities than was another system of human inequality (correlational 
foundational hypothesis).  
To begin, we had to choose which human inequalities we would use in 
the pilot studies. Human inequality needed to be comparable to human-animal 
inequality. In other words, human inequality needed to be psychologically as 
similar as possible to human-animal inequality. Evidence of this would be 
found in the same items comprising the principal component of each scale.  
Perhaps two of the most poignant human inequalities that spring to 
mind are gender and ethnicity. Both men (Wollstonecraft, 1792) and white 
Europeans (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) have historically used 
notions of supremacy in their justification of oppressing women and ethnic 
others, respectively. In addition, both inequalities between gender and 
ethnicity share historical parallels with human-animal relations (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). For example, historically, women 
(Hacker, 1951), and ethnic minorities (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
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1994) were seen by many as second class citizens and denied human rights, 
similar to how most animals are currently treated today (Singer, 1995). In 
addition, the existing literature on the psychology of human-animal relations 
has posited that both gender (Adams, 2015) and race (Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 
2016) are tied intrinsically to the subjugation of animals. We therefore chose 
to use gender and race in our first pilot study. Because we thought the way 
people think about the male-female inequality or the white Europeans-ethnic 
minority inequality stems from the way people think about human-animal 
inequality, we hypothesize that: 
a) Endorsement of the human-animal and human inequalities would be 
correlated across participants, and content correlated as measures as 
shown in the inter-item correlations and PCA results. 
b) Endorsement of human-animal inequality would be a stronger predictor 
of the endorsement of the male-female inequality, than would the white 
Europeans-ethnic minority inequality (and vice versa). 
4.2.2 Method 
Participants. Forty participants (22 Male, 18 Female) took part in the 
survey (Mean age 36.08 years, SD=11.20) in exchange for £1. The survey 
took participants on average 6 minutes and 46 seconds to complete (SD = 2 
minutes, 54 seconds; [3 minutes & 48 seconds, 15 minutes & 44 seconds]). 
Thirty-six participants self-identified as white European, 2 as Black/ African, 0 
as Hispanic, 2 as East Asian, 1 as Indian, 1 as multiracial, 1 as other 
(participants could enter more than one ethnicity). 39 participants self-
identified as UK citizens. In terms of religious affiliation, 5 participants self-
identified as Christian, 1 Orthodox, 1 Buddhist, 1 agnostic, 3 as atheist, one 
participant wrote Yorkshire and 1 participant wrote London, and the remainder 
either wrote they had no religion or left the question blank. In terms of diet, 18 
participants said they were meat-eaters, 13 omnivore, 5 had limited meat 
intake (ate no red meat or ate only fish or chicken), and 4 were vegetarian. 
Participants completed the study in their own time, and on an internet enabled 
device of their choice (e.g., cell phone, tablet, desktop computer). 
57 
  
Materials. Questions were designed to be blatant, explicit, and 
unambiguous. The questions we included in the pilot needed to meet two 
criteria. We wanted to capture 1) the notion that X group was superior to Y, 
and 2) that it was acceptable/appropriate that X benefited at Y’s expense. 
Because we would be using British participants, we made some of the 
questions explicitly about intergroup relations in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
scale we aimed to design would be used for various target groups, with the 
only difference being the names of the target groups changing. Accordingly, 
we used the following items (replacing ‘X’ and ‘Y’ for the corresponding target 
groups): 
1. X dominates Y. 
2. X are superior to Y. 
3. X are more privileged than Y. 
4. It is okay that X benefit from the current order of society. 
5. It is okay that Y suffer from the current order of society. 
6. In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think the way X treat Y is? 
7. To what extent do you accept the way X treat Y in the UK? 
8. Do you agree that the way X treat Y in the UK needs to change? 
Participants answered the questions on a sliding scale from 0 (Not at 
all) to 100 (Completely). The scale went up in whole numbers, so participants 
could choose any number between (and including) 0 to 100. There were no 
other words demarcating other points on the scale. When participants were 
completing the survey, all the sliding scale questions began on 50, so as not 
to bias the responses one way or another (Bendig, 1953).  In addition to the 
inequalities measures, participants answered demographics. 
Age. To measure participants age, we asked participants “how old are 
you?”, and participants entered their age in a text box. 
Gender. To measure participants’ gender, we asked participants to 
select one of three categories that were: male, female, or other. 
Ethnicity. To measure participants’ ethnicity, we asked participants to 
select one of eight categories that were: white/European, Black/African, 
Hispanic, East Asian, Indian, Arab, Multiracial, or Other. 
58 
  
UK citizenship. To measure participants’ citizenship status, we had 
participants select one of four options that were: UK citizen, UK permanent 
resident, UK student visa, or not living in the UK. 
Diet. To measure participants’ diet, participants were asked what best 
describes your diet and were given the following six options: Meat eater, 
omnivore, limited meat intake (no red meat), limited meat intake (only fish or 
chicken), vegetarian, or vegan. 
Procedure. The participants were recruited from the online survey 
distributer Prolific Academic (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). 
Participants completed an online survey that had informed consent, the survey 
questions, and a short debrief. Participants were reminded that they were not 
obliged to complete the study, and they could opt out of the study at any time 
by closing the browser window on their device. 
4.2.3 Results 
Analysis strategy. We used principal components analysis (PCA) to 
develop single component subscales (manual extraction of one component). 
We employed both frequentist (using SPSS software) and Bayesian 
correlations (using JASP software). Unlike null hypothesis significance testing, 
Bayesian analyses allows for tests in favour of the null hypothesis, and gives 
a continuous measure of support for the alternative hypothesis. We used the 
default settings in JASP which had a zero-centred Cauchy prior with scale of 
.707, which was not updated as we went along with each study. We report 
Bayes factors alongside significance tests in this and all subsequent chapters. 
Bayes factors are “a continuous measure of how probable the data are 
assuming one hypothesis is true (e.g. the alternative hypothesis, H1) relative 
to another (e.g., the null, H0)” (Loughnan, Davies, Zaharieva, Kinga, & 
McLatchie, 2019). Bayes factors less than 0.33 are interpreted as moderate 
evidence for the null, and Bayes factors greater than 3 and 10 are interpreted 
as moderate and strong evidence for H1 respectively (Dienes, 2014). Bayes 
factors between 0.33 and 3 provide inconclusive evidence. 
Missing data. There was no missing data in pilot study 1. 
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Human-animal inequality. To measure participants’ attitudes towards 
human-animal inequality we began by asking participants to what extent they 
agreed with the 8 statements listed in the materials section. After checking for 
missing data, we looked at the frequentist and Bayesian bivariate correlations 
between the items. We then ran a PCA as a tool for dimension reduction. See 
Table 4.1 below for the inter-item Pearson correlations, frequentist p-values, 
and Bayes Factors. In addition, see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 for a scree plot 
and component loadings of the one factor solution.  
The results suggested a 5-item component comprising of items 2, 4, 5, 
7, and 8, X2 (20, 60) = 68.58, p < .001. The 5-item component comprised of 
the following five items: Humans are superior to animals; It is okay that humans 
benefit from the current order of society; It is okay that animals suffer from the 
current order of society; To what extent do you accept the way humans treat 
animals in the UK; Do you agree that the way humans treat animals in the UK 
needs to change (r). The component did not include the items about humans 
dominating animals or being privileged to animals, or the item about how fixed 









Table 4.1. Showing human-animal inequality inter-item Pearson 
correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 r  0.20        
 p .207        
 BF₁₀  0.43        
 3 r  0.56  0.16       
 p  < .001  .322       
 BF₁₀  163.60  0.32       
4 r  0.20  0.79  0.12      
 p  .222  < .001  .463      
 BF₁₀  0.40  8.08e +6  0.26      
5 r  -0.06  0.32  -.12  0.38     
 p  .731  .046  .464  .014     
 BF₁₀  0.21  1.35  0.26  3.57     
6 r  -0.04  -0.07  0.01  -0.15  -0.23    
 p  .790  .676  .975  .365  .157    
 BF₁₀  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.29  0.52    
7 r  0.04  0.20  0.08  0.46  0.51  0.02   
 p .804  .208  .630  .003  < .001  .909   
 BF₁₀  0.20  0.42  0.22  14.54  41.89  0.20   
8 r  0.04  -0.25  0.08  -0.46  -0.60  0.18  -0.79  
 p  .809  .120  .635  .003  < .001  .254  < .001  
 BF₁₀  0.20  0.63  0.22  14.30  608.00  0.37  7.92e +6  
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 




Table 4.2. Showing human-animal inequality items and PCA Component 
Loadings. 
Item PC 1  Uniqueness  
1. Humans dominate animals. .  0.974 
2. Humans are superior to animals. 0.657  0.568  
3. Humans are more privileged than animals. .  0.989  
4. It is okay that humans benefit from the current 
order of society. 
0.813  0.339  
5. It is okay that animals suffer from the current 
order of society. 
0.726  0.473  
6. In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think 
the way humans treat animals is? 
.  0.943  
7. To what extent do you accept the way humans 
treat animals in the UK? 
0.773  0.402  
8. Do you agree that the way humans treat animals 
in the UK needs to change? 
-0.815  0.335  
Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are suppressed. 
 









Male-female inequality. Next, we looked at the items about the male-
female inequality.  We used the same 8 items but changed the wording slightly 
to refer to relations between men and women instead of between humans and 
animals. See Table 4.3 below for the correlations between items and Table 4.4 
and Figure 4.2 below for the PCA results. The results suggested a 6-item 
component comprising of items 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, X2 (20, 60) = 89.98, p < 
.001. The 6-item component comprised of the following six items: Men 
dominate women; Men are more privileged than women; It is okay that men 
benefit from the current order of society; In the United Kingdom, how fixed do 
you think the way men treat women is; To what extent do you accept the way 
men treat women in the UK (r); Do you agree that the way men treat women 
in the UK needs to change. The component did not include the items about 
men being superior to women, or that it was okay that women suffered from 
the current order of society. The results of the correlations and the PCA for the 
male subjugation of women differ from the results and correlations of the 
human subjugation of animals. Most importantly, the key item (2) that “men are 




Table 4.3. Showing male-female inequality inter-item Pearson correlations, 
frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 r  0.17       
 p  .299       
 BF₁₀  0.33       
3 r  0.87 0.08      
 p  < .001 .615      
 BF₁₀  2.48e+10 0.22      
4 r  -0.16 0.31 -0.22     
 p  .329 .049 .168     
 BF₁₀  0.31 1.28 0.49     
5 r 0.06 0.77 0.00 0.29    
 p  .714 < .001 .996 .067    
 BF₁₀  0.21 1.66e+6 0.20 0.99    
6 r  -0.36 -0.06 -0.36 0.22 -0.11   
 p  .023 .711 .024 .172 .508   
 BF₁₀  2.35 0.21 2.30 0.49 0.24   
7 r  -0.47 0.06 -0.50 0.49 0.29 0.31  
 p  .002 .705 .001 .001 0.074 .051  
 BF₁₀  19.76 0.21 32.43 28.17 0.92 1.24  
8 r  0.75 -0.02 0.83 -0.23 -0.15 -0.32 -0.752 
 p  < .001 .926 < .001 .148 .372 .047 < .001 
 BF₁₀  5.56e +5 0.20 4.13e+
8 
0.54 0.29 1.33 6.71e 
+5 
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 





Table 4.4. Showing male-female inequality items and PCA Component 
Loadings  
Item PC 1  Uniqueness  
1. Men dominate women 0.84  0.29  
2. Men are superior to women .  1.00  
3. Men are more privileged than women 0.88  0.22  
4. It is okay that men benefit from the current 
order of society. 
-0.45  0.80  
5. It is okay that women suffer from the current 
order of society. 
.  0.97  
6. In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think 
the way men treat women is? 
-0.50  0.75  
7. To what extent do you accept the way men 
treat women in the UK? 
-0.80  0.37  
8. Do you agree that the way men treat women in 
the UK needs to change? 
0.92  0.16  
Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are suppressed. 
 
Figure 4.2. Scree plot for male-female inequality PCA results. 
White European-ethnic minority inequality 
Next, we looked at the items about the white European-ethnic minority 
inequality.  We used the same 8 items but changed the wording to refer to 
relations between white Europeans and ethnic minorities. See Table 4.5 below 
for the correlations between items and Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3 below for the 
PCA results. The results suggested a 7-item component, X2 (20, 60) = 53.63, 
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p < .001. The only item that the PCA did not keep was item 6: In the United 
Kingdom, how fixed do you think the way white Europeans treat ethnic 
minorities is? While the ethnic minorities component did include the key item 
about white Europeans supremacy, the component was again (like the male 
subjugation of women), different to the humans and animals component. The 
difference was again the inclusion of the questions about domination and 
privilege.  
Table 4.5. Showing the European-ethnic minority inequality inter-item 
Pearson correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 r  -0.01        
 p  .970        
 BF₁₀  0.20        
3 r  0.50  -0.30       
 p  < .001  .058       
 BF₁₀  40.21  1.12       
4 r  -0.23  0.40  -0.41      
 p  .157  .011  .008      
 BF₁₀  0.52  4.48  5.71      
5 r  -0.27  0.77  -0.58  0.45     
 p  .097  < .001  < .001  .003     
 BF₁₀  0.74  2.49e+6  309.36  12.24     
6 r  -0.04  0.08  -0.20  0.08  0.20    
 p  .786  .635  .209  .635  .218    
 BF₁₀  0.20  0.22  0.42  0.22  0.41    
7 r  0.01  0.28  -0.31  0.60  0.28  0.07   
 p  .940  .085  .050  < .001  .082  .677   
 BF₁₀  0.20  0.83  1.25  569.49  0.85  0.21   
8 r  0.38  -0.48  0.54  -0.51  -0.64  -0.27  -0.60  
 p  .016  .002  < .001  < .001  < .001  .097  < .001  
 BF₁₀  3.20  24.31  89.57  44.80  2874.24  0.74  679.90  
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 




Table 4.6. Showing the European-ethnic minority inequality items and PCA 
Component Loading. 
Item PC 1  Uniqueness  
1. White Europeans dominate ethnic minorities. -0.42  0.82  
2. White Europeans are superior to ethnic 
minorities. 
0.68  0.54  
3. White Europeans are more privileged than 
ethnic minorities. 
-0.73  0.46  
4. It is okay that White Europeans benefit from the 
current order of society. 
0.72  0.48  
5. It is okay that ethnic minorities suffer from the 
current order of society. 
0.83  0.30  
6. In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think 
the way White Europeans treat ethnic minorities 
is? 
.  0.92  
7. To what extent do you accept the way White 
Europeans treat ethnic minorities in the UK? 
0.62  0.61  
8. Do you agree that the way White Europeans 
treat ethnic minorities in the UK needs to change? 
-0.86  0.26  
Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are supressed. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Scree plot for the European-ethnic minority inequality PCA results. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The first goal of pilot study 1 was to see whether the endorsement of 
gender or racial inequalities were similar to human-animal inequality. To do 
this we developed a scale that would capture individual differences in the 
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extent to which people endorse each of those inequalities. We used the 
dimension reduction method of principal components analysis (PCA) to find 
the single component which best-captured participants’ endorsement of three 
inequalities. However, the results of the three PCAs were all different and our 
first hypothesis was not supported. Consequently, we could not test our 
second hypothesis. The scale items which best captured the common variance 
between the items regarding human-animal inequality were different to the 
items which best captured the common variance between the items pertaining 
to gender or race relations. 
It may be that because people do not themselves dominate animals, or 
see animals as unprivileged (because animals are so far beyond the realm of 
moral concern) domination and privilege do not best capture the variation in 
the endorsement of human-animal inequality. That is, the results revealed that, 
at least in the current study, the content of the way people think about human-
animal inequality may be different to the way they think about the male-female 
inequality, and the white European-ethnic minority inequality in the United 
Kingdom. It is also possible that because our sample size for pilot study 1 was 
small we were unable to find support for our hypotheses. An alternative 
interpretation to a null result due to small sample size is that the main 
differences between the components for human-animal inequality and the 
male-female inequality were the inclusion of the items about domination and 
privilege for the male-female inequality, and the inclusion of ideas about 
superiority and the acceptance of harming animals for human-animal 
inequality. Human-animal inequality and the male-female inequality were in 
turn both different to the white Europeans-ethnic minority inequality. Unlike the 
male-female inequality, participants’ endorsement of the white Europeans-
ethnic minority inequality included ideas about superiority and the acceptance 
of harming minorities for the majority’s benefit; dissimilar to human-animal 
inequality, participants’ endorsement of white Europeans-ethnic minority 
inequality included items about majority whites being privileged and 
dominating ethnic minorities.  
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has compared 
various forms of human inequality to see the similarities and differences 
between human-animal and human inequalities. This short pilot study adds to 
the existing body of work on human animal relations, by giving initial evidence 
that there might be subtle but important differences in the way people think 
about human-animal and human inequalities. While prejudice research has 
shown there are correlations between prejudice towards animals and prejudice 
towards human groups, the current research shows that the way people think 
about human-animal and particular human (e.g., male-female and white 
Europeans-Ethnic minority) inequalities are different. This finding could be 
explained in terms of the more subtle nature of prejudice towards women 
(benevolent sexism) and ethnic minorities (aversive racism). This would be an 
interesting avenue for future research.  
To examine the relationship between human and human-animal 
inequality, we turned our attention to other oppressed groups towards whom 
we thought people would more openly endorse their prejudice. In our next 
study (pilot study 2), we wanted to find human inequalities which produced the 
same principal component as human-animal inequality. As in our initial plans 
for pilot study 1, the scale we hoped to develop in pilot study 2 would then be 
used as the DVs in the subsequent experiments (e.g., chapter 4). 
4.3 Pilot Study 2 
4.3.1 Introduction  
Pilot Study 1 revealed that the way people think about human-animal 
inequality was different to the way they thought about the male-female or the 
white European-ethnic minority inequalities. The purpose of pilot study 2 was 
to identify other human inequalities that would show more alignment with 
human-animal inequality. In doing so, we would identify the human target 
group to be used as the comparison condition in the subsequent experimental 
studies (chapters 4 - 7).  
As we have shown by introducing the meat paradox (chapter 1), people 
tend not to have strong and inflexible justifications for human-animal inequality: 
psychologically navigating human-animal inequality is flexible and can change 
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as a function of the situation. Because people in pilot study 1 did not think of 
animals being dominated and humans being privileged (but did for the male-
female and white European inequalities), we wanted to select human 
inequalities, which, like human-animal inequality, are on the fringes of moral 
concern. We therefore chose to use human inequalities based on previous 
research highlighting those individuals in society that are the most 
dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Human inequality we included in this 
study were between non-addicts and drug addicts; homeowners and homeless 
people; and the mentally healthy and the mentally ill. Due to the unexpected 
results of pilot study 1, we did not have hypotheses about which human 
inequality would map onto human-animal inequality. We did, however, 
hypothesize that: 
a) All subscales will be positively correlated. 
b) Support for human-animal inequality would be a stronger predictor 
of human inequalities (e.g., drug addict inequality) than any other 
human inequality (e.g., homeless inequality), and vice versa. 
4.3.2 Method 
Participants. The participants were 63 individuals recruited from the 
online site prolific academic (Mean age = 35.32, SD =12.01; 35 female, 28 
male), who completed the study in exchange for £1. The study took 
participants 8 minutes, 16 seconds to complete (SD = 3 minutes, 40 seconds). 
Regarding ethnicity, 60 participants self-identified as white European, 2 Indian, 
1 ‘other’. In terms of citizenship, 59 participants were UK citizens, 3 were 
permanent residents. With respect to diet, 30 participants self-identified as 
meat-eaters, 16 as omnivore, 7 were vegetarian, 7 had limited meat intake (no 
red meat, or only fish or chicken), and 3 were vegan (no animal products). No 
participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Design. The study was a correlational within-subjects design. 
Participants completed demographics, and a survey about different groups in 
society. 
Materials. For each inequality, we presented participants with eight 
questions measuring the extent to which they endorsed that inequality. The 
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questions were the same structure as in the previous pilot study (replacing ‘X’ 
and ‘Y’ for the corresponding inequality). Participants answered the questions 
on the same sliding scale as pilot study 2 from 0 (Not at all) to 100 
(Completely). The items were: 
1. X dominate Y. 
2. X are superior to Y. 
3. X are more privileged than Y. 
4. It is okay that X benefit from the current order of society. 
5. It is okay that Y suffer from the current order of society. 
6. In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think the way X treat Y is? 
7. To what extent do you accept the way X treat Y in the UK? 
8. Do you agree that the way X treat Y in the UK needs to change? 
In addition to the above primary questions, participants were also given 
demographics and existing measures of social dominance orientation (SDO) 
and system justification to examine the new scale’s convergent validity with 
existing validated measures of related but different constructs.  
Age. To measure participants age, we asked participants “how old are 
you?”, and participants entered their age in a text box (e.g., 21). 
Gender. To measure participants’ gender, we asked participants to 
select one of three categories that were: male, female, or other. 
Ethnicity. To measure participants’ ethnicity, we asked participants to 
select one of eight categories that were: White/European, Black/African, 
Hispanic, East Asian, Indian, Arab, Multiracial, or Other. 
UK citizenship. To measure participants’ citizenship status, we had 
participants select one of three options that were: UK citizen, UK permanent 
resident, or UK student visa. 
Diet. To measure participants’ diet, participants were asked what best 
describes your diet and were given the following six options: Meat eater, 
omnivore, limited meat intake (no red meat), limited meat intake (only fish or 
chicken), vegetarian, or vegan. 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Participants support for group-
based inequality, or social dominance orientation, was measured with an 
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existing, validated 4-item measure of Social Dominance Orientation taken 
directly from (Wilson & Liu, 2003). Participants were asked “for each of the 
following questions about groups in general, indicate whether you think the 
statement is positive or negative:” Winning is more important than how the 
game is played; Getting ahead by any means necessary; Sometimes war is 
necessary to put other countries in their place; Inferior groups should stay in 
their place. The scale was anchored from 1 (Very Negative), through 3 
(Neutral), to 5 (Very Positive), and had good internal reliability, α = .81, 95% 
CI [0.72, 0.88]. 
System Justification. To measure participant’s belief that society is fair 
and just, we used a validated 8-item measure of system justification (Kay & 
Jost, 2003). Participants answered to what extent they agree with various 
statements about society. Example questions include “In general, I find society 
to be fair; In general, the British political system operates as it should; British 
society needs to be radically restructured (reverse scored)”. The scale was 
anchored from 1 (Strongly Disagree), through 4 (Neither Agree nor Disagree), 
to 7 (Strongly Agree). The scale had good internal reliability, α = .85, 95% CI 
[0.79, 0.90]. 
Procedure. The participants were recruited from the online survey 
distributer Prolific Academic (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). 
Participants completed an online survey that had informed consent, the survey 
questions, and a short debrief. Participants were reminded that they were not 
obliged to complete the study, and they could opt out of the study at any time 
by closing the browser window on their device. 
4.3.3 Results 
 Analysis strategy. We initially examined the correlations between the 
items for each target group, and then ran a principal components analysis 
(PCA) to reduce each measure to one dimension. The purpose of the principal 
component analysis was two-fold. We first wanted to see whether participants’ 
thoughts about the different inequalities would compose the same component. 
The goal was to identify human inequality that mapped onto human-animal 
inequality (i.e., a PCA produced a similar scale for the human and human-
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animal inequality). The purpose of the data reduction method was to identify 
the items in each subscale capturing most of the variance, and reflecting the 
underlying construct. Therefore, because we aimed to reduce each scale 
down, we chose to use principal components analysis. Because we only 
required one scale per target, we used manual extraction to produce a single 
dimension for each target.  
We did not run all the items together in one principal component 
analysis as each subscale used the same items with different target groups. 
Because of this, the PCA algorithm would be comparing the fit between each 
single inequality (i.e., all the questions about humans and animals), and 
between the similar questions (e.g., X is superior to Y; A is superior to B). In 
addition, we wanted individual measures for each target group precisely so we 
could compare the foundational hypothesis in the subsequent experiments 
(see chapter 4). For a discussion of doing PCA the way utilized in this thesis, 
please see the discussion of this chapter. 
Missing data. Of the 63 participants, 16 had missing data. There was 
no systematic missing data (e.g., one person having most of the missing data, 
or one item having most of the missing data). Because the measures with a 
sliding scale (from 0 to 100) started on 50, we reasoned that participants might 
have left the marker where it was if they wanted to leave it on 50. However, if 
the marker was not touched, Qualitrics recorded that item as missing data. 
Accordingly, we transformed all missing data to 50 (i.e., the scale midpoint and 
default position). 
Human-animal inequality. Table 4.7 below shows the inter-item 
Pearson correlations (two-tailed), frequentist p-values, and Bayes Factors 
between human-animal inequality items. After looking at the frequentist and 
Bayesian correlations, we ran a PCA with manual extraction yielding one 
component. See Figure 3.4 below for a scree plot and Table 4.8 for the 
component loadings of the one factor solution. We wanted to reduce the 
measure down to one scale, (to highlight those items which should be 
discarded), and so we used manual extraction of one component. 
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Table 4.7. Showing human-animal inequality inter-item Pearson correlations, 
frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
 Item     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2  r  
 0.17              
p   .190              
  BF₁₀  0.36              
3  r  
 0.43  0.29            
p   < .001  0.022            
  BF₁₀  68.96  2.04            
4  r  
 0.28  0.68  0.23          
p   .026  < .001  .066          
  BF₁₀  1.79  1.32e +7  0.82          
5  r  
 0.02  0.46  0.01  0.41        
p   .869  < .001  .935  < .001        
  BF₁₀  0.16  203.19  0.16  37.24        
6  r  
 -0.15  -0.18  0.03  -0.03  -0.17      
p   .230  .165  .791  .802  .192      
  BF₁₀  0.32  0.40  0.16  0.16  0.36      
7  r  
 -0.00  0.44  -0.07  0.56  0.43  -0.27    
p   .974  < .001  .612  < .001  < .001  .034    
  BF₁₀  0.16  93.22  0.18  1.26e +4  70.57  1.41    
8  r  
 -0.12  -0.38  0.14  -0.56  -0.51  0.37  -0.75  
p   .354  .002  .260  < .001  < .001  .003  < .001  
  BF₁₀  0.24  15.68  0.29  1.28e +4  1067.49  12.16  9.52e +9  
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 
factor; Items 1-8 correspond with new materials developed. 
Table 4.8. Showing human-animal inequality, items and component loadings. 
Item   RC 1 Uniqueness 
Humans dominate animals.  .  0.93  
Humans are superior to animals.  0.75 
 
0.43  
Humans are more privileged than animals.  . 
 
0.98  










In the United Kingdom, how fixed do you think the way 




To what extent do you accept the way humans treat 






Table 4.8. Showing human-animal inequality, items and component loadings. 
Item   RC 1 Uniqueness 
Do you agree that the way humans treat animals in the UK 




Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are supressed. 
 
Figure 4.4. Showing Scree Plot for human-animal inequality PCA. 
The results suggested a 5-item factor comprising of items 2, 4, 5, 7, and 
8, X2 (20, 60) = 74.63, p < .001. As a final step we refined the solution down to 
4-items because two items were measuring almost the same thing, as can be 
seen in the face value of items 7 (To what extent do you accept the way 
humans treat animals in the UK) and 8 (Do you agree that the way humans 
treat animals in the UK needs to change), and in the correlations. The final 
human-animal inequality measure comprised of the following four items (M = 
48.11, SD =18.60): Humans are superior to animals; it is okay that humans 
benefit from the current order of society; it is okay that animals suffer from the 
current order of society. To what extent do you accept the way humans treat 
animals in the UK. The scale had good internal reliability, α = .80, 95% CI [0.70, 
0.87]. 
Drug addict inequality. Table 4.9 below shows the inter-item Pearson 
correlations (two-tailed), frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors between drug 
addict inequality items. 
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Table 4.9. Showing drug addict inequality inter-item Pearson correlations, 
frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 










             














           


















         






















       


























     






























   



































  BF₁₀  0.19  1.77e +9  0.25  3129.42  4.33e +6  2.06  1.52e +11  
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 
factor; Items 1-8 correspond with new materials developed. 
 
After looking at the frequentist and Bayesian correlations, we ran a 
manual PCA yielding one component. See Figure 3.5 below for a scree plot 
and component loadings of the one factor solution. We wanted to reduce the 
measure down to one scale, (to highlight those items which should be 
discarded), and so we again used manual extraction of one component. 
Table 4.10. Showing drug addict inequality items and component loadings. 
Item   RC 1 Uniqueness 
Those who are not addicted to drugs dominate drug addicts  .  1.00  







Table 4.10. Showing drug addict inequality items and component loadings. 
Item   RC 1 Uniqueness 
Those who are not drug addicts are more privileged than 




It is okay that those who are not drug addicts benefit from 
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To what extent do you accept the way non addicted 




Do you agree that the way non addicted persons treat drug 




Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are supressed. 
 
Figure 4.5. Scree plot for non-addict-drug addict inequality, visually showing 
results of the PCA. 
The results suggested the same 5-item factor comprising of items 2, 4, 
5, 7, and 8, X2 (20, 60) = 36.06, p = .02. As a final step we refined the solution 
down to 4 items because the same two items (7 and 8) were measuring almost 
the same thing, as can be seen in the face value of the items 7 (To what extent 
do you accept the way non-addicted persons treat drug addicts in the UK) and 
8 (Do you agree that the way non-addicted persons treat drug addicts in the 
UK needs to change), and in the correlations. The final drug addict inequality 
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measure comprised of the following four items (M = 46.47, SD = 12.60): Non-
addicts are superior to drug addicts; It is okay that non-addicts benefit from the 
current order of society; It is okay that drug addicts suffer from the current order 
of society. To what extent do you accept the way non-addicts treat drug addicts 
in the UK? The scale also had good internal reliability, α = .86, 95% CI [0.80, 
0.91]. 
Homeowner-homeless inequality. Table 4.11 below shows the inter-
item Pearson correlations (two-tailed), frequentist p-values, and Bayes Factors 
between the homeowner-homeless inequality items. After looking at the 
frequentist and Bayesian correlations, we ran a manual PCA asking for one 
component. See Figure 3.6 below for a scree plot and component loadings of 
the one factor solution. Similar to previous PCA’s, we wanted to reduce the 
measure down to one scale, (to highlight those items which should be 
discarded), and so we used manual extraction of one component. 
 
Table 4.11. Showing homeowner-homeless inequality inter-item Pearson 
correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
2   r  
 0.14                          
p   .287                          
  BF₁₀   0.27                
3   r  
 0.20   -0.10                      
p   .112   .423                      
  BF₁₀   0.54   0.22              
4   r  
 0.15   0.38   0.10                  
p   .236   .002   .444                  
  BF₁₀   0.31   15.13   0.21            
5   r  
 0.16   0.64   -0.27   0.26              
p   .220   < .001   .034   .036              
  BF₁₀   0.33   1.17e +6   1.40   1.35          
6   r  
 0.12   0.01   -0.03   0.24   0.04          
p   .357   .951   .793   .061   .735          
  BF₁₀   0.24   0.16   0.16   0.87   0.17        
7   r  
 0.07   0.61   -0.12   0.33   0.39   0.18      
p   .597   < .001   .359   .009   .001   .148      
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Table 4.11. Showing homeowner-homeless inequality inter-item Pearson 
correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
  BF₁₀   0.18   1.76e +5    0.24   4.50   23.17   0.44      
8   r  
 -0.01   -0.41   0.23   -0.34   -0.55   -0.15   -0.64    
p   .943   < .001   .074   .007   < .001   .237   < .001    
  BF₁₀   0.16   33.00   0.75   5.67   5847.99   0.31   8.05e +5    
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 




Table 4.11. Showing homeowner-homeless inequality items and component 
loadings. 
Item   RC 1 Uniqueness 
Those who live in homes dominate the homeless.  .  0.97  
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Do you agree that the way those who live in homes 






Note: Small coefficients (<.4) are supressed. 
 
Figure 4.6. Scree plot for subjugation of homeless, visually showing results of 
the PCA. 
The results again suggested the same 5-item factor comprising of items 
2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, X2 (20, 60) = 48.79, p < .001. As a final step, we again refined 
the solution down to 4 items because the same two items (7 and 8) were also 
measuring the same thing, as can be seen in the face value of the items 7 and 
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8, and in the correlations. The final homeowner-homeless inequality measure 
comprised of the following four items (M=33.65, SD =16.04): Homeowners are 
superior to the homeless; it is okay that homeowners benefit from the current 
order of society; it is okay that the homeless suffer from the current order of 
society. To what extent do you accept the way homeowners treat the homeless 
in the UK? The scale had good internal reliability, α = .75, 95% CI [0.64, 0.84]. 
Mentally healthy-mentally ill inequality. Table 4.12 below shows 
mentally healthy-mentally ill inequality inter-item Pearson correlations, 
frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. After looking at the frequentist and 
Bayesian correlations, we ran a PCA with manual extraction yielding one 
component. See Figure 4.7 below for a scree plot and component loadings of 
the one factor solution. The results of the PCA also suggested the 5-item factor 
comprising of items 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, X2 (20, 60) = 46.82, p < .001. As a final 
step, we again refined the solution down to 4 items because the same two 
items (7 and 8) which were measuring the same thing, as can be seen in the 
face value of the items 7 and 8, and in the correlations. The final mentally 
healthy-mentally ill inequality measure comprised of the following four items 
(M =30.87, SD =13.39): Mentally healthy people are superior to the mentally 
ill; It is okay that mentally healthy people benefit from the current order of 
society; It is okay that the mentally ill suffer from the current order of society. 
To what extent do you accept the way mentally healthy people treat the 





Table 4.12. Showing the mentally healthy-mentally ill inequality inter-item 
Pearson correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
Item  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
2  r  
 0.20                          
p   .110                          
  BF₁₀   0.55                
3  r  
 0.26   -0.04                      
p   .041   .755                      
  BF₁₀   1.21   0.16              
4  r  
 -0.07   0.42   -0.18                  
p   .598   < .001   .150                  
  BF₁₀   0.18   56.28   0.43            
5  r  
 -0.04   0.49   -0.13   0.17              
p   .766   < .001   .300   .178              
  BF₁₀   0.16   618.62   0.27   0.38          
6  r  
 -0.28   -0.04   0.05   0.20   -0.02          
p   .024   .734   .726   .112   .850          
  BF₁₀   1.89   0.17   0.17   0.54   0.16        
7  r  
 -0.12   0.46   -0.29   0.53   0.34   0.11      
p   .346   < .001   .022   < .001   .007   .383      
  BF₁₀   0.24   197.64   2.05   2223.48   5.62   0.23      
8  r  
 0.09   -0.53   0.07   -0.26   -0.33   -0.20   -0.57    
p   .484   < .001   .576   .040   .008   .123   < .001    
  BF₁₀   0.20   3026.31   0.18   1.23   4.84   0.50   1.36e +4    
Note. Correlations are two-tailed; r = Pearson’s r; p = p-value; BF₁₀ = Bayes 





Table 4.13. Mentally healthy-mentally ill inequality items and component 
loadings. 
   RC 1  Uniqueness  
Mentally healthy people dominate the mentally ill.  .  0.98  
Mentally healthy people are superior to the mentally ill.  0.76 
 
0.42  
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Figure 4.7. Scree plot for mentally healthy-mentally ill inequality, visually 
showing results of the PCA. 
Convergent validity. While the PCA results were promising, we also 
wanted to see whether the scales had good convergent validity by also 
measuring attitudes towards SDO and system justification, both more general 
83 
  
measures of group based dominance (SDO) and justification of the status quo 
(system justification), both related but insufficient measures of inequalities. 
Predictive validity of the subscales is tested in our final study with charitable 
behaviour, in chapter 4. 
Table 4.14. Showing inter-correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes 
factors between all target measures, social dominance orientation (SDO), 
and system justification (SJ). 
Measure  Animals Addicts Mentally 
Ill 
Homeless SDO 
Addicts r  0.45     
 p  < .001     
 BF₁₀  264.52     
Mentally 
Ill 
r  0.49 0.58    
p  < .001 < .001    
 BF₁₀  994.81 5.64e+4    
Homeless r  0.67 0.69 0.78   
 p  < .001 < .001 < .001   
 BF₁₀  1.16e+7 5.36e+7 4.32e+11   
SDO r  0.28 0.51 0.45 0.59  
 p  .014 < .001 < .001 < .001  
 BF₁₀  3.22 2114.07 281.14 7.32e+4  
SJ r  0.30 0.29 0.38 0.54 0.34 
p  .010 .010 < .001 < .001 .003 
 BF₁₀  4.58 4.22 35.36 7691.89 11.60 
Note: All tests are one-tailed. 
Table 4.15. Means and standard deviations of measures developed in 
pilot study 2, SDO, and system justification. 
Measure Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
   Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Animal 48.11 22.74 -.10 0.30 .05 0.60 
Addicts 46.47 23.54 -.08 0.30 -.77 0.60 
Mentally ill 30.87 18.39 0.31 0.30 -.37 0.60 
Homeless 33.65 18.77 0.50 0.30 -.26 0.60 
SDO 1.98 0.80 1.30 0.30 2.43 0.60 
SJ 3.46 1.13 0.18 0.30 -0.55 0.60 
Note: SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error, SDO = social dominance  






The purpose of pilot study 2 was to identify human inequalities with a 
stronger affinity with participants’ endorsement of human-animal inequality 
than pilot study 1 found. In addition, we wanted to identify human inequality to 
be used as the comparison condition in the subsequent experimental studies 
(see chapter 4). Accordingly, we turned our attention to inequalities that we 
thought people would more openly endorse (Harris & Fiske, 2006). We 
therefore chose to use the drug addict, homeless, and mentally ill inequalities. 
Previous research has shown these groups to be dehumanized the most by 
western society (Harris & Fiske, 2006).  
We found good evidence from our correlations and PCA results that all 
human inequalities in pilot study 2 share an affinity with how participants 
thought of human-animal inequality. All of human inequality produced the 
same single PCA dimension. The items that we kept for each final scale were 
the same for both human-animal and human inequalities. The scale items had 
strong face validity, measuring the endorsement that it was okay that the 
‘superior’ group benefited and the ‘inferior’ group suffered from the current 
order of society; acceptance of the relationship between the groups; and belief 
that one group was superior to the other. The questions that were not kept in 
the study were questions about the oppressor dominating the other; the 
oppressor being privileged, the relationship between the two groups being 
fixed, and one item about the status quo needing to change (which was too 
similar to the item about accepting the status quo). We decided to keep the 
question about ‘accepting the status quo’, over ‘wanting the status quo to 
change’ as it had stronger face validity with the other 3 items in the scale. On 
reflection, the item about the way X treating Y being fixed was not as clear as 
the others, and routinely had low correlations with other items, as confirmed in 
the results of the PCA’s. We were intending the question to measure how 
changeable participants thought the inequality is. However, in hindsight, the 
endorsement of a inequality is orthogonal to whether one thinks that system is 
fixed or rigid.  
Nevertheless, having the PCA for each inequality produce the same 
items adds to the psychology of human-animal relations by introducing a short 
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scale measuring the endorsement of both human and human-animal 
inequalities (see also general discussion of this chapter). Each of the sub-
scales correlated with SDO and System justification in a moderate and 
significant way, however, there were important differences between the 
measures as evident in the moderate correlations. Bayes factors also provided 
evidence that our subscales were positively correlated with SDO and System 
Justification. Our subscales although correlated, are measuring variance that 
SDO and system justification do not capture, as shown in the correlations 
between all items in Table 4.14. In short, pilot study 2 produced four 4-item 
measures with strong face validity, capturing individual differences in the 
extent to which participants endorse human-animal and human inequalities. 
Each scale also had good convergent validity, correlating positively, but 
moderately, with validated measures of social dominance orientation (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and system justification (Kay & Jost, 
2003). 
After having created the subscales, we then tested our correlational 
hypotheses (see Table 4.14). We first hypothesized that endorsement of all 
inequalities would be positively correlated with each other, and found good 
evidence of this (0.45 < all rs < 0.78). We next hypothesised that human-animal 
inequality would correlate higher with human inequalities if human-animal 
inequality is foundational to human inequalities. However, when looking at the 
correlations (see Table 4.14), it is clear that even though endorsing human-
animal inequality correlates well with endorsing human inequality (0.45 < all rs 
< 0.67), the correlations between the drug addict and the homeless inequality 
(r = 0.69), and between the homeowner-homeless and the mentally healthy-
mentally ill inequality were stronger (r = 0.78). Therefore, while endorsing 
human-animal inequality is indeed related to human inequalities, there is no 
correlational evidence in pilot study 2 that human-animal inequality is 
foundational to human inequalities. The results from pilot study 2 did therefore 
not support our correlational foundational hypothesis.  
It is not surprising that endorsement of inequalities involving the 
homeless, drug addicts, and the mentally ill are all strongly related. 
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Perceptions of these groups are often overlapping (e.g., homeless people 
having both drug addictions and mental health concerns (Christensen, et al., 
2005)). Indeed, the results of pilot study 2 sit well with the established idea of 
generalized prejudice – people who are prejudice towards one group (e.g., 
women) are likely prejudiced towards other groups (e.g., ethnic minorities) 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
The lack of support for the correlational foundational hypothesis does 
raise initial questions about our overall foundational hypothesis. Recent work 
on the interspecies model of prejudice (Costello & Hodson, 2014) suggests 
that it is negative evaluations of animals that in turn foster dehumanization of 
human outgroups. Which is why we expected that support for human-animal 
inequality should be a stronger predictor of support for human inequalities 
(e.g., between non-addicts and drug addicts), than other human inequalities 
(e.g., between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill). As opposed to the 
direction being, say, negative attitudes towards drug addicts, which then in turn 
translate to negative attitudes towards animals. What this means, is that further 
questions are raised about the relationship between different human 
inequalities, and whether there may be an asymmetrical human inequality 
(such as towards the mentally ill) which may best predict (and perhaps 
perpetuate) other human inequalities (such as towards drug addicts). While 
these may be fruitful suggestions for further work, they are beyond the scope 
of this thesis (but see the general discussion in chapter 9 for further 
comments). 
The final purpose of pilot study 2 was to identify a comparison group for 
future studies. In the next chapter, we wanted to examine whether challenging 
human supremacy over animals can reduce the endorsement of human 
inequalities. Though we did not have specific hypotheses about which human 
inequality in pilot study 2 would be endorsed the most, we did compare the 
means (and standard deviations) of each measure to inform our subsequent 
experimental studies (in chapter 4). In looking at the level of endorsement of 
each human inequality, we found that participants endorsed the inequality 
between non-addicts and drug addicts the most. Consequently, we chose to 
87 
  
challenge non-addict supremacy over drug addicts as the comparison group 
in our subsequent experimental studies (see chapter 4). 
4.4 General Discussion 
In this chapter, we presented two pilot studies. Initially, we only intended 
to run one pilot study. Pilot study 1 revealed two human inequalities (that 
between men and women, and between white Europeans and ethnic 
minorities) that are not similar to human-animal inequality. Pilot study 2 was 
then developed to identify human inequalities that were similar to human-
animal inequality. The overall goal of the chapter was two-fold. The pilot 
studies were used to see which human inequalities were similar to human-
animal inequality. To do this we developed a scale which captured individual 
differences in the extent to which people endorse various forms of human and 
human-animal inequality. The subscales we developed in the pilot studies will 
now be used as the dependent measure in the subsequent experiments in 
chapter 4. Additionally, the pilot studies were also used to provide a test for 
our correlational foundational hypothesis. That is, we wanted to examine 
whether attitudes towards human-animal inequality were foundational 
(stronger predictors than endorsement of other human inequalities) to human 
inequalities.  
Running two pilot studies was an important first step in this thesis. The 
results of the first pilot study (that human-animal inequality was different to the 
male-female or white European-ethnic minority inequalities) were unexpected, 
and helped us to think more critically about the various inequalities in society, 
and which inequalities would be best to use in our subsequent studies (e.g., 
drug addicts being a more acceptable group to express inequality towards than 
women). We could have perhaps elicited more variance in our pilot study 
measures by using a more conservative sample, and so we sampled from a 
more conservative population in the experiments reported in chapter 4. 
In Pilot 1, parallel analyses suggested a two-factor structure for the 
male-female inequality, and some support for a two-factor structure for the 
human-animal inequality. However, the first principal components of both 
human-animal and male-female PCAs revealed quite different factor solutions. 
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For example, the items about dominance and privilege were present in the 
male-female solution but absent in the human-animal solution. In addition, the 
items about superiority and suffering were present in the human-animal 
solution, but were absent in the human-animal solution. Therefore, we decided 
to retain the first factor of the human-animal solution because these questions 
were more closely measuring our construct of inequality. Accordingly, we 
turned to a second pilot study to identify unequal human intergroup relations 
that participants thought about in the same manner as human-animal relations. 
In our second pilot study, our first important finding was the creation of 
a short scale with strong face validity, convergent validity, and internal 
reliability. Our scale can be used to measure attitudes towards both human-
animal and human inequalities and captures individual differences in the extent 
to which participants endorse oppressive relations between two groups. Our 
second pilot study revealed that the way people think about human-animal 
inequality more closely resembles more psychologically distant, somewhat 
removed, and less studied forms of inequality (such as the treatment of drug 
addicts, the homeless, and the mentally ill) than traditionally studied forms of 
inequality such as sexism and racism (as used in our first pilot study). Taken 
together, and to the best of our knowledge, these pilot studies are the first in 
the published literature on human-animal relations which have pitted various 
systems of human inequality against human-animal inequality, to examine 
which human inequality does in fact most resemble human-animal inequality.  
In short, creating our scale (and identifying which human inequalities 
are similar to human-animal ) was an important first step in examining whether 
oppressing animals is foundational to human forms of . Testing the 
correlational foundational hypothesis revealed that endorsing human-animal  
was not foundational to human inequalities. In addition, we wanted to compare 
the means and standard deviations of the subscales to identify the human 
group for which people had the least concern. Doing so revealed that the ideal 
human group to test our experimental foundational hypothesis in chapter 4 is 
drug addicts. Endorsing the inequality of drug addicts showed strong 
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correlations with endorsing human-animal inequality, and drug addicts were 
the human group which participants endorsed the inequality of the most. 
Finally, the finding that it was groups on the fringes of moral concern 
such as drug addicts (not women or ethnic minorities) which best resembled 
human-animal inequality was interesting. This represents an advancement in 
theorizing in the psychology of human-animal relations. Going further, we 
wondered what other human inequality might be conceptualized in the same 
manner as human-animal inequality. It could be that there are various different 
overlooked human groups that people oppress and think about in a similar way 
to human-animal inequality. Indeed, what remains understudied in both 
human-animal relations and social psychology in general is people’s attitudes 
towards (and participation in) inequality in international relations. This 
prompted us to include in chapter 4, the even more distant (psychologically 
and geographically) inequality of that between the UK and Bangladesh 
sweatshop workers as a dependent variable (to see whether the foundational 
hypothesis showed spill over to an understudied group of highly oppressed 
peoples). We chose to use Bangladesh as they are a distant country where 
many people are thoroughly oppressed to produce clothing in dire 
circumstances, largely for consumption in the West (Siddiqi, 2009).  
4.4.1 Limitations 
There are certain limitations to this chapter of work. Of most importance 
would be the method of scale creation. It is possible that we could have 
conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses in a large sample of 
up to N=500 for each factor analysis (Haig, 2005). We also could have started 
with a larger set of measures, and we may have captured the inequalities 
construct clearer. Indeed, this may have produced a more precise measure. 
However, while that would have been possible to do, we were also working 
within certain resource constraints, particularly time and money, which meant 
we had to make a compromise between creating an ultra-precise measure, 
versus a ‘good enough’ measure which we could use in experimental work. 
We are mindful that the limitations of not conducting exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses are not negligible, and we acknowledge that 
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doing so would be a fruitful avenue for future research. We chose to go with a 
smaller sample size for the pilot studies, and to save additional time and money 
by not doing factor analyses, and instead opted for the use of principal 
components analyses. 
4.4.2 Conclusion 
The key takeaway from chapter 4 is that support for human-animal 
inequality more so reflects less common and understudied human inequalities 
such as the drug addict inequality, than the male-female inequality. In addition, 
chapter 4 found that support for the human-animals inequality can be reliably 
measured, is distinct from generalized prejudice such as SDO, and predicts – 





















Chapter Five: A First Examination of the Foundational 
Hypothesis 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, two pilot studies revealed that the ideal human inequality 
for our first experiment is the drug addict inequality. Specifically, the drug 
addict system produced the same principal components as the human-animal 
system. Chapter 4 revealed that the way people think about human-animal 
inequality more closely resembles forms of inequality toward more 
psychologically distant members of society such as drug addicts (as opposed 
to women and ethnic others as per pilot study 1). Therefore, in study 1, we 
chose to also include a measure of support for the Bangladesh inequality we 
described in chapter 3. In addition, the drug addict inequality was also human 
inequality which participants in the pilot studies showed the most support for. 
To initially test the foundational hypothesis, we used correlational analyses in 
the pilot studies which revealed that endorsing human-animal inequality was 
not foundational to (a stronger correlate of) other human inequalities.  
 In chapter 5, we wanted to experimentally test our experimental 
foundational hypothesis. We wanted to include a thorough test of the 
experimental foundational hypothesis by ruling out that reducing support for 
human inequalities did not also translate to a reduction in support for human-
animal inequality. We chose to use a self-persuasion task to challenge notions 
of supremacy because they have previously been shown to effectively change 
participant’s attitudes towards a topic that the participant initially disagrees 
with, in a cost effective way (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). In self-persuasion 
tasks, participants are instructed to argue for a case that they themselves do 
not necessarily hold (Wilson T. D., 1990). The idea being that while the task is 
ostensibly about convincing someone else about the topic, participants are 
actually persuading themselves while thinking and writing about the topic. We 
wanted participants to engage with, consider, and challenge their own 
supremacist beliefs and accordingly chose self-persuasion as our method of 
attitude change. Further, self-persuasion has been shown to be more powerful 
and have longer lasting effects than direct persuasion (Aronson, 1999). 
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Furthermore, self-persuasion has also been shown to reduce prejudice in 
children (van Dijk, Thomaes, Poorthuis, & de Castro, 2019). Self-persuasion 
can also be more effective when participants feel they have a sense of agency 
in the scenario (compared to low agency) (Damen, Müller, van Baaren, & 
Dijksterhuis, 2015). Finally, self-persuasion has been shown to be more 
effective at changing explicit versus implicit attitudes (Alhabash, & Wise, 
2012).We wanted to develop a type of self-persuasion task that could be easily 
adapted to challenge both human supremacy over animals, and also 
supremacy over drug addicts. We decided to have participants simply 
challenge the idea that one group is superior to another, with the two groups 
depending on the condition. 
We reasoned that having participants write a passage about how 
humans are not superior to animals would disrupt the dominant notion that 
humans are superior to animals (Costello & Hodson, 2009), resulting in those 
participants persuading themselves that humans are not superior to animals. 
We would then measure participants’ endorsement of human-animal and 
human inequalities. Turning to the other direction – non-addict supremacy 
impacting on support for human-animal inequality – we also reasoned that if 
human-animal inequality is foundational to the inequality of humans, then 
challenging non-addict supremacy should not have an impact on the 
participants’ support for human-animal inequality. If, however, we did find that 
challenging non-addict supremacy reduced support for human-animal 
inequality, then this would also be an interesting finding. If this were the case, 
then having participants write a passage about how non-addicts are not 
superior to drug addicts should show an improvement in attitudes towards the 
drug addict inequality compared to a control condition. However, those same 
participants in the drug addicts’ condition should not display lower levels of 
support for human-animal inequality than either the animals or control 
conditions. We also expected both animal and addicts conditions to produce 
the same level of attitudes towards the drug addict inequality, and that both 




5.1.1 Correlational hypotheses. We hypothesized that attitudes 
towards the human-animal, drug addict, and Bangladesh inequalities would all 
be positively correlated. That is, people who support one inequality are likely 
to support other inequalities (Costello & Hodson, 2014). We did not expect that 
support for human-animal inequality would be asymmetrically correlated to 
support for human inequalities, as per the results of the pilot studies in the 
previous chapter. 
5.1.2 Experimental hypotheses. We predicted that participants who 
challenge human supremacy over animals would show reduced support for 
human-animal inequality, and reduced support for human inequality (drug 
addict and Bangladesh inequalities). We predicted that challenging non-addict 
supremacy over drug addicts would show a reduction in endorsing the drug 
addict inequality (but not human-animal inequality), compared to the control 
condition, but not the human supremacy condition; we thought there would be 
no difference in support for the drug addict inequality between the human 
supremacy and the non-addict supremacy conditions. We were unsure 
whether challenging non-addict supremacy would translate to a reduction in 
support for the Bangladesh inequality. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants. We wanted to include a more diverse sample than 
psychology undergraduate students (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), 
and so purposefully recruited adult UK participants from across the political 
spectrum, and a large variety of ages. We were able to do this using the online 
recruitment website Prolific Academic. Sample size was determined a priori 
using g*power software. Using α = .05; power = .80; and f = 0.25 for an 
ANCOVA with three conditions suggested a minimum of 158 participants 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
The 287 participants (120 Male; Mean age 38.31 years, SD = 12.14) 
were paid £1.50 and spent on average 10 minutes and 19 seconds (SD = 4 
minutes and 7 seconds) to complete the study. The minimum time it took 
participants to complete the survey was 5 minutes and 56 seconds, and the 
maximum time was 46 minutes and 15 seconds. In terms of ethnicity, 273 
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participants self-identified as White European, 3 as Black/ African, 1 as East 
Asian, 5 as Indian, 4 as multiracial, and 1 as ‘other’. Regarding citizenship, 276 
participants self-identified as UK citizens, 4 participants were UK permanent 
residents and one participant stated they were not in the UK. In terms of diet, 
156 participants said they were meat eaters, 73 omnivore, 30 had limited meat 
intake (ate no red meat or ate only fish or chicken), 25 were vegetarian, and 3 
were vegan. Participants consented to the study by clicking on the next page 
button on their computer. Participants completed the study in their own time, 
and on an internet enabled device of their choice (e.g., cell phone, tablet, 
desktop computer).  
5.2.2 Design. Participants were given informed consent, and were then 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. Participants were 
instructed to write a few convincing sentences about their assigned topic. 
There was no minimum or maximum time limit given to participants, and they 
could move on to the dependent measures when they decided they had 
completed the writing task. That is, participants could spend as little or as long 
on the written task as they needed. Participants were then given the dependent 
measures, were debriefed and then paid.  
5.2.3 Manipulations 
Challenging Human Supremacy. We wanted to challenge 
participants’ notion of human supremacy over animals. To do this, we had 
participants challenge the widely held belief that humans are superior to 
animals (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). To help participants get started 
writing, we gave an example of the positive aspects of other species, and the 
negative aspects of our own. The first example we gave participants included 
the lay belief that language is one of the pillars that separates humans from 
the animal world (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Because, of course, there are 
many other functions or skills that other species have, we wanted participants 
to consider the skills that other animals have (and that we do not), for instance 
the ability to fly like birds. The intention was to challenge human supremacy 
by offering a different perspective on human abilities, and to consider other 
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animal species’ abilities, in the hope that doing so would make human 
language seem less unique, and therefore human supremacy more fictitious.  
We also wanted to give participants another angle to write from, in the 
form of reminding participants of the violent side of humans. The purpose of 
this was again to challenge human supremacy over animals, but this time by 
providing examples of negative human qualities. Reminders that humans can 
be very violent (Pinker, 2011) might challenge the idea that humans are 
superior to animals because of the refined emotions humans allegedly 
exclusively possess. In other words, how can humans be deemed superior to 
animals when we can be more violent than animals (Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014). We gave participants two broad examples to write about, using the 
following instructions: 
“Imagine you have to convince a friend that humans are not superior to 
animals. The following two ideas might help, or you can use your own ideas! 
1. While humans may be superior than animals at some things, such as talking 
in a language and building houses, there are many things we are not superior 
at. For example, we cannot swim like fish, or fly like birds, and most mammals 
are faster than us. 
2. Also, there are some bad things humans are better at than animals. For 
example humans are very good at being cruel, and hurting and killing other 
people and animals.  
In the space below, write a few sentences about how humans are not superior 
to animals. Allow yourself two or three minutes to write what you would say to 
your friend in the box below.” 
Challenging Non-Addicts Supremacy. In the condition of challenging 
human supremacy, we wanted to challenge participants’ notion of non-addicts 
supremacy over drug addicts (Hari, 2015). To do this, we had participants think 
about relations between non-addicts and addicts, and to challenge widely held 
beliefs, or stereotypes about the two (Hari, 2015). We gave an example of the 
adverse childhood experiences which can increase the likelihood that 
someone will become addicted to drugs (Dube, et al., 2003), and we gave an 
example of more commonly used (and socially acceptable) drugs which many 
people are addicted to, such as caffeine (Olekalns & Bardsley, 1996).  
The first example we gave participants included various forms of 
traumatic childhood experiences, such as growing up in broken homes, or 
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growing up in poverty (Dube, et al., 2003). The purpose of this was to reduce 
the personal blame that can be attributed to drug addicted persons (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006), by reminding participants of the factors which are beyond the 
control of the drug addicted individual, which may contribute to their becoming 
addicted to drugs (Dube, et al., 2003). Doing so should challenge the notion of 
non-addicts supremacy over drug addicts (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In addition, 
we gave another example that reminds participants that people become 
addicted to many other socially acceptable drugs such as alcohol (Olekalns & 
Bardsley, 1996). Doing so should make the drug addict seem more similar, 
and by extension less inferior (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012). 
Participants were instructed with the following: 
“Imagine you have to convince a friend that people who do not take drugs are 
not superior to people who are addicted to drugs. The following two ideas might 
help, or you can use your own ideas! 
1. People who are addicted to drugs often come from broken homes, grew up 
in poverty, or experienced trauma or neglect when they were small children, 
therefore they are not bad people, but are people who have had bad things 
happen to them. 
2. While some people are addicted to 'hard drugs' like cocaine and heroin, a 
lot of people are addicted to 'softer drugs' such as alcohol, cigarettes, tea, or 
coffee. In this way, a lot of people are addicted to things, but some addictions 
are more socially acceptable than others. 
In the space below, write a few sentences about how people who do not take 
drugs are not superior to people who take drugs. Allow yourself two or three 
minutes to write what you would say to your friend in the box below.” 
Control condition. In the control condition, we wanted participants to 
similarly challenge a notion of supremacy in a self-persuasion writing task. 
However, we wanted the topic to be less contentious than drug addiction, and 
so asked participants to write about relations between people who read books, 
and people who watch television. We asked participants to write why people 
who read books are not superior to people who watch TV. The examples we 
gave were that watching TV could be more relaxing than reading a book, and 
that watching TV can be a more social past time. The control condition was 
designed to be structured the same as the other two conditions, but with the 
content of the control condition being an uncontentious or silly notion of 
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supremacy (because in the UK most people have both read books and 
watched TV). We instructed participants in the following: 
“Imagine you have to convince a friend that people who read books are 
not superior to people who watch TV. The following two ideas might help, or 
you can use your own ideas! 
1. People who watch TV can find the activity more relaxing, as it is less 
strenuous than reading a book, thus they can more enjoyment from their 
leisure time. 
2. Also, people tend to read different books and so chatting about books is 
harder than chatting about TV shows, as people tend to watch the same 
shows. 
In the space below, write a few sentences about how people who watch TV are 
not superior to people who read books.  Allow yourself two or three minutes to 
write what you would say to your friend in the box below.” 
5.2.4 Measures 
Human-animal inequality. To measure support for human-animal 
inequality, we used our 4-item measure created in pilot 2 of chapter 2. The 
scale had good internal reliability, α = 0.76, 95% CI [0.72, 0.81].  
Drug addict inequality. To measure support for the drug addict 
inequality, we used our 4-item measure created in pilot 2 of chapter 2. The 
scale had good internal reliability, α = 0.80, 95% CI [0.76, 0.84]. 
Bangladesh inequality. To measure support for the Bangladesh 
inequality, we created a 4-item measure, similar to those created in pilot 2 of 
chapter 2. The scale consisted of the 4 items, British people are superior to 
sweatshop workers from Bangladesh; It is okay that British people benefit from 
the current order of society; It is okay that sweatshop workers from Bangladesh 
suffer from the current order of society. I accept the way British people treat 
sweatshop workers from Bangladesh. Participants answered the questions on 
a sliding scale from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Completely). The scale had good 
internal reliability, α = 0.86, 95% CI [0.83, 0.88]. In addition, a Principal 
Components Analysis with manual extraction of one component supported the 
solution containing the 4-items, X2 (2) = 51.26, p < .001. Note: the inclusion of 




Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Participants support for group-
based inequality was measured with a validated 4-item measure of Social 
Dominance Orientation taken directly from (Wilson & Liu, 2003). Participants 
were asked “for each of the following questions about groups in general, 
indicate whether you think the statement is positive or negative:” Winning is 
more important than how the game is played; Getting ahead by any means 
necessary; Sometimes war is necessary to put other countries in their place; 
Inferior groups should stay in their place. The scale was anchored from 1 (Very 
Negative), through 3 (Neutral), to 5 (Very Positive), and had good internal 
reliability, α = .78, 95% CI [0.73, 0.82]. 
Political Orientation. To capture individual differences in participant’s 
political orientation, we used a one-item measure asking how left-wing or right 
wing participants were. Participants answered the question from 0 (left wing) 
to 100 (conservative). 
Age. To measure participants age, we asked participants “how old are 
you?”, and participants entered their age in a text box (e.g., 21). 
Gender. To measure participants’ gender, we asked participants to 
select one of three categories that were: male, female, or other. 
Ethnicity. To measure participants’ ethnicity, we asked participants to 
select one of eight categories that were: white/European, Black/African, 
Hispanic, East Asian, Indian, Arab, Multiracial, or Other. 
UK citizenship. To measure participants’ citizenship status, we had 
participants select one of four options that were: UK citizen, UK permanent 
resident, UK student visa, or not living in the UK. 
Diet. To measure participants’ diet, participants were asked what best 
describes your diet and were given the following six options: Meat eater, 
omnivore, limited meat intake (no red meat), limited meat intake (only fish or 
chicken), vegetarian, or vegan. 
Warmth. Participants were given a single item measure of warmth 
towards each target group. Participants were asked to rate how warm they felt 





5.3.1 Analysis strategy. We employed both frequentist (SPSS 
software) and Bayesian analyses (JASP software), and ran different models 
with and without SDO as a covariate. Unlike null hypothesis significance 
testing, Bayesian model comparison allows for tests in favour of the null 
hypothesis. Bayesian analyses also allows for model comparison between the 
null, the covariate, the independent variable, and the independent variable 
controlling for the covariate. We also ran our main analyses with and without 
the ethnic minorities and vegetarians/vegans. For simplicity, we report Bayes 
factors alongside null hypothesis significance tests, although we conducted 
these tests separately  
5.3.2 Preliminary data treatment. Originally, 298 participants took part 
in the survey. We removed 11 participants because they did not follow 
instructions in the essential writing task (i.e., they wrote in favour of the wrong 
side of the argument, or wrote so little their argument could not be deciphered) 
which left us with 287 participants for analyses. However, when looking at the 
participants written responses, we noticed that in the control condition, around 
one quarter of participants (27) wrote in the wrong direction of the argument 
(e.g., that people who watch TV are not superior to people who read books). 
In looking at the survey on qualitrics, we noticed that there was an error in the 
control manipulation, which stated for participants to both write that people who 
read books are not superior, and then it instructed participants to write about 
how people who watch TV are not superior (conflicting instructions). We 
therefore wanted to see whether there was a difference between instructions 
people followed, and their scores on the dependent measures.  
We ran an independent samples Bayesian T-test, with the direction of 
the participants written response as a between subjects factor (book readers 
are not superior to TV watchers versus TV watchers are not superior to people 
who read books), on their endorsement of human-animal inequality. The 
results revealed there was inconclusive evidence that participants who wrote 
about book readers not being superior (N = 71, M = 41.20, SD = 18.92) scored 
different on human-animal inequality measure (N = 27, M = 45.50, SD = 17.95), 
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BF10 = 0.37. Because of this result, we decided to keep the participants in the 
control condition together. It is noteworthy that the purpose of the control 
condition was to challenge a form of supremacy between two groups where 
there is no inequality (i.e., book readers and TV watchers), so we did not 
anticipate seeing any differences between groups, irrespective of whether the 
book readers or the TV watchers were deemed superior in the task. The next 
study (in chapter 4) rectified this error by making sure the manipulation wording 
was correct. 
5.3.3 Missing data. 40 participants had missing data, the majority of 
which were just missing an answer to one or two questions in the dependent 
measures. The missing data was replaced with the mean of the scale (50) as 
in the pilot studies. 
5.3.4 Correlational results. Please see Table 5.1 below for 
correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors between all variables in 
study 1. Supporting our correlational hypotheses, the attitudes towards all 
three inequalities (human-animal, drug addict, and Bangladesh) were all 
positively correlated. Attitudes towards animals were again not more strongly 
correlated with the human target groups than the other human group, and vice 
versa. These correlational results provide further evidence that human-animal 
inequality is not asymmetrically correlated to human inequalities.  
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
drug addict and Bangladesh inequalities. Conservative political orientation was 
correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, but like SDO, 
was more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the human groups.  
When looking at warmth, feelings of warmth towards animals was 
negatively correlated with support for human-animal inequality, but was not 
correlated with attitudes towards human inequalities. Warmth towards animals 
was also not correlated with warmth towards drug addicts, but was correlated 
with warmth towards Bangladesh workers. Warmth towards drug addicts was 
strongly negatively correlated with support for the drug addict inequality, and 
so too was warmth towards Bangladesh workers and support for the 
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Bangladesh inequality. Feelings of warmth towards drug addicts were also 








Table 5.1. Showing Pearson correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors, between all variables in study 1. 
Variable  1.Human-
Animal 
2.Drug addict 3.Bang- 
ladesh 






2 r  0.38         
p  < .001         
 BF10 3.81e+8        
3 r  0.41  0.62        
p < .001  < .001        
 BF10 4.87e+10 3.47e+28       
4 r  0.30 0.48  0.54      
p < .001  < .001  < .001       
 BF10 1.23e+5 1.31e+15 1.11e+20      
5 r  0.20  0.48  0.42  0.48      
p  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001      
 BF10 37.09 3.11e+15 1.70e+11 1.23e+15     
6 r  -0.36  -0.02  -0.12  -0.07  0.04     
p  < .001  0.378  0.018  0.106  0.759     
 BF10 3.16e+7 0.10 1.29 0.29 0.05    
7 r  -0.16  -0.60  -0.33  -0.35  -0.40  0.05    
p 0.003  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  0.186    
 BF10 6.19 8.42e+26 1.11e+6 1.21e+7 8.22e+9 0.04   
8 r  -0.20  -0.35  -0.44  -0.32  -0.18  0.18  0.35  - 
p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  0.002  0.008  < .001  - 
 BF10 34.27 1.21e+7 3.47e+12 5.61e+5 11.30 2.70 1.09e+7 - 
Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 





It is interesting to note that feelings of warmth only correlate low to 
moderately with support for the inequality, for both humans and animals, and 
British and Bangladesh people, and that warmth and support for the inequality 
was only strongly correlated for drug addicts. This is interesting because most 
people in the study likely contribute to the inequality of both animals and 
Bangladesh people (via their consumption of meat/animal products and their 
consumption of sweatshop clothing from Bangladesh), more directly than they 
do contribute to oppressing drug addicts. From the correlational results, 
participants’ feelings of warmth (or coldness) towards drug addicts are more 
aligned with participants support for the drug addict inequality, than were the 
correlations between the other target groups. Whereas for the human-animal 
and the Bangladesh inequalities, the weaker relationship between endorsing 
the inequality and feelings of warmth, suggest that participants’ feelings of 
warmth and acceptance of inequality are not as tightly aligned as they are for 
drug addicts. This discrepancy between feelings of warmth and support for 
human-animal inequality is consistent with research on the meat paradox 
(Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). 
5.3.5 Experimental Results 
Human-animal inequality. To examine whether there were differences 
in participant’s support for human-animal inequality, we conducted a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with condition as a between subjects factor. We 
ran our ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to control for individual 
differences in SDO.  
Please see Figure 5.1 below for the mean level of support for human-
animal inequality per conditions. See also Figure 4.7 at the end of this section 
for a graph showing mean level of support for all three inequalities, by 
condition.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference in the support for human-animal inequality between conditions, F(2, 
284) = 1.42, p = 0.244, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01, BFM = 4.26e -6. That is, both the animals (M 
= 38.04, SD = 19.47) and the addicts condition (M = 38.63, SD = 18.72) 




than the control condition (M = 42.24, SD = 18.57). Levene’s test for equality 
of variance was not violated, F(2, 284) = 0.08, p = .928. When including SDO 
in the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 283) = 30.90, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2
  
= 0.10, BFM = 8.88 and the overall model improved and became marginally 
significant, but was not supported by Bayesian analyses, F(2, 283) = 2.46, p = 
0.087, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.02, BFM = 1.01.  
Bayesian model comparison results showed good support for SDO 
predicting support for human-animal inequality, inconclusive evidence that 
condition and SDO together predicted support for human-animal inequality, 
and strong evidence against a main effect of condition. Bayesian model 
comparison also revealed strong evidence against the null model, BFM = 
3.139e -5. To sum, Bayesian model comparison revealed that individual 
differences in SDO best predicted attitudes towards human-animal inequality, 
suggesting there was inconclusive evidence that our manipulation had an 
effect on support for human-animal inequality. 
 
Figure 5.1. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for human-
animal inequality per condition. Higher numbers equal more support. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards animals. We ran a similar ANOVA model to examine 
any differences in perceptions of warmth towards animals. See Figure 5.2 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards animals per conditions. The 
results revealed no significant difference in feelings of warmth towards animals 
between conditions, F(2, 284) = 0.09, p = 0.913, 𝜂𝑝


































Participants in the animal (M = 80.93, SD = 17.23), addicts (M = 80.49, SD = 
21.32), and control conditions (M = 81.63, SD = 17.25) all displayed high levels 
of warmth towards animals. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed 
SDO was not a significant covariate F(1, 283) = 1.48, p = 0.224, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM 
= 0.77, and the model remained non-significant, F(2, 283) = 0.06, p = 0.943, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.00, BFM = 0.03. Further, Bayesian model comparison showed support 
for the null model, BFM = 9.27, providing good evidence there was no effect of 
condition or SDO in predicting warmth towards animals.  
 
Figure 5.2. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
animals per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 
1 standard error.  
Drug addict inequality. To examine whether there were differences in 
participant’s support for the drug addict inequality, we conducted a one way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with condition as a between subjects factor. 
Again, we ran our ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to control for 
individual differences in SDO. See figure 5.3 below for the mean level of 
support for the drug addict inequality per condition. 
Supporting our hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed a significant difference 
in the support for the drug addict inequality between conditions, F(2, 284) = 
4.67, p = 0.010, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.03. However, contrary to our hypothesis, the animals 
condition (M = 33.19, SD = 23.36) did not show significantly less support for 
the drug addict inequality compared to the control condition (M = 34.30, SD = 
























the drug addicts condition (M = 25.63, SD = 19.88) displayed less support for 
the drug addict inequality than both the animals, 95% CI [-15.00, -0.12], and 
the control condition, 95% CI [-16.04, -1.30]. However, dissimilar to the 
frequentist analysis, Bayesian post hoc comparisons suggested there was 
inconclusive support for the difference between the addicts and animals 
condition, BF10,U  = 2.16, and good support for the difference between the 
addicts and the control condition BF10,U  = 10.08. Levene’s test for equality of 
variance was not violated, F(2, 284) = 1.42, p = .243. When including SDO in 
the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 283) = 91.83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2
  = 
0.25, BFM = 0.08, and the overall model improved, F(2, 283) = 7.83, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.05, BFM =120.58.  
Bayesian model comparison showed strong support that the model 
including SDO as a covariate best explained the variance in support for the 
drug addict inequality, and weak evidence for SDO alone predicting support 
for the drug addict inequality. In addition, Bayesian model comparison 
revealed very strong evidence against the null model, BFM = 1.383e -16, and 
very strong evidence against a main effect of condition, BFM = 3.468e -16. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the drug addict’s manipulation 
revealed a difference in support for the drug addict inequality between 
conditions, when controlling for individual differences in SDO.  
 
Figure 5.3 Showing participants in the non-addict supremacy condition 
































and marginally less than the human supremacy condition. Higher numbers 
equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error.  
Warmth towards drug addicts. We ran a similar ANOVA model to 
examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards drug addicts. See 
Figure 5.4 below for the mean feelings of warmth towards drug addicts per 
condition. The results revealed a significant difference in feelings of warmth 
towards drug addicts between conditions, F(2, 284) = 4.68, p = .010, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.03. 
Participants in the addicts condition (M = 47.33, SD = 21.59) displayed higher 
levels of warmth towards drug addicts than both participants in the animal (M 
= 37.44, SD = 24.19), and control conditions (M = 40.49, SD = 21.90). Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferoni adjustments, and Bayesian post hoc comparisons 
revealed that only the difference between the animals and addicts condition 
was significant, p = .009, 95% CI [-17,85, -1.93], BF10,U  = 8.52. When 
controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 
283) = 41.01, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.13, BFM = 0.53, and the overall model remained 
significant, F(2, 283) = 5.62, p = .004, η² p  = 0.04, BFM = 17.01. In short, unlike 
warmth towards animals, warmth towards drug addicts was best predicted by 
the between subjects factor of condition, while controlling for individual 
differences in SDO. 
 
Figure 5.4. Showing participants in the non-addict supremacy condition had 
warmer feelings towards drug addicts than participants in the human-animal 
condition, and marginally more than the control condition. Higher numbers 

























Bangladesh inequality. To examine whether there were differences in 
participant’s support for the Bangladesh inequality, we conducted a one way 
ANOVA, with condition as a between subjects factor. Again, we ran our 
ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to control for individual 
differences in SDO. See figure 5.5 below for the mean level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality per condition. 
In contrast with our hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference in the support for the Bangladesh inequality between conditions, 
F(2, 284) = 1.08, p = .342, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM  = 6.020e -21. The animals condition 
(M = 22.23, SD = 21.86) did not show significantly less support for the 
Bangladesh inequality compared to the control condition (M = 21.10, SD = 
19.81) or the addicts condition (M = 18.05, SD = 18.41). Levene’s test for 
equality of variance was not violated, F(2, 284) = 1.78, p = .171. When 
including SDO in the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 283) = 
117.36, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.29, BFM = 12.49, and the overall model improved, but 
remained non-significant, F(2, 283) = 2.11, p = .123, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.02, BFM = 0.72. 
Bayesian model comparison also revealed very strong evidence against the 
null model, BFM = 6.066e -20. Taken together, Bayesian model comparison 
revealed there was inconclusive evidence that there was an effect of condition 
on support for the Bangladesh inequality, and good evidence that SDO alone 



































Figure 5.5. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality per condition. Higher numbers equal more support. 
Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards Bangladeshi workers. We ran another ANOVA 
model to examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards 
Bangladesh workers. See Figure 5.6 below for the mean feelings of warmth 
towards Bangladeshi workers per condition. The results revealed no significant 
difference in feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh workers between 
conditions, F(2, 281) = 2.08, p = .126, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.02, BFM = 1.824e -6. Participants 
in the addicts condition (M = 74.04, SD = 21.26) displayed higher levels of 
warmth towards Bangladesh workers than both participants in the animal (M = 
67.03, SD = 25.97), and control conditions (M = 70.40, SD = 22.86), but these 
differences were not significant. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA 
showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 280) = 32.48, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.10, 
BFM = 10.11, however, the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 280) 
= 2.30, p = .102, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.02, BFM = 0.89. Bayesian model comparison also 
revealed very strong evidence against the null model, BFM = 7.345e -6. That 
is, similar to attitudes towards Bangladesh workers, Bayesian model 
comparison revealed there was inconclusive evidence of an effect of condition 
on the dependent variable, and good evidence that SDO alone best predicted 




























Figure 5.6. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
Bangladesh workers per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Post Hoc Bayesian Analyses. Because the limited research on human 
animal relations most relevant to the current work sometimes excludes 
vegetarians (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012) and sometimes 
excludes ethnic minorities (Costello & Hodson, 2009) in their samples, we then 
removed 3 vegans and 25 vegetarians, leaving a sample of 259. We further 
removed 14 participants who did not self-identify as white Europeans, leaving 
a final sample of 245 white European meat eaters. We then re ran the main 
analyses (support for the human-animal and human inequalities) using 
Bayesian analyses, which is robust to multiple post-hoc comparisons on the 
data set. All effects remained the same as with the full sample. That is, the two 
effects we found support for (drug addicts covariate models for main DV and 
warmth) remained, and all other main effects and ANCOVAs remained 
unsupported. 
5.3.6 Qualitative Analyses. In study 1, we found that the drug addicts’ 
manipulation had a significant effect on the support for the drug addict 
inequality. This effect held when controlling for SDO, and with and without 
vegetarians, vegans, and ethnic minorities. We then wondered why there was 
no effect on endorsing human-animal inequality in the human supremacy 
condition. To begin answering this question, we turned to what the participants 
wrote about in the human supremacy condition, to see whether there were 
differences in what participants wrote about. 
Method. To analyse the written response participants completed as 
part of their manipulation, we turned to content analyses, which is used to 
reduce written language down into smaller content categories (Elo & Kyngas, 
2008). We used an inductive approach to the content analysis because we had 
no prior knowledge about what categories to sort the content into and we 
needed to derive the categories from the data (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). The unit 
of analysis in content analysis can be the word, a sentence, or a paragraph. 
Consequently, we opted for the ‘category’ level distinction, whether that was 




manifest content (explicit) and did not read into latent content (hidden 
meanings or interpretations of the response).  
Procedure. We read the written answers participants gave to get a 
sense of what was being written. We then went through the qualitative data 
again, this time making comments about the main points of their argument. 
The purpose of the content analysis is to reduce the data down to key topics 
that participants used to make their arguments. We wanted to see whether the 
frame or content of their argument was related to their results on the dependent 
measures. 
Results. We found that there were 3 main topics that participants chose 
to write about. Participants tended to write about (1) the notion of supremacy 
is arbitrary (2) negative human qualities, or (3) providing positive descriptions 
of animals. However, within each category, there were also other 
subcategories which were not examined empirically, but which provide insight 
into the types of thoughts that sprang to mind when participants were asked to 
support the notion that humans are not superior to animals. 
The notion of supremacy is arbitrary. The category that was the most 
distinct (but also the least used), was challenging the validity and legitimacy of 
the argument itself. For example, 5 participants suggested that the notion of 
superiority was itself invalid because of its subjective nature. For example, one 
participant began by writing: 
“The only way you could say that humans are "superior" is by defining 
"superior" to mean the things that humans are good at”. 
This response illustrates an insightful and thoughtful response to the 
manipulation. The same participant went on to describe how subjective and 
anthropocentric (human centric) the notion of human supremacy is, by 
illustrating how another animal might think about supremacy: 
“..I'm sure if you asked a cat what the definition of "superior" is, the cat would 
say its sharp claws and the ability to catch small animals”. 
However, a common theme throughout the content analysis was that 
participants often wrote about more than one example, and so imposing 




went on to describe some of the negative qualities of humans, which is another 
category in itself (which we get to below): 
“..We do have some unique properties among animals, but it seems they are 
mainly wasted on us as we just seem to mess things up using them.” 
Another participant wrote about the arbitrary nature of supremacy in the 
following way: 
“The claim that humans are superior to animals is almost meaningless in that 
we are attempting to apply an entirely human concept (superiority in a general 
sense) to creatures which by their nature do not recognise this concept.” 
This response reveals again that the concept of ‘humans being superior 
to animals’ is anthropocentric, and based on things which humans may claim 
to be the important criteria for saying one is superior to another. That is, the 
notion of supremacy is open to interpretation. The same participant goes on to 
provide a rich explanation and further analogy: 
“While it may be true that if you select certain metrics which humans consider 
important (intelligence, language, ability to dominate) then you can say that 
humans score higher, all this proves is that the things humans select measures 
which place them above animals when attempting to consider where they 
stand.  This claim appears to be like a plumber claiming superiority over a 
builder because they're better at dealing with plumbing.” 
Negative human qualities. A second category arose which comprised 
of the negative qualities of humans. Participants either wrote about humans 
being cruel and evil, or humans having poor animalistic qualities (e.g., being 
bad at hunting and survival), or a combination of the two. For example, one 
participant focussed on the bad qualities of humans, such as: 
“We are the only species that kill other species for reasons other than hunger. 
We are also the only species that is wrecking the environment, leaving us with 
nowhere to live in the future. Our greed has overtaken common sense, and 
our intelligence has moved us out of a normal evolutionary cycle, where the 
fittest survive.” 
This participant’s response contains information about humans killing 




negative aspects of humans, providing the idea that killing is okay when one 
can justify it (such as when one is ‘hunger’) does raise questions about 
reinforcing human supremacy by justifying the killing of animals. In addition to 
some of the negative things humans do, another participant wrote that 
unskilled aspects of human nature: 
“..We are weak when we are first born and take 16-20 years to fully develop 
whereas some animals can fend for themselves after a few hours of being 
born.”  
The idea of humans being weak and lacking survival skills came up in 
other ways. For example, another participant wrote that: 
“Humans though have higher intellect than animals but their other senses have 
dimmed or have lost its sharpness, for example the sense of sight, touch, 
hearing, taste etc.  Larger cranial capacity came at the cost of these senses.  
While animals are very good at these senses and are adapted to its habitat in 
a much better manner than the humans.” 
This response begins with a caveat that humans have higher intellect 
than animals, but that this has come at the cost of other senses being dimmed. 
This was a common response for participants who wrote about negative 
human qualities, and that participant then went on to describe times when 
animals show compassion, and are more thoughtful in their killing. For 
example: 
 “Animals show aggression only when they are hungry or for self-defence and 
will not hurt for any other reason, unlike humans.  Animals are not calculative, 
greedy and self-centred like humans.” 
This participant therefore provided examples of both humans being bad, 
and animals being good in their response. Alongside reporting more than one 
concept in their response, another difficulty in the qualitative results were those 
participants whose response were in ways unintelligible. For example, one 
participant began by writing that: 
“If we didn't have tools/technology, we would be quite low on the food 
chain…would you fight a lion a bear, monkey without something to defend 




However, while this could be seen as a criticism of human supremacy, 
this participant then went on to write:  
“but as a human brain work[s] in a far more complex way we have adapted as 
you can see by how [far] we have advanced with tools etc. rather [than] must 
eat to live living style and have strength rather [than] brains, we are no different 
from any animal as we also have this built in as we do require food to eat so 
we just go a shop not the local watering pool for a chance to eat.” 
As can be seen, this participants’ writing becomes quickly unclear, and 
difficult to interpret. While this was not frequently observed, the legibility of the 
responses, and perhaps how persuasive responses are, may be fruitful 
avenues for future research on self-persuasion and human animal relations to 
include. 
Positive animal qualities. Complementing those who wrote about the 
downfall of humans, others chose to write about the positive qualities of 
animals. These responses included two main subgroups; that animals had 
better animalistic and survival qualities than humans, or that animals were kind 
and not as malicious as humans. For example, this response below captures 
well the two key categories of positive animal qualities: 
“Most animals have a superior sense than humans, be that smell or sight or 
hearing. Dogs have infinitely better sense of smell, birds have better eyesight 
and bats can hear better. They only hunt to eat and not for pleasure. They are 
far more resourceful than humans and can survive extremes in temperature 
far better.” 
This response included examples of animals having sharper senses 
than humans; that animals are more considerate (hunters) and resourceful 
than humans. Other examples that animals have sharper senses than humans 
surround the idea that animals can fend for themselves earlier on in life than 
humans. For example, one response started with: 
“Most animals are relatively independent after a few weeks of being born, out 
can walk within days. Humans rely on the constant supervision of parents, in 





However, while this participant included positive things about animals, 
they also included negative things about humans, specifically that children 
contribute nothing to the species when they are young. In short, there were 
three main categories surrounding what participants chose to write about. 
These were that the idea of human supremacy is arbitrary, the idea that 
humans do many bad things, and the idea that animals can do very good 
things. In addition to these responses, there were some additional interesting 
responses that are beyond the scope of analysis here. These include the idea 
that ‘humans are actually animals’, and that ‘humans and animals are equal in 
many ways’.  
Another way of interpreting the data could have been the types of 
animal species which participants compared humans to. For instance, it could 
be that the term ‘animal’ means different things to different people. For the 
most part, participants did not actually mention a specific animal species, and 
just wrote about ‘animals’ in their responses. However some participants did. 
Of those, participants either wrote about wild majestic animals, such as lions, 
elephants and tigers; fish who swim in the open seas, or birds who can fly – 
presumably they were not thinking about fish in private fish tanks, or birds in 
captivity. In addition, some participants also mentioned domestic dogs as 
examples of well natured animals. It would be interesting to explore further 
whether using specific animals, or categories of animals (such as farm cattle 
and sheep, wild, carnivorous, or herbivorous animals) would have an impact 
on the psychological process that occurs for participants during the 
manipulation. It may be that challenging human supremacy over majestic 
animals (such as lions or tigers), may not improve attitudes towards humans 
so much as challenging attitudes towards those animals we routinely exploit, 
such as farm animals and domestic pets. To sum, the qualitative aspect of the 
research in this chapter informed us that using different groups of animals such 
as (wild vs farmed vs pets) might be promising avenues for future research, 
but are questions which are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Discussion. Taken together, while there are many different ways of 




three categories to be used in a further analysis, where we employed a 
research assistant (RA) to code each written answer into one of the three 
categories that were developed. We would then test if there were any 
differences in the support for human-animal inequality, based upon what 
participants wrote about in the human supremacy manipulation. The RA who 
coded the responses was blind to hypotheses. 
Qualitative content Bayesian analysis. The purpose of analysing the 
RA’s findings were to see whether the three categories developed in the 
content analysis had an impact on the dependent measures. If there was a 
difference, then this would direct our manipulations in the subsequent studies, 
and inform whether we should use a more specific manipulation wording in the 
human supremacy condition.  
Method. The RA classified each written response in the human 
supremacy condition based off the three following groups. The coder was 
instructed to use whole sentences or paragraphs to decide which category to 
place participants in. We originally planned to use 2 coders to be able to test 
for inter-rater reliability, however, only one of our coders completed the task, 
and we therefore could not compute inter-rater reliability. The RA helped with 
this research as part of a volunteer work experience program in the department 
of psychology at the University of Edinburgh (not paid or given course credit). 
The three categories the RA had to place each participant’s qualitative 
response into were the three categories that emerged from our content 
analysis. 
1. The notion that humans are superior to animals is arbitrary 
2. Focus is on humans (e.g., humans do bad/cruel things, humans are useless 
hunters etc.) 
3. Focus is on animals (e.g., animals are faster than us/ better swimmers etc., 
or animals are kind etc.) 
However, in qualitative research, often an answer can go into numerous 
different categories. To keep things simple, the research assistant was 
therefore also instructed that if people wrote about more than one of the above 




off of which is most written about, or which is written about first, or what the 
research assistant thought made better sense.  
Results. To analyse the research assistants’ analysis of the qualitative 
data, we used Bayesian analysis, which is more robust to unequal sample 
sizes than frequentist statistics. We ran a one-way ANOVA with content 
category as a between subjects factor (arbitrary vs. focus on humans vs focus 
on animals), on human supremacy. The results revealed that there was 
inconclusive evidence for the null model, BF10 = 0.27, and inconclusive 
evidence for the main effect of condition, BF10 = 0.12. When including SDO as 
a covariate, the results revealed moderate evidence for SDO predicting 
support for human-animal inequality, BF10 = 4.05, and inconclusive evidence 
that condition with SDO partialled out predicted support for human-animal 
inequality, BF10 =1.32. Participants who wrote about the arbitrary nature of 
human supremacy (M = 23.65, SD = 23.96, N = 5), endorsed human-animal 
inequality less than participants who wrote about humans being bad (M = 
39.75, SD = 18.95, N = 55), or participants who wrote about animals being 
good (M = 35.15, SD = 19.99, N = 34), however, the difference were not 
significant. It is important to note the small sample size of (N = 5) for the human 
supremacy is arbitrary condition, which means that caution should be taken in 
interpreting any results with a sample this small, as any data point has a much 
stronger effect on the means and SD compared to larger samples.  
Discussion. Taken together, analysing the results of the RA’s coding 
provided inconclusive evidence for or against a meaningful difference based 
upon what was written in the animal condition. In short, there was inconclusive 
evidence that the content of the human supremacy manipulation had an impact 
on support for human-animal inequality. 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Correlational Results. First looking at our correlational results, 
we found that support for human-animal and human inequalities (i.e., drug 
addict, and Bangladesh) were all positively correlated. Similar to pilot study 2 
in chapter 2, and supporting our predictions, we again did not find support for 




inequality was not a stronger predictor of support for the drug addict inequality 
than was support for the Bangladesh inequality. Similarly, support for human-
animal inequality was not a stronger predictor of attitudes towards the 
Bangladesh inequality than was support for the drug addict inequality. As 
expected, feelings of coldness towards the target groups (e.g., drug addicts) 
were correlated with support for the associated inequality (e.g., the drug addict 
inequality). 
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
drug addict and Bangladesh inequalities. Conservative political orientation was 
correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, but like SDO, 
was more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the human groups. These 
correlational results provide further evidence that human-animal inequality is 
not asymmetrically correlated to human inequalities. 
5.4.2 Experimental results. In study 1 we did not find any evidence for 
either of our first two experimental hypotheses. The results revealed that 
having participants write a short passage challenging human supremacy over 
animals, did not reduce the support for human-animal inequality relative to 
participants in the other two conditions. In addition, those same participants 
who completed a self-persuasion task challenging human supremacy did not 
show reduced support for human inequality (i.e., the drug addict, and 
Bangladesh inequalities). In other words, the human supremacy manipulation 
did not yield a reduction in support for human-animal inequality, and compared 
to the control condition, there was no reduction in support for human 
inequalities either. In short, we found no evidence for the experimental 
foundational hypothesis. 
Turning to our other hypotheses surrounding human supremacy 
impacting on human-animal relations, we reasoned that if human-animal 
inequality is foundational to human inequalities, then challenging the notion of 
non-addict supremacy over drug addicts’ should not have an impact on support 
for human-animal inequality. However, participants in the non-addicts 




inequality compared to controls; we were unsure whether challenging non-
addict supremacy would have an impact on attitudes towards the British-
Bangladesh inequality. We also expected both human supremacy and non-
addict supremacy conditions to produce similar levels of support for the drug 
addict inequality, and that both conditions would display less support for the 
drug addict inequality than controls.  
We found mixed support for these hypotheses. The participants who 
wrote about non-addicts not being superior to drug addicts did show a 
reduction in support for the drug addict inequality compared to the two other 
conditions. However, we did not find that the non-addicts supremacy and 
human supremacy conditions displayed similar levels of support for the drug 
addict inequality. This finding shows the non-addict supremacy manipulation 
we developed was effective for reducing support for the drug addict inequality. 
We also found that challenging the notion of non-addict supremacy over drug 
addicts did not translate into a reduction of support for the human-animal or 
Bangladesh inequalities. This latter finding provides initial support that 
challenging human forms of supremacy (in this case of non-addict supremacy 
over drug addicts), does not have downstream effects on human-animal, or 
other human inequalities. These effects remained when analysing the data 
without vegetarians (and vegans) and ethnic minorities. 
In looking at feelings of warmth, there was no difference in feelings of 
warmth towards animals between conditions. All participants showed high 
levels of warmth. Feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh workers were just 
below feelings of warmth towards animals and there was also no significant 
difference in feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh workers between 
conditions. There was a significant main effect of condition on feelings of 
warmth towards drug addicts, and this effect remained significant when 
controlling for SDO. Participants in the addicts’ condition attributed significantly 
more warmth towards drug addicts than participants in the human supremacy 
condition, and marginally significantly more warmth than those in the control 
condition, however the mean of all conditions was below the mid-point of the 




and ethnic minorities who might have more favourable attitudes towards 
animals and ethnic others, respectively.  
Taking a step back from specific hypotheses and analyses, looking at 
the relation between support for the inequalities, and warmth towards the 
oppressed groups paints an interesting picture. The correlation between 
support for human-animal inequality, and warmth towards animals was much 
weaker than the correlations between either of human inequality and their 
corresponding measures of warmth. In addition, participants displayed the 
highest feelings of warmth towards animals, even though participants 
displayed the highest level of support for human-animal inequality. Participants 
displayed the highest level of warmth towards Bangladeshis, and the 
Bangladesh inequality was given the least support out of all measured 
inequalities. Participants displayed cold-neutral feelings towards drug addicts, 
even though they endorsed the drug addict inequality less than they did 
human-animal inequality. These findings reflect well the meat paradox – that 
people can both love and harm animals (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). People 
can have positive feelings towards animals, all the while endorsing human-
animal inequality. 
5.4.5 Qualitative results. The result of study 1 that the human 
supremacy manipulation did not have an effect on support for human-animal 
or human inequalities was unexpected. We turned to a content analysis of 
participants’ text this. We found three main topics (1) the notion of supremacy 
is arbitrary (2) negative human qualities, or (3) providing positive descriptions 
of animals.  
Participants who wrote about the notion of supremacy being arbitrary 
tended to write about how fickle and ill-founded supremacist beliefs were, and 
how anthropocentric trying to claim that humans are superior to animals was. 
Only 5 participants approached the task in this way, and they gave quite 
convincing arguments. In retrospect, challenging the very idea of supremacy 
itself may be a decent way to reduce supremacist beliefs in more than one 
domain. The majority of participants wrote about negative human qualities (N 




(some) people’s desire to kill animals for the fun of it. It is possible that 
participants who write about negative human qualities were reinforcing their 
stereotypes and heuristics about vulnerable human groups (such as drug 
addicts, homeless people, and sweatshop workers from Bangladesh). 
Because most participants in the human supremacy condition chose to write 
about negative human qualities, the promotion of heuristic thinking towards 
outgroups could explain the lack of effects in study 1. The finding that 
participants mostly chose to write about the negative qualities of humans was 
unexpected, but noteworthy. In particular, the participants who wrote about 
negative human qualities provided stereotypical examples of prejudice 
towards outgroups such as drug addicts or sweatshop workers from 
Bangladesh – namely that they are useless humans, cannot look after 
themselves, or fend for themselves properly. While speculative, it may be that 
when those participants went on to answer the dependent measures about 
drug addicts and sweatshop workers from Bangladesh, they had a heightened 
sense of apathy for the very inequalities we were trying to reduce. In a similar 
vein, it might be that instead of the group-based supremacy manipulated in 
this thesis, future work could benefit from looking at challenging supremacy at 
the individual level. Such future work could explore whether challenging 
individual supremacy over animals (e.g., ‘I am not superior to animals’ as 
opposed to ‘humans are not superior to animals’; and supremacy over 
individual animals as opposed to the group animals) could be a more efficient 
manipulation than the group-based manipulations presented. Such an 
exploration is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 The remaining participants (N = 34) wrote about the positive aspects 
of animals, and they tended to focus on wild carnivorous animals and stress 
those animals’ survival instincts. It is interesting to note that most participants 
did not give an example of a particular animal (e.g., cows or lions) and instead 
used the term ‘animals’ as instructed. No participants mentioned the animals 
that are commonly used for human consumption, (chickens, cows, pigs). We 
hired a research assistant to code each participant’s response and we then 




the focus of their passage. We found that participants who wrote about the 
arbitrary nature of supremacy endorsed human-animal inequality less than 
participants who wrote about negative human qualities or positive animal 
qualities, however, the Bayesian results showed inconclusive evidence that 
there was a difference in support for human-animal inequality.  
5.4.6 Limitations of Study 1. There are at least three limitations in 
study 1 that may have affected our findings. Firstly, as previously mentioned 
in the methods section, there was an error in the control condition 
manipulation. The condition stated both, that participants should write that 
“people who read books are not superior to people who watch TV”, and 
(incorrectly) that “people who watch TV are not superior to people who read 
books”. Although this typo is unfortunate, we ran a Bayesian t-test to see 
whether participants who followed one versus the other instructions scored any 
different on human-animal inequality measure, which revealed there was no 
difference. We then analysed all control participants together in subsequent 
analyses, and made sure there was no typos in future studies. 
Second, we decided to measure support for the Bangladesh inequality 
after having conducted the pilot studies, and we therefore did not run a PCA 
before reducing the scale down to the 4 items that is was. However, the scale 
had good internal reliability, and a Principal Components Analysis revealed 
good support for the 4-item measure. Internal reliability analyses also provided 
additional support for the measure, as did correlations with the existing 
measures from pilot study 2. 
Finally, in all our conditions (but particularly the human supremacy 
condition), we found that participants within conditions wrote about different 
things. For instance, some people in the human supremacy condition wrote 
about humans not being superior to animals, some people wrote about 
humans and animals being equal, and some people wrote that the notion of 
supremacy itself was arbitrary. We hired a research assistant to code the 
written response, and then ran within condition comparisons to test if there was 
any difference in the dependent measure of human-animal inequality based 




animal condition). We did not find any difference in the dependent measure. 
However, our qualitative approach to exploring the results of the first study was 
not as comprehensive as qualitative research can be.  
As experimental psychologists, it is possible that we overlooked the 
value of a more thorough qualitative exploration of the data in study 1 because 
the exploration of the qualitative data was not pre-planned, and is not typical 
in the most relevant experimental psychology (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & 
Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009). Indeed, the most relevant 
psychological research that has used similar written manipulations did not 
even report what participants wrote during their manipulation. Therefore, we 
believe that the post hoc qualitative exploration of the data from study 1 was 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis. We also believe that future qualitative 
work could be employed to further examine the different ways in which people 
qualitatively conceptualize ‘human supremacy’ and how these 
conceptualizations could inform the experimental psychological work on 
human-animal relations. 
5.4.7 Conclusion. There are two key findings from study 1 that 
surround the experimental and correlational findings. Firstly, challenging 
human supremacy does not necessarily translate to improved human 
attitudes. In study 1 using a sample with very strong power, and a diverse 
range of UK participants, we found no evidence for our foundational 
hypothesis. We did however, find strong correlational evidence corroborating 
the results from the pilot studies that the way participants thought about 
human-animal inequality is strongly – but not asymmetrically – related to how 
participants thought about human inequalities. To further explore whether the 
content which participants write about has an impact on the dependent 
variables and could therefore explain the inconclusive findings in study 1, we 
decided to run study 2 with variations of the human supremacy manipulation, 





Chapter Six: Developing the Qualitative Framing of the 
Manipulations 
6.1 Introduction 
 In study 1, we developed a novel manipulation which challenged 
notions of supremacy (e.g., human supremacy over animals, or non-addict 
supremacy over drug addicts), and we then tested our experimental 
foundational hypotheses, on the support for various (human-animal and 
human) inequalities. We reasoned that if human-animal inequality was 
foundational to human inequalities, then challenging human supremacy should 
reduce support for both human-animal and human forms of inequality. 
However, if human-animal inequality is foundational to human forms of 
inequality, then challenging non-addict supremacy over drug addicts should 
only reduce support for human but not human-animal inequalities. We found 
that having participants write a short passage challenging human supremacy 
over animals did not reduce the support for human-animal inequality relative 
to participants in the other two conditions (participants who challenged either 
non-addict supremacy over drug addicts, or a control). In addition, those same 
participants who challenged human supremacy did not show reduced support 
for human inequality (i.e., the drug addict, and Bangladesh inequalities). In 
short, we found no evidence for the experimental foundational hypothesis.  
To begin to explore why this might be, we then turned to a content 
analysis of what the participants wrote about in the human supremacy 
condition. We found that there was variance in what participants chose to write 
about and so we hypothesized that the differences in the content of the written 
response could explain the results. That is, we thought that the manner in 
which participants challenged human supremacy could have an impact on the 
dependent measures.  We found that the three main topics participants wrote 
about were (1) the notion of supremacy is arbitrary (2) negative human 
qualities, or (3) positive animal qualities. We found that participants who wrote 
about the arbitrary nature of supremacy endorsed human-animal inequality 




animal qualities, however, the Bayesian results showed inconclusive evidence 
that the differences were statistically meaningful.  
We thought that because of the variation in the qualitative results of the 
self-persuasion task in study 1 in the human supremacy condition, it may be 
that challenging a specific component of human supremacy over animals may 
be a more effective way to reduce support for human-animal and human 
inequalities. We hypothesize that challenging human supremacy by framing 
the manipulation towards the arbitrary nature of ‘human supremacy’ will 
provide the largest decrease in the dependent measures, compared to other 
conditions. This is because challenging human supremacy by writing about the 
arbitrary nature of supremacy could lead to participants to think more openly 
and reduce reliance on heuristic and stereotypical thinking (Crisp & Turner, 
2010). That is, by challenging the stereotypical thinking associated with human 
supremacy, this might translate into reduced stereotypical thinking towards 
both human-animal inequality, and human inequalities more generally (Crisp 
& Turner, 2010).  
We hypothesize that challenging human supremacy by framing the 
manipulation towards thinking and writing about humans’ downfalls could 
reduce support for human-animal inequality, but strengthen support for human 
inequalities. This is because reminders of some of the negative things that 
humans do could challenge the idea that humans are superior to animals and 
it could also perpetuate outgroup stereotypes and lead to support for human 
inequalities 
Alternatively, challenging human supremacy by thinking and writing 
about the positive aspects of animals may reduce support for human-animal 
inequality and possibly a reduction in support for human inequalities. This is 
because thinking about animals in a favourable light (e.g. being warm and 
competent) may challenge the indifference associated with human-animal 
inequality resulting in reduced support for human-animal inequality. However, 
thinking more positively about animals may not necessarily translate into 
reduced endorsement of human inequalities because of the separation 




the inequality that group experiences). The purpose of study 2 is to examine 
whether the framing of the human supremacy manipulation has an impact on 
the support for human-animal and humans inequalities. Similar to study 1, we 
had both correlational and experimental hypotheses. 
6.1.1 Correlational hypotheses. We hypothesized that attitudes 
towards the human-animals, drug addict, and Bangladesh inequalities would 
all be positively correlated. That is, people who support one inequality are likely 
to support other inequalities (Costello & Hodson, 2014). We did not expect that 
support for human-animal inequality would be asymmetrically correlated to 
support for human inequalities, as per the results of the pilot studies, and study 
1. 
6.1.2 Experimental hypotheses. We predicted that participants who 
challenge human supremacy over animals by writing that human supremacy 
is arbitrary would show reduced support for human-animal inequality 
(compared to those who wrote about positive animal qualities or negative 
human qualities). In addition, we expected that participants in the arbitrary 
condition to show reduced support for human inequality (drug addict and 
Bangladesh inequalities). We did not have specific hypotheses about whether 
the positive animal qualities condition and the negative human qualities 
condition would be different, as previous research supports different 
hypotheses as outlined in the introduction to this chapter (Brewer, 1999; 
Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants. Similar to study 1, we wanted to include a sample 
of participants diverse in age and political orientation (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), and so purposefully recruited adult UK participants from 
across the political spectrum, and a large variety of ages. We were able to do 
this using the same online recruitment website Prolific Academic as we used 
for study 1 in the previous chapter. Sample size was determined a priori using 
g*power software. Using α = .05; power = .80; and f = 0.25 for an ANCOVA 





One hundred and fifty two participants completed the study (63 Male; 
Mean age 40.65 years, SD = 12.98) and were paid £1 and spent on average 
9 minutes and 15 seconds (SD = 3 minutes and 57 seconds) to complete the 
study. The minimum time it took participants to complete the survey was 3 
minutes and 20 seconds, and the maximum time was 27 minutes and 57 
seconds. In terms of ethnicity, 140 participants self-identified as White 
European, 3 as Black/ African, 1 as East Asian, 2 as Indian, 4 as multiracial, 
and 2 as ‘other’. Regarding citizenship, 145 participants self-identified as UK 
citizens, 2 participants were UK permanent residents and 5 participants did not 
answer this question. In terms of diet, 64 participants said they were meat 
eaters, 52 omnivore, 17 had limited meat intake (ate no red meat, or only fish 
or chicken), 17 were vegetarian, and 2 were vegan. Participants consented to 
the study by clicking on the next page button on their computer. Participants 
completed the study in their own time, and on an internet enabled device of 
their choice (e.g., cell phone, tablet, desktop computer). 
6.2.2 Design. The entire study was completed online. Participants were 
given informed consent and then randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
All participants completed one of three writing tasks, and were then given the 
dependent measures. Participants were then debriefed and paid. 
6.2.3 Manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned to write 
about one of the three topics. All topics involved challenging the idea of human 
supremacy over animals, and were comprised from the qualitative results in 
study 1. In all conditions, participants were instructed to imagine they had to 
convince a friend that humans are not 'superior' to animals. Participants then 
received one of three different suggestions (human supremacy is arbitrary vs 
negative human qualities vs positive animal qualities). Participants in all three 
conditions were then instructed to take 2 or 3 minutes to write about how 
humans are not superior to animals. 
Human supremacy is arbitrary. Participants in the human supremacy 
is arbitrary condition were asked to challenge human supremacy, and were 
given as their writing example the following prompt derived from the qualitative 




“Some people say that humans are 'superior' to animals because we are more 
'intelligent' or 'sophisticated' than other animals. Because of this, we say 
humans should not be harmed, but it is okay to harm animals. However, 
humans choose 'what it means to be superior' based on something we know 
we are good at (e.g., intelligence). But why should 'intelligence' and 
'sophistication' be the criteria for whether a species is superior? If we chose an 
attribute besides intelligence or sophistication then humans are no longer 
superior. For example, if we used survivability rather than intelligence, then 
cockroaches would be superior to humans. Also, if we chose an attribute such 
as living a long life, then whales and tortoises would be superior to humans 
(both can live up to 200 years). We decided that we are 'superior' to animals, 
but we have also decided what it means to be superior.” 
Negative human qualities. The next manipulation was designed to 
have participants write about the bad things that humans can do, as an 
example of why humans are not superior to animals. We chose to focus just 
on the harmful, cruel dimension of bad human behaviour (and leave out ideas 
about humans being unable to survive in the wild etc.), to distinguish between 
the other two conditions (particularly the ‘animals are good condition’). 
Participants in this condition were given this writing suggestion: 
“There are many bad things humans do. For example, humans are very good 
at being cruel and hurting other people, and some people kill animals 
unnecessarily. People can also be greedy and live such wasteful lives and this 
is having a massive impact on the environment.” 
Positive animal qualities. Participants in the ‘positive animal qualities’ 
condition were instructed to challenge the notion of human supremacy by 
writing about some of the positive aspects of animals’ life. Participants in this 
condition were given the following as writing suggestions: 
“Animals love playing! Baby goats’ jump all over each other, little piglets run 
around together and small puppies play together. Some animals stay together 
for their whole life and appear to be in love. Many animals help each other and 
care for their family members, and members of other species, sometimes 





The measures were identical to Study 1. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Analysis strategy. We employed both frequentist (using SPSS 
software) and Bayesian analyses (using JASP software), and ran different 
models with and without SDO as a covariate. We also ran our main analyses 
with and without the ethnic minorities and vegetarians/vegans; we obtained 
the same results (with one exception – see end of Results section) when 
excluding vegetarians, and so only report the analyses including all 
participants. 
6.3.2 Preliminary data treatment. One hundred and sixty six 
participants were originally recruited, however, fourteen people did not 
complete the study and these people were removed from analysis, leaving our 
final sample of 152. Before analysing the data, we looked at the qualitative 
response participants wrote. This showed that no participants wrote against 
the argument (i.e., that humans are superior to animals), therefore all 
participants were included in the analyses.  
6.3.3 Missing data. Forty-seven participants had missing data; most of 
these were just missing an answer to one or two questions in the dependent 
measures. The missing data was replaced with the mean of the scale (50) as 
in the previous study. 
6.3.4 Correlational results. Please see Table 6.1 below for 
correlations between all variables in study 2 with correlations, frequentist p-
values, and Bayes factors. Overall, the correlational results from Study 2 
replicate the correlational results from Study 1. That is, supporting our 
correlational hypotheses, the attitudes towards all three inequalities (human-








Table 6.1. Showing Pearson correlations, frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors between all variables in study 2. 










2  r  0.38        
p < .001        
 BF10 7.92e+3        
3 r  0.44 0.47       
p  < .001  < .001       
 BF10 8.84e+5 5.76e+6       
4 r  0.30  0.50  0.54       
p < .001 < .001  < .001      
 BF10 196.08 1.70e+8 1.58e+10      
5 r  0.18  0.33  0.38  0.37      
p .014  < .001 < .001 < .001     
 BF10 2.25 593.56 2.18e+4 1.23e+4     
6 r  -0.51  -0.15  -0.28  -0.16  -0.02     
p < .001 .033  < .001 .025  .400     
 BF10 3.15e+8 1.07 79.12 1.30 0.13    
7 r  -0.08  -0.47  -0.21  -0.24  -0.40  0.10    
p .157  < .001 .005  .002  < .001  .119    
 BF10 0.29 1.04e+7 5.83 13.99 1.00e+5 0.05   
8 r  -0.04  -0.23  -0.39  -0.22  -0.16 0.12  0.27  - 
p  .311  .003  < .001 .004  .027  .070  < .001  - 
 BF10 0.16 7.89 2.87e+4 6.68 1.25 0.04 0.02  
Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 






In addition, attitudes towards animals were again not more strongly 
correlated with the human target groups than the other human group, and vice 
versa. These correlational results provide further evidence that human-animal 
inequality is not asymmetrically correlated to human inequalities.  
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
drug addict and Bangladesh inequalities. Conservative political orientation was 
correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, but like SDO, 
was more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the human inequalities.  
When looking at warmth, feelings of warmth towards animals was 
negatively correlated with support for human-animal inequality, but was not 
correlated with attitudes towards human inequalities. Warmth towards animals 
was also not correlated with warmth towards drug addicts or towards 
Bangladesh workers. Warmth towards drug addicts was strongly negatively 
correlated with support for the drug addict inequality, and so too was warmth 
towards Bangladesh workers and support for the Bangladesh inequality. 
Feelings of warmth towards drug addicts were also positively correlated with 
warmth towards Bangladesh workers. 
It is interesting to note that feelings of warmth and support for the 
inequality correlate highly for both human-animal and the drug addict 
inequality, whereas warmth and support for the Bangladesh inequality was 
moderately correlated. This is interesting because most people in the study 
likely contribute to the inequality of Bangladesh people (via their consumption 
of sweatshop clothing from Bangladesh), more directly than they do contribute 
to oppressing drug addicts. From the correlational results, participants feelings 
of warmth (or coldness) towards drug addicts and animals are more aligned 
with participants support for the inequalities. Whereas for the Bangladesh 
inequality, the weaker relationship between endorsing the inequality and 
feelings of warmth, suggest that participants’ feelings of warmth and 
acceptance of inequality are not as tightly aligned as they are for drug addicts 




support for the Bangladesh inequality is consistent with research on the 
consumption of morally troublesome goods (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). 
6.3.5 Experimental Results 
Human-animal inequality. To examine whether there were differences 
in participant’s endorsement of human-animal inequality, we conducted a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with condition as a between subjects 
factor, and support for human-animal inequality as the dependent variable. We 
ran our ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to control for individual 
differences in SDO. See Figure 6.1 below for the mean level of support for 
human-animal inequality. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference in the endorsement of human-animal inequality between conditions, 
F(2, 142) = 0.56, p = 0.572, 𝜂𝑝
2    = 0.00, BFM = 0.00. That is, both the positive 
animal qualities (M = 32.99, SD = 18.77) and negative human qualities (M = 
31.85, SD = 21.76) showed slightly, but not significantly less endorsement of 
human-animal inequality, than the arbitrary condition (M = 36.05, SD = 19.84). 
Levene’s test for equality of variance was not violated, F(2, 142) = 0.42, p = 
.656. When including SDO in the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 
141) = 14.24, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.09, BFM = 26.88, and the overall model remained 
non-significant, F(2, 141) = 0.49, p = .613, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 0.30.  
Bayesian model comparison results showed good support for SDO 
predicting support for human-animal inequality, inconclusive evidence that 
condition and SDO together predicted support for human-animal inequality, 
and weak evidence for a main effect of condition. Bayesian model comparison 
also revealed inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 0.02. To sum, 
Bayesian model comparison revealed that individual differences in SDO best 
predicted support for human-animal inequality, and there was inconclusive 






Figure 6.1. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for human-
animal inequality per condition. Higher numbers equal more support. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards animals. We ran a similar ANOVA model to examine 
any differences in perceptions of warmth towards animals. See Figure 6.2 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards animals per condition. Levene’s 
test for equality of variance was violated, F(2, 149) = 3.81, p = .024. The 
results, with Welch correction for heterogonous variance, revealed a significant 
difference in feelings of warmth towards animals between conditions, F(2, 
94.41) = 3.56, p = .032, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.04, BFM = 0.74. Participants in the positive 
animal qualities (M = 88.22, SD = 12.57), displayed more warmth towards 
animals than participants in both the negative human qualities condition (M = 
82.80, SD = 20.02) and the arbitrary conditions (M = 79.86, SD = 20.23). When 
controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 
148) = 4.17, p = .043, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, BFM = 1.23, and the model remained marginally 
significant, F(2, 148) = 2.96, p = 0.055, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, BFM = 0.88. Further, Bayesian 
model comparison showed inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 
1.19, suggesting we cannot rule out there is no effect of condition. Together, 
Bayesian model comparison suggests that the evidence for the effect of 
condition on warmth towards animals is inconclusive even when controlling for 































Figure 6.2. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
animals per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 
1 standard error of the mean. 
Drug addict inequality. To examine whether there were differences in 
participant’s endorsement of the drug addict inequality , we conducted a one 
way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with condition as a between subjects 
factor. Again, we ran our ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to see 
whether partially out individual differences in SDO changed the results of the 
ANOVA. See Figure 6.3 below for the mean level of support for the drug addict 
inequality per condition. 
The ANOVA revealed there was no significant difference in the 
endorsement of the drug addict inequality between conditions, F(2, 141) = 
0.51, p = .601, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 4.47e -9. The positive animals qualities (M = 
23.35, SD = 17.99) did not show significantly less endorsement of the drug 
addict inequality than the negative human qualities (M = 29.10, SD = 20.02) or 
arbitrary condition (M = 33.05, SD = 22.70). Levene’s test for equality of 
variance was not violated, F(2, 141) = 1.23, p = .287. When including SDO in 
the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 140) = 46.95, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
0.25, BFM = 36.27, and the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 140) 
= 0.24, p = .788, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 0.01, BFM = 025.  
Bayesian model comparison showed strong support that SDO alone 































weak evidence for SDO and condition predicting attitudes towards the drug 
addict inequality. In addition, Bayesian model comparison revealed very strong 
evidence against the null model, BFM = 4.20e -8. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the type of manipulation had no impact on endorsing the drug 
addict inequality, even when controlling for individual differences in SDO.  
 
Figure 6.3. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for the drug 
addict inequality per condition. Higher numbers equal more support. Error bars 
are +/- 1 standard error.  
Warmth towards drug addicts. We ran a similar ANOVA model to 
examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards drug addicts. See 
Figure 6.4 below for the mean feelings of warmth towards drug addicts per 
condition. The results revealed no significant difference in feelings of warmth 
towards drug addicts between conditions, F(2, 149) = 0.15, p = .865, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 0.01, 
BFM = 0.02. Participants in the positive animals qualities (M = 42.20, SD = 
22.50), negative human qualities (M = 41.98, SD = 28.42), and the arbitrary 
condition (M = 44.43, SD = 24.87) displayed low levels of warmth towards drug 
addicts. Levene’s test for equality of variance was not violated, F(2, 149) = 
2.63, p = .076. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a 
significant covariate F(1, 148) = 8.93, p = 0.003, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.06, BFM = 15.70, and 
the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 148) = 0.244, p = .784, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 
0.01, BFM = 0.21. There was also inconclusive evidence for the null model, 


































drug addicts, and there is inconclusive evidence that condition had any 
additional effect. 
 
Figure 6.4. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards drug 
addicts per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 
1 standard error. 
Bangladesh inequality. To examine whether there were differences in 
participant’s endorsement of the Bangladesh inequality, we conducted a one-
way ANOVA, with condition as a between subjects factor. See figure 6.5 below 
for the mean level of support for the Bangladesh inequality per condition. 
Again, we ran our ANOVA with and without SDO as a covariate, to see whether 
partially out individual differences in SDO changed the results of the ANOVA.  
In contrast with our hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no significant 
difference in the endorsement of the Bangladesh inequality between 
conditions, F(2, 147) = 0.50, p = .609, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM  = 4.62e -11. The positive 
animal qualities (M = 17.12, SD = 14.81), the negative human qualities (M = 
18.61, SD = 16.70) and the arbitrary condition (M = 20.42, SD = 17.95) all 
showed low support for the Bangladesh inequality. Levene’s test for equality 
of variance was not violated, F(2, 147) = 2.27, p = .107. When including SDO 
in the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 146) = 60.85, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
0.29, BFM = 21.77, and the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 146) 
= 0.87, p = .420, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 0.41. Bayesian model comparison also 


































together, Bayesian model comparison revealed there was inconclusive 
evidence that there was an effect of condition on the dependent variable, and 
good evidence that SDO alone best predicted support for the Bangladesh 
inequality. 
 
Figure 6.5. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality per condition. Higher numbers equal more support. 
Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards Bangladesh workers. We ran another ANOVA 
model to examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards 
Bangladesh workers. See Figure 6.6 below for the mean feelings of warmth 
towards Bangladeshi workers per condition. The results revealed no significant 
difference in feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh workers between 
conditions, F(2, 149) = .41, p = .663, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 0.05. Participants in the 
positive animal qualities (M = 71.60, SD = 18.58), the negative human qualities 
(M = 71.02, SD = 21.10), and arbitrary conditions (M = 68.14, SD = 21.83), all 
showed high levels of warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers. When 
controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 
148) = 7.13, p = .008, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.05, BFM = 9.29, however, the overall model 
remained non-significant, F(2, 148) = 0.39 p = .675, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 0.22. 
Bayesian model comparison also revealed inconclusive evidence for or 
against the null model, BFM = 0.58. That is, similar to attitudes supremacy over 


































inconclusive evidence that condition had an effect, and good evidence that 
SDO alone best predicted warmth towards Bangladesh workers. 
 
Figure 6.6. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
Bangladesh workers per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Post hoc analyses excluding vegetarians and ethnic minorities. 
Finally, similar to study 1, we next removed the 12 ethnic minorities, 17 
vegetarians and 2 vegans and re ran the Bayesian analyses. There was no 
difference in any of the results, with the exception that SDO as a covariate in 
predicting warmth towards animals improved from BFM = 1.23 to BFM = 4.47. 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Correlational Results. We found that support for human-animal 
and human inequalities were all correlated with each other. We also found that 
support for human-animal inequality was not a stronger predictor of support for 
human- human inequalities (e.g., drug addicts) than was the other human 
inequality (e.g., workers from Bangladesh). Both of these findings are 
consistent with the results of the pilot studies and study 1. In addition, these 
correlational results add to the literature on human-animal relations by showing 
that people’s attitudes towards human inequalities, such as towards drug 
addicts and towards the exploitation of developing world labour is consistently 
associated with attitudes towards human-animal inequality.  
In addition, SDO was more strongly correlated with the Bangladesh and 






































This finding is also consistent with the pilot studies and study 1. This finding 
could be the result of participants at all levels of SDO openly supporting 
human-animal inequality, yet when it comes to human inequalities, low SDO 
people are more likely to report that human inequality are not okay, even if the 
participants support those inequalities (e.g., by purchasing sweatshop 
clothes). 
Taking the frequentist and Bayesian correlational results together, there 
was inconclusive evidence that political orientation was related to 
endorsement of human-animal inequality or warmth towards animals, 
suggesting that, overall people all along the political spectrum are neutral 
about human-animal inequality. However, these same people all have warm 
attitudes towards animals. These effects are consistent with work on the meat 
paradox: people both like animals and like exploiting animals (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017). Interestingly, political orientation was strongly correlated 
with endorsing supremacy over both our human outgroups. Right wing political 
orientation was positively associated with endorsing the drug addict inequality, 
and an even stronger predictor of endorsing the Bangladesh inequality.  
These findings show overall consistency with study 1. For instance, 
study 1 found moderate evidence that conservative political orientation 
predicted support for human-animal inequality. In addition, conservative 
political orientation was associated very highly with support for both human 
inequality. However, both studies revealed that both SDO and conservative 
political orientation predicted human inequalities far more strongly than they 
predicted human-animal inequality. 
Like previous research, SDO and political orientation in this study were 
significantly positively correlated. However, political conservatism was a very 
strong predictor of cold feelings towards drug addicts, but there was no good 
evidence that political conservatism was related to feelings towards animals or 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers. In line with study 1, feelings of warmth 
towards animals were also unrelated to feelings of warmth towards both 
human groups. Again, in line with study 1, only feelings of warmth towards 




6.4.2 Experimental results. We found no support for our experimental 
hypotheses; we found no main effect of condition on our dependent variables. 
This was an unexpected finding as we had hypothesized that the focus of 
supremacy being arbitrary would have an impact on the dependent variables. 
Instead, we found that all participants slightly disagreed with the endorsement 
of human-animal inequality (all conditions scored just below the mean of the 
scale), and had high levels of warm feelings towards animals (all conditions 
near the high end of the scale), and that individual differences in SDO best 
predicted their support for all inequalities. In other words, on average, 
participants (including meat eaters when analysed separately) opposed 
human-animal inequality and had positive feelings towards animals, even 
though those same participants are complicit in harming animals indirectly via 
their consumption of animal products. 
All participants showed a similar level of disagreement with the drug 
addict inequality (all conditions scored around the bottom third of the scale). 
However, unlike human-animal inequality, low support for the drug addict 
inequality was accompanied by relatively cold feelings towards drug addicts 
(all conditions below the midpoint of the scale). That is, overall, participants did 
not endorse the drug addict inequality but they had neutral feelings towards 
drug addicts. This suggests that participants see drug addicts as a cold group, 
and is consistent with research on the dehumanization and stereotyping of 
drug addicts (Harris & Fiske, 2006). 
The pattern of participant’s attitudes and feelings towards Bangladesh 
workers, more so reflects attitudes and feelings towards animals than towards 
drug addicts. That is, participants showed a very low level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality (the lowest of all three inequalities), and very warm 
feelings towards sweatshop workers, even though our participants highly likely 
consume sweatshop clothes. Interestingly, the two inequalities that 
participants are more directly involved in (human-animal, and Bangladesh), 
were afforded the warmest feelings. This finding is consistent with research 




attitudes towards the group one is exploiting (e.g., animals, or sweatshop 
workers in Bangladesh) (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). 
Indeed, because of the way society functions, participants may not be 
aware of the consequences of their behaviour, and so do not feel dissonance 
from caring about animals and Bangladesh workers, while consuming products 
which necessitate the exploitation of those two groups. Study 1 and study 2 
both reveal that participants can have positive feelings for, and exploit others.  
In addition, it is also possible that participants can advocate against 
inequalities, all the while their behaviour supports those systems. Indeed, it is 
important to note that the effects observed in this study held even when 
excluding all vegetarians from analyses. In particular, meat eaters rejected 
human-animal inequality to the same degree as vegetarians, even though they 
regularly eat animal products. This finding is consistent with research 
suggesting that people are often unaware of the reality of their consumer 
behaviour (e.g., the reality of the meat industry), and therefore do not feel 
dissonance from caring about animals and wanting to eat them (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017).  
The same psychological mechanisms may also be at play with respect 
to Bangladesh sweatshop workers, although it is unclear to what extent our 
participants are aware of the sweatshop industry and their participation in it. It 
may be that participants have a distorted view of the consequences of their 
consumer behaviour on Bangladesh workers; such a finding would be 
interesting, but is beyond the scope of this research. 
6.4.3 Limitations of Study 2. The main limitation of study 2 is the focus 
on refining the human supremacy manipulation and no other manipulation. We 
chose to only examine whether framing the human supremacy manipulation 
differently had an impact on the results, and we did not examine whether 
framing the drug addicts’ manipulation differently might also have an impact 
on the results. We did not do this because in study 1 we found that the non-
addict supremacy manipulation successfully changed participants support for 
the drug addicts supremacy (compared to other conditions), whereas the 




impact on support for human-animal inequality. Therefore, we wanted in study 
2 to examine whether we could refine the human supremacy manipulation. It 
could be that refinement of both the non-addicts supremacy manipulation and 
the control manipulation could also led to an improvement in the effect on the 
dependent variables, however, due to resource constraints such further 
refinement was beyond the scope of this thesis. We believe that doing so could 
be an avenue for future research. 
6.4.4 Conclusion. There is one key takeaway from study 2: we did not 
find any evidence that could explain the null results of study 1. We explored 
three qualitatively different ways of framing the human supremacy 
manipulation in study 2, and found the difference in manipulations had no 
effect on any of the dependent measures. After finding out that the wording of 
the animal manipulations could not explain the results of study 1, we sought to 
replicate study 1, in a different sample. The most relevant previous research 
has used undergraduate psychology students, whereas this thesis has so far 
drawn from a UK wide adult population. For example, the two previous studies 
which have manipulated attitudes towards human-animal relations (i.e., 
manipulated the human-animal divide) and measured the impact on human 
outgroups (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 
2009) both employed undergraduate psychology students from a Canadian 
University in their sample. Moreover, the research conducted by Bastian, 
Costello, Loughnan, and Hodson (2012; study 3) had a mean age of 19 years, 
and was 82% female. Furthermore, the research conducted by Costello and 
Hodson (2009) also had a mean age of 19 years old and similarly was 
comprised of 75% female participants.  
The relevant experimental research measuring the impact of human-
animal attitudes on outgroup attitudes has not been published using a sample 
as diverse as this thesis used. That is, the pilot studies, and study 1 and 2 were 
conducted using a UK wide participant pool, and employed people of a wide 
age range and included people across the political spectrum. Because of the 
research identifying concerns with using niche samples such as 




Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), it is possible that the lack of support for our 
hypotheses are due to the sample we have used. Therefore, we decided our 
third study would examine our foundational hypotheses using a similar sample 
to previous literature on human-animal relations that has found significant 






Chapter Seven: Returning to the foundational hypothesis 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 6, we presented study 2 that revealed that framing the human 
supremacy manipulation in different ways did not have an impact on 
participants’ support for human-animal or human inequalities. We concluded 
study 2 by discussing the differences in participant sample between the most 
relevant research on human-animal relations (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & 
Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009) and the current work. Study 3 
examines our experimental foundational hypothesis using a sample of 
undergraduate psychology students. Doing so would reveal whether the 
findings in study 1 were due to the experimental foundational hypothesis being 
false; methodological flaws in the manipulations and measures; or due to 
differences in the participants used. In study 3, we utilized the undergraduate 
participant pool in psychology to run our study. In addition, we also included a 
fourth experimental condition, and a fourth ‘inequality’ dependent variable.  
We explain the rationale for these two additions here, beginning with 
the new condition. Recall that study 1 revealed that participants in the human 
supremacy tended to write one of three variations about humans not being 
superior to animals. Also, recall that in study 2 we did not find any differences 
in the dependent variables based upon what participants wrote about. 
Therefore, the first addition to study 1 was to include two versions of the human 
supremacy manipulation in this study – alongside the same non-addict 
supremacy manipulation and the control manipulation – to see if we could 
replicate study 2. 
The second addition to study 1 was to include a third human inequality 
in the measures of this study. We decided to include a measure of support for 
the homeless inequality, because homeless people are another vulnerable 
group in UK society which are dehumanized and neglected by society (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006). In addition, the pilot studies 
revealed that the homeless inequality was human inequality supported the 
most, second only to the drug addict inequality. We acknowledge that 




harmed in the way that animals are. However, homeless people share a similar 
personal profile to drug addicts and therefore represent a vulnerable 
population in society, which are beyond the realm of moral concern for most 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006). Similar to the previous two chapters, we had both 
correlational and experimental hypotheses.     
7.1.1 Correlational hypotheses. We hypothesized that attitudes 
towards the human-animals, drug addict, Bangladesh, and homeless 
inequalities would all be positively correlated. That is, people who support one 
inequality are likely to support other inequalities (Costello & Hodson, 2014). 
We did not expect that support for human-animal inequality would be 
asymmetrically correlated to support for human inequalities, as per the results 
of the pilot studies, and studies 1 and 2. 
7.1.2 Experimental hypotheses. We had evidence to support two 
foundational hypotheses. On the one hand, we expected to replicate the null 
effect of study 1 that there would be no difference in the dependent variables 
by condition. However, on the other hand we predicted that using 
undergraduate psychology students as participants would show support for the 
foundational hypothesis. We thought this would be the case because the most 
relevant research which has manipulated human-animal relations and 
measured attitudes towards humans has only been published with psychology 
undergraduate students (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; 
Costello & Hodson, 2009). If we did find a difference between conditions on 
the dependent measures, we expected the ‘human supremacy is arbitrary’ to 
show the least support for human-animal and human inequalities, based off 
the qualitative responses of study 1 and the results of previous work (Bastian, 
Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009). 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants. We wanted to include a sample similar to previous 
work on human-animal relations (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 
2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009), and so recruited undergraduate psychology 
students from the University of Edinburgh. The participants were similar age 




Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009). Sample size was determined a priori 
using g*power software. Using α = .05; power = .80; and f = 0.25 for an 
ANCOVA with four conditions suggested 179 participants (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
The participants were 205 first year undergraduate psychology students 
(Mean age = 19.88, SD =14.39; 152 women, 51 men, 2 missing cases) from 
the University of Edinburgh. Participants completed the study in exchange for 
0.5 course credit. Three participants took over 3 hours to complete the study, 
possibly because they started the study, then went away from their computer 
and came back and completed it the next day (all three of these participants 
completed all parts of the study and so were included in all analyses). 
Excluding those 3 participants from the time taken suggested the average time 
to complete the survey was 14 minutes, 39 seconds (SD = 6 minutes, 41 
seconds). Regarding ethnicity, 167 participants self-identified as white 
European, 14 East Asian, 10 Multiracial, 6 ‘other’, 4 Indian, 1 Hispanic, 1 Arab, 
2 missing cases. In terms of citizenship, 139 participants were UK citizens, 46 
were on student visas, and there were 12 residents, 8 missing cases. 
Regarding diet, 78 participants self-identified as meat-eaters, 64 as omnivore, 
28 limited meat intake, 24 vegetarian, 9 vegan (no animal products), and 2 
missing cases.  
7.2.2 Design. The entire study was completed online. Participants were 
given informed consent, and were then randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions. Participants were instructed to write a few convincing 
sentences about their assigned topic (self-persuasion task). There was a 
minimum time set for participants, so they could only move on to the dependent 
measures when they had spent at least 2 minutes on the writing task. There 
was no maximum time participants were allowed to spend on the writing task. 
Participants were then given the dependent measures, were debriefed and 
then given 0.5 course credit.  
7.2.3 Manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned to complete 
one of four manipulations; two about human supremacy over animals, one 




(book readers not being superior to TV watchers). We first describe the two 
human-animal manipulations, before describing the human manipulations. 
Human supremacy is arbitrary. This manipulation was a shorter 
version of the ‘human supremacy is arbitrary’ manipulation used in study 2.  
“The criteria people use, for saying humans are superior to animals, is 
made up. Some people say humans are 'superior' to animals because 
we are more intelligent or sophisticated - but humans choose what it 
means to be superior based on something we think we are good at (e.g., 
intelligence). But why should 'intelligence' be the criteria for whether a 
species is superior? We decided that we are superior to animals. If the 
criteria for supremacy was 'living a long life', then whales would be 
considered superior to humans.” 
Negative human qualities. This manipulation was the same as the 
‘negative human qualities’ in study 2.  
Challenging Non-addict supremacy. To challenge non-addict 
supremacy, we used the same manipulation as in study 1.  
Control condition. Our control condition was the same as the control 
condition from study 1.  
7.2.4 Measures 
The measures were identical to Study 1; except for the addition of a 
measure of homeless inequality. 
Homeless inequality. The homeless inequality was measured with the 
same questions as previous measures of inequalities but adapted for relations 
between homeless men and homeowners. The four items in the scale were: 
‘People who own homes are superior to homeless men who live on the streets’, 
‘It is okay that people who own homes benefit from the current order of society’, 
‘It is okay that homeless men suffer from the current order of society’, and ‘I 
accept the way others treat homeless men in the UK’. The scale had good 
internal reliability, α = 0.80, 95% CI [0.75, 0.84]). Responses were scored from 
0 (Totally Disagree), through 50 (Neutral), to 100 (Totally Agree). In addition, 
a Principal Components Analysis with manual extraction of one component 





7.3.1 Analysis strategy. We employed both frequentist (using SPSS 
software) and Bayesian analyses (using JASP software), and ran different 
models with and without SDO as a covariate. Unlike null hypothesis 
significance testing, Bayesian model comparison allows for tests in favour of 
the null hypothesis. Bayesian analyses also allows for model comparison 
between the null, the covariate, the independent variable, and the independent 
variable controlling for the covariate. We also ran our main analyses with and 
without the ethnic minorities and vegetarians/vegans. 
7.3.2 Preliminary data treatment. We had 237 people sign up to the 
study. Of those, 213 completed the measures of the survey. Out of those, only 
205 completed the written manipulation and the measures.  
7.3.3 Missing data. There was no missing data in this study.  
7.3.4 Manipulation check. We inspected the written responses of 
participants. We found that 3 participants in the ‘human supremacy is arbitrary’ 
condition and 2 participants in the control condition did not follow instructions. 
All participants in the drug addict’s condition and the negative human qualities 
condition followed instructions. We included all participants in analyses 
because we did not have specific plans for qualitative exclusion. For example, 
one participant in the ‘human supremacy is arbitrary’ condition who wrote in 
the wrong direction of the argument wrote that: 
“Humans, though technically animals, are superior to many other types of 
animals and mammals. Humans have some of the most complex brain 
capacity, allowing the innovation seen throughout our history. Whilst many 
animals do things like build and hunt and gather, etc., humans have had the 
capacity to grow and create societies and infrastructure and colonize and in 
some ways can be seen as the top of the food-chain. While yes, some animals 
may prey on humans in the wild, humans have adapted artificially to protect 
themselves and remain "top dog"”. 
An example of someone who did not follow instructions in the control 
condition wrote that: 
“I would disagree with this statement as it tends to be that those who do read 
books have an expanded vocabulary as they are opening themselves up to 
new words which take more processing than 8 and so means that they are 




have more of an imagination as they are required to use their imagination more 
with reading and so this could translate into everyday life.” 
An example of someone who followed instructions in the human 
supremacy is arbitrary condition wrote eloquently that: 
“Peter Singer, the popular contemporary ethicist, is an outspoken critic of 
'anthropocentric bias', or that we as human beings place ourselves at the 
centre of most of our appraisals. Considering the idea of intelligence (per the 
example), even the conception of intelligence being wielded by the question 
expresses this anthropocentric bias - there are likely other organisms which 
possess more advanced neurological faculties than we do. Perhaps some 
animals have a more developed social sense than we, or perhaps some have 
a more developed memory than we do; provided this was the case, people 
wouldn't be satisfied with calling these animals more intelligent than we are, 
even if we were to deconstruct what 'intelligence' is comprised of, and show 
them to be superior. We intuitively manipulate factors to place ourselves, 
human beings, at the top of the food-chain, which seems to reflect an internal 
bias which is likely wrong. Even beyond that, it seems like we enact this 
behaviour to satisfy a need of ours, rather than to express some objective truth. 
An abundance of research has been completed within Social Psychology to 
suggest that people will subconsciously make decisions which make the 
groups to which they belong seem superior to other groups, even if these 
evaluations are mistaken. Along the same lines, a part of our identities is as 
members of the human race, so it'd make sense that we fabricate lines of logic 
to prove that we are superior to all other life.” 
This is a good example of the richness and complexity of the qualitative 
answers that some participants gave. The participant even goes as far as 
criticising the very framing of the question, and pulls apart the premises of the 
prompt. While this is an unusually articulate and thought provoking response, 
their writing provides important qualitative data. Complete analyses of the 
qualitative data is beyond the scope of this thesis, and could be a promising 
avenue for future work. 
An example of a participant in the control condition who followed 
instructions wrote that: 
“Reading books is not a superior activity to watching TV because the same 
information can be absorbed by either activity, just in alternative ways. People 
learn and pick up information in different ways and so it may be more beneficial 
for some people to watch TV to pick up this information as they may find this 
easier, you cannot discriminate the two people in this way as it does not 




7.3.5 Correlational results. Please see Table 7.1 for correlations 
between all variables in study 3 with frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. 
When taken together, the correlational results from study 3 corroborate the 
correlational results from studies 1 and 2. That is, supporting our first 
correlational hypotheses, the attitudes towards all four inequalities (human-
animal, drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless) were all positively correlated. In 
addition, support for the homeless inequality was strongly related to both 
human-animal and human inequalities.  
As expected, support for the homeless and drug addicts inequality were 
very strongly correlated. Unexpectedly, support for the homeless and 
Bangladesh inequalities were also very strongly correlated. Departing from the 
previous two studies, attitudes towards human-animal inequality were actually 
correlated more strongly with the drug addict and Bangladesh inequality than 
in study 1 and study 2. However, in sum, these correlational results provide 
further evidence that human-animal inequality is not asymmetrically correlated 
to human inequalities, and support our second correlational hypothesis. 
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
Bangladesh and homeless inequalities. Conservative political orientation was 
correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, but like SDO 























2 r  0.57          
p  < .001          
 BF10 3.97e+16         
3 r  0.50  0.58         
p < .001  < .001         
 BF10 3.69e+11 1.52e+17        
4 r  0.59  0.75  0.68        
p < .001  < .001  < .001        
 BF10 3.70e+17 2.03e+35 1.31e+26       
5 r  0.45  0.43  0.51  0.52       
 p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001       
 BF10 6.91e+8 7.94e+7 2.00e+12 8.27e+12      
6 r  0.20  0.22  0.26  0.28  0.24      
p .002  <.001  < .001  < .001  < .001      
 BF10 9.11 26.72 218.91 834.48 85.37     
7 r  -0.44  -0.23  -0.21  -0.28  -0.19  -0.04     
p < .001  <.001 .001 < .001  .003 .305    
 BF10 4.19e+8 32.80 14.44 753.66 6.91 0.14    
8 r  -0.31  -0.56  -0.26  -0.43  -0.21  -0.16  0.15    
p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  .001 .011 0.016    
 BF10 5433.66 3.11e+15 213.45 1.33e+8 17.96 2.37 1.70   
9 r  -0.27  -0.24  -0.49  -0.37  -0.32  -0.23  0.27  0.31   
p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001   
 BF10 356.58 86.26 1.46e+11 6.82e+5 7306.23 49.09 317.01 4596.46  
10 r  -0.23  -0.30  -0.31  -0.44  -0.25  -0.14  0.27  0.59  0.57   
p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  .022 < .001  < .001  < .001   








Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 
Orientation; Human-animal, Drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless = inequalities; Workers warmth = warmth towards 




When looking at warmth, feelings of warmth towards animals was 
negatively correlated with support for human-animal inequality. However, 
dissimilar to studies 1 and 2, feelings of warmth towards animals was also 
negatively associated with support for human inequalities. Warmth towards 
animals was not correlated with warmth towards drug addicts. However, again 
dissimilar to studies 1 and 2, warmth towards animals was positively 
associated with warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers and towards 
homeless men.  
Warmth towards drug addicts was strongly and negatively correlated 
with support for the drug addict inequality (far more so than warmth towards 
animals and the support for human-animal inequality), and so too was warmth 
towards Bangladesh workers and support for the Bangladesh inequality. 
Feelings of warmth towards drug addicts were also positively correlated with 
warmth towards Bangladesh workers, and very strongly correlated with 
warmth towards homeless men. In addition, feelings of warmth and support for 
the inequality correlate highly for all target groups. Feelings of warmth towards 
each target group was strongly correlated with both human-animal and all 
human inequalities.  
In study 1, feelings of warmth towards animals did not predict support 
for human inequalities, and feelings for warmth towards humans did not predict 
support for human-animal inequalities (although warmth towards sweatshop 
workers did weakly correlate with support for human-animal inequality). In 
study 2, warmth towards animals moderately predicted support for the 
Bangladesh inequality, and neither warmth towards drug addicts or sweatshop 
workers was associated with support for human-animal inequality. In the 
current study, warmth towards animals was moderately and negative 
correlated with support for the homeless inequality (but not the drug addict or 
Bangladesh inequalities). In addition, support for human-animal inequality was 
correlated negatively with warmth towards drug addicts, sweatshop workers, 
and homeless men (in descending order).  
Taken together, compared to the general UK population (studies 1 and 




students, feelings of warmth and support for inequalities were more likely to 
occur across species lines (e.g., warmth towards animals associated with 
support for human inequalities, and warmth towards humans associated with 
support for human-animal inequality). In other words, for undergraduate 
psychology students, feelings and attitudes towards humans and animals are 
more closely aligned than for the wider UK public. 
7.3.6 Experimental Results. To examine the impact the manipulations 
had on the dependent variables, we ran multiple ANOVAs, with and without 
controlling for SDO as a covariate. We also examined the Bayesian model 
comparison with and without vegetarians and vegans, to see whether the 
effects remained for omnivores. 
Human-animal inequality. See Figure 7.1 below for the mean level of 
support for human-animal inequality between conditions. To examine the 
impact that the manipulations had on the support for human-animal inequality, 
we ran an ANOVA which revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(3, 
201), = 4.50, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.06, BFM  = 1.34e-9. Levene’s test of homogeneity 
of variance was not violated, F(3, 200) = .58, p = .631. When entering SDO 
into the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 199), = 55.07, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.22, BFM = 0.08, and the overall model improved, F(3, 199), = 5.96, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08, BFM = 106.78.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed strong support for the interaction 
between condition and SDO best predicting support for human-animal 
inequality. Bayesian model comparison also revealed very strong evidence 
against condition alone, or the null model (BFM = 2.74e -10) predicting support 
for human-animal inequality. Frequentist post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants in the arbitrary condition (M = 27.47, SD = 18.39) had significantly 
lower endorsement of human-animal inequality compared with all other 
conditions. There were no other significant differences between conditions. 
Bayesian post hoc comparisons revealed good evidence that participants in 
the arbitrary condition endorsed human-animal inequality less than 
participants in the control condition (M = 38.79, SD = 16.01, p = .002, BF10, U 




BF10, U = 4.38). There was frequentist support but inconclusive Bayesian 
evidence that participants in the arbitrary condition endorsed human-animal 
inequality less than participants in the drug addict’s condition (M = 35.66, SD 
= 16.07, p = .005, BF10, U = 2.71). We consider the effect between the arbitrary 
and drug addict condition to be inconclusive and therefore not a meaningful 
difference. 
 
Figure 7.1. Showing participants in the human supremacy is arbitrary 
displayed less support for human-animal inequality than the negative human 
or control condition, and marginally less than the drug addicts’ condition. 
Higher numbers equal more support. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error.  
We then analysed the data excluding vegetarians and vegans. See 
table 7.2 below for Bayesian model comparison with and without vegetarians 
and vegans, predicting endorsement of human-animal inequality. See Table 
7.3 for means of the endorsement of human-animal inequality with and without 
vegetarians. The interpretation of the Bayesian model comparison results were 
the same when ran without vegetarians or vegans: the interaction between 
SDO and condition best predicted the data. There were three differences in 
the results of the Bayesian post hoc comparisons when excluding vegetarians 
and vegans. First, the results showed less support for the difference between 
participants in the arbitrary condition endorsing human-animal inequality less 
than participants in the control condition (BF10, U = 4.78) or the human downfall 
condition (BF10, U = 3.33), although these effects still provide support for a 



























participants in the arbitrary condition endorsed human-animal inequality less 
than participants in the drug addict’s condition improved (BF10, U = 3.45). Taken 
together, excluding vegetarians and vegans from analyses did not greatly alter 
the interpretation of the impact that condition and SDO had on the 
endorsement of human-animal inequality.  
 
Table 7.2. Bayesian model comparison shows the interaction between 
Condition and SDO best predicts endorsement of human-animal inequality, 
with and without vegetarians and vegans. 
Model BFM  BFM (excluding 
vegetarians) 
Condition + SDO 106.78 50.61 
SDO 0.08 0.18 
Condition 1.34e-9 8.85e -7 
Null model 2.74e -10 3.20e -7 
Note: All priors are set evenly at 0.25 in JASP.  
 
Table 7.3. Comparing means and standard deviations for the endorsement 
of human-animal inequality, by condition, with and without vegetarians. 
 All participants Excluding vegetarians 
Condition Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
Negative human 36.48 (16.13) 51 39.11 (15.24) 44 
arbitrary  27.47 (18.39) 52 29.87 (18.99) 43 
Drug addicts 35.66 (16.07) 52 38.98 (14.15) 43 
Control  38.45 (16.00) 49 39.90 (15.11) 41 
 
Warmth towards animals. We ran a similar ANOVA model to examine 
any differences in perceptions of warmth towards animals. See Figure 7.2 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards animals per condition. The 
results revealed no difference in feelings of warmth towards animals between 
conditions, F(3, 201) = .21, p = .891, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.03, BFM = 0.01. Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(3, 200) = .079. When 
controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 
199) = 7.50, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .036, BFM =12.81, and the overall model remained 
non-significant, F(3, 199) = 1.87, p = .905, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, BFM = .08. Further, 




BFM = 0.57. Together, Bayesian model comparison suggests individual 
differences in SDO best predict warmth towards animals. 
 
Figure 7.2. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
animals per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 
1 standard error. 
 
Drug addict inequality. To examine the impact that the manipulations 
had on the support for the drug addict inequality, we ran an ANOVA which 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(3, 201), = 2.96, p = .033, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= 0.04, BFM  = 3.94e-8. See figure 7.3 below for the mean level of support for 
the drug addict inequality. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not 
violated, but was marginally significant, F(3, 201) = 2.28, p = .080. When 
entering SDO into the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 199), = 
43.81, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.18, BFM = 3.56, and the overall model remained 
unchanged, F(3, 199), = 2.88, p = .037, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.04, BFM = 2.52.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed support for SDO, and 
inconclusive support for the interaction between condition and SDO, predicting 
support for the drug addict inequality. Bayesian model comparison also 
revealed very strong evidence against condition alone, or the null model (BFM 
= 4.56e -8) predicting support for the drug addict inequality. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants in the arbitrary condition (M = 24.59, 





























inequality compared with the control condition (M = 33.75, SD = 18.57, p = 
.054, BF10, U = 2.30). Participants in the drug addicts’ condition (M = 23.63, SD 
= 16.31) also displayed marginally significantly less endorsement of the drug 
addict inequality compared to controls, p = .099, BF10, U = 8.41, however there 
was Bayesian support for this difference. There were no other (marginally) 
significant or significant differences between conditions. It is interesting to note 
the differences in post-hoc results between frequentist and Bayesian analyses 
(see Discussion of this section). 
 
Figure 7.3. Showing participants in the human supremacy is arbitrary and the 
drug addict condition displayed marginally significantly less support for the 
drug addict inequality than the control condition, but not the negative human 
qualities condition. Higher numbers equal more support. Error bars are +/- 1 
standard error. Note the difference between the arbitrary condition and the 
control condition did not remain when excluding vegetarians. 
We then analysed the data excluding vegetarians and vegans. Support 
for the overall model decreased and support for SDO predicting support for the 
drug addict inequality increased. Support against condition alone or the null 
model predicting support for the drug addict inequality remained very strong. 
In looking at the Bayesian post hoc comparisons without vegetarians and 
vegans, the support for a difference in endorsement of the drug addict 
inequality between the arbitrary and control condition (BF10, U = 0.73), and the 
drug addicts and control condition (BF10, U = 3.20) both decreased. There were 
no other differences in the results when excluding vegetarians or vegans. 
































results remained the same, however, there was less support for the Bayesian 
post hoc comparisons.  See Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 below for Bayesian model 
comparison with and without vegetarians and vegans, predicting endorsement 
of the drug addict inequality. 
 
Table 7.4. Showing Bayesian model comparison with and without 
vegetarians and vegans, predicting endorsement of the drug addict 
inequality. 
Model BFM  BFM (excluding 
vegetarians) 
SDO 3.56 13.04 
Condition + SDO 2.52 0.69 
Null model 4.56e -8 1.81e -5 
Condition 3.94e-8 5.31e -6 
Note: All priors are set evenly at 0.25 in JASP.  
 
Table 7.5. Showing means and standard deviations for the endorsement of 
the drug addict inequality, by condition, with and without vegetarians. 
 All participants Excluding vegetarians 
Condition Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
Negative human  28.65 (20.66) 51 30.21 (20.64) 44 
arbitrary  24.59 (20.70) 52 27.05 (21.35) 43 
Drug addicts 23.63 (16.31) 52 24.74 (16.15) 43 
Control  33.75 (18.57) 49 34.30 (19.06) 41 
 
Warmth towards drug addicts. We ran an ANOVA model to examine 
any differences in perceptions of warmth towards drug addicts. See Figure 7.4 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards drug addicts per condition. The 
results revealed no difference in feelings of warmth towards drug addicts 
between conditions, F(3, 201) = .43, p = .730, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.00, BFM = 0.01. Levene’s 
test of homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(3, 200) = .89, p = .447 
When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant 
covariate F(1, 199) = 8.92, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .043, BFM = 25.51, and the overall 
model remained non-significant, F(3, 199) = 0.28, p = .840, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, BFM = 
0.10. Further, Bayesian model comparison showed inconclusive evidence for 
the null model, BFM = 0.23. Together, Bayesian model comparison suggests 





Figure 7.4. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards drug 
addicts per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 
1 standard error. 
Bangladesh inequality. To examine the impact that the manipulations 
had on the support for the Bangladesh inequality, we ran an ANOVA which 
showed no main effect of condition, F(3, 201), = 1.38, p = .252, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.02, BFM  
= 3.59e -13. See figure 7.5 below for the mean level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality per condition. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance 
was not violated, but was marginally significant, F(3, 201) = 2.13, p = .097. 
When entering SDO into the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 199), 
= 73.43, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.27, BFM = 8.03, and the overall model improved and 
became marginally significant, F(3, 199), = 2.25, p = .084, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03, BFM = 
1.12.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed moderate support for SDO 
predicting support for the Bangladesh inequality, and inconclusive support for 
the interaction between condition and SDO predicting support for the 
Bangladesh inequality. Bayesian model comparison also revealed very strong 
evidence against condition alone, or the null model (BFM = 2.87e -12) 
predicting support for the Bangladesh inequality. 
Post-hoc Bayesian comparisons revealed inconclusive evidence that 
there were any meaningful differences between any conditions in the 
































the main frequentist ANCOVA did not yield a significant result, and the 
Bayesian analyses were inconclusive, we did not break down the SDO x 
Condition interaction, and did not make any post hoc frequentist comparisons.  
 
Figure 7.5. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for the 
Bangladesh inequality between conditions. Higher numbers equal more 
support. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
See Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 below for Bayesian model comparison with 
and without vegetarians, predicting endorsement of the Bangladesh inequality. 
When analyzing the data excluding vegetarians, we found improved support 
for SDO alone best predicting the endorsement of the Bangladesh inequality. 
The condition plus SDO interaction remained inconclusive. The support 
against either the null model or condition alone predicting the endorsement of 
the Bangladesh inequality remained very strong. 
Table 7.6. Showing Bayesian model comparison with and without 
vegetarians, predicting endorsement of the Bangladesh inequality. 
Model BFM  BFM (excluding 
vegetarians) 
SDO 8.03 26.89 
Condition + SDO 1.12 0.34 
Null model 2.87e -12 7.84e -10 
Condition 3.59e - 13 5.21e -11 
Note: All priors are set evenly at 0.25 in JASP.  
 
Table 7.7. Showing means and standard deviations for the endorsement of 


































 All participants Excluding vegetarians 
Condition Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
Negative human  16.41 (14.12) 51 17.35 (14.16) 44 
arbitrary  13.85 (15.74) 52 15.99 (16.32) 43 
Drug addicts 17.78 (14.61) 52 18.35 (14.79) 43 
Control  19.89 (17.75) 49 20.74 (18.09) 41 
 
Warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers. We ran another 
ANOVA model to examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers See Figure 7.6 below for the mean feelings of 
warmth towards Bangladeshi workers per condition. The results revealed no 
difference in feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers 
between conditions, F(3, 201) = .10, p = .962, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.00, BFM = 1.91e - 6. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(3, 200) = .69, 
p = .562. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a 
significant covariate F(1, 199) = 22.74, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .10, BFM = 95.53, and 
the overall model remained non-significant, F(3, 199) = .214, p = .887, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.00, BFM = 09. Further, Bayesian model comparison showed strong evidence 
against the null model, BFM = 7.02e -4. Together, Bayesian model comparison 
strongly shows individual differences in SDO best predict warmth towards 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers. 
 
Figure 7.6. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
Bangladesh workers per condition. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error 




































Homeless inequality. To examine the impact that the manipulations 
had on the support for the Homeless inequality, we ran an ANOVA which 
showed no main effect of condition, F(3, 201), = 1.65, p = .178, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.02, BFM  
= 1.22e -13. See figure 7.7 below for the mean level of support for the 
homeless inequality per condition. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance 
was not violated, F(3, 201) = 1.62, p = .187. When entering SDO into the 
model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 199), = 75.74, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.28, 
BFM = 9.60, and the overall model improved and became marginally 
significant, F(3, 199), = 2.08, p = .104, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03, BFM = 0.94.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed moderate support for SDO 
predicting support for the Homeless inequality, and inconclusive support for 
the interaction between condition and SDO predicting support for the 
Homeless inequality. Bayesian model comparison also revealed very strong 
evidence against condition alone, or the null model (BFM = 7.39e -13) 
predicting support for the Homeless inequality. 
Post-hoc Bayesian comparisons revealed inconclusive evidence that 
there were any meaningful differences between any conditions in the 
endorsement of the Homeless inequality, 0.22 < all BF10, U < 1.32. Because the 
main frequentist ANCOVA did not yield a significant result, we did not break 
down the SDO x condition interaction, and did not make any post hoc 
frequentist comparisons.  
We then re-ran the Bayesian main analyses without vegetarians. The 
interpretation of the results remained the same, and the support for SDO alone 
best predicting the Homeless inequality improved. See Table 7.8 and Table 
7.9 below for Bayesian model comparison with and without vegetarians, 





Figure 7.7. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for the 
homeless inequality between conditions. Higher numbers equal more support. 
Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
 
Table 7.8. Showing Bayesian model comparison with and without 
vegetarians, predicting endorsement of the Homeless inequality. 
Model BFM  (all participants ) BFM (excluding 
vegetarians) 
SDO 9.60 18.71 
Condition + SDO 0.94 0.48 
Null model 7.39e -13 9.83e -10 



































Table 7.9. Showing means and standard deviations for the endorsement of 
Homeless inequality, by condition, with and without vegetarians. 
 All participants Excluding vegetarians 
Condition Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N 
human downfall  28.04 (18.60) 51 29.98 (18.51) 44 
arbitrary  24.18 (19.33) 52 26.79 (19.63) 43 
Drug addicts 26.76 (15.76) 52 28.61 (15.23) 43 
Control  31.78 (17.95) 49 33.71 (17.47) 41 
 
Warmth towards homeless men. We ran another ANOVA model to 
examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards homeless men. See 
Figure 7.8 below for the mean feelings of warmth towards homeless men per 
condition. The results revealed no difference in feelings of warmth towards 
homeless men between conditions, F(3, 201) = .68, p = .568, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 
0.00. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(3, 200) 
= 1.67, p = .175. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a 
significant covariate F(1, 199) = 13.17, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .06, BFM = 40.11, and 
the overall model remained non-significant, F(3, 199) = .72, p = .543, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, 
BFM = 0.17. Further, Bayesian model comparison showed inconclusive 
evidence against the null model, BFM = 0.04. Together, Bayesian model 
comparison strongly shows individual differences in SDO best predict warmth 








Figure 7.8. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
homeless men between conditions. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.2 Correlational Results. The correlational results supported both 
our correlational hypotheses. Support for human-animal inequality is strongly 
correlated with support for all three human inequalities measured. That is, 
supporting our first correlational hypotheses, the attitudes towards all four 
inequalities (human-animal, drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless) were all 
positively correlated. In addition, support for the homeless inequality was 
strongly related to both human-animal and human inequalities.  
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
Bangladesh and homeless inequalities. Conservative political orientation was 
correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, but like SDO 
was more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the human inequalities.  
In addition, and supporting our hypotheses, human-animal inequality 
was not foundational to other inequalities. That is, human inequality were 
correlated more strongly with each other than with human-animal inequality. 
As expected, support for the homeless and drug addicts inequality were very 

































inequalities were also very strongly correlated. Departing from the previous 
two studies, attitudes towards human-animal inequality were actually 
correlated more strongly with the drug addict and Bangladesh inequality than 
in study 1 and study 2.  
Taken together, we again found strong evidence that the endorsement 
of human-animal inequality was related to the endorsement of human 
inequality, however, it was not asymmetrically related to human inequalities. 
7.4.3 Experimental results  
Human-animal inequality. Overall, participants endorsed human-
animal inequality more than any of human inequality. We found that 
participants in the human supremacy is arbitrary condition showed significantly 
less endorsement of human-animal inequality than the other three conditions. 
This effect persisted when controlling for individual differences in SDO, and 
when excluding vegetarians from the analyses. However, the post hoc 
comparisons were less pronounced when excluding vegetarians from the 
analyses. In addition, we found good evidence that challenging non-addict 
supremacy did not have a downstream effect for reducing endorsement of 
human-animal inequality.  
Drug addict inequality. We found a main effect of condition in the 
endorsement of the drug addict inequality. We found that participants who had 
just written a paragraph arguing that non-addicts are not superior to drug 
addicts showed marginally significantly less endorsement of the drug addict 
inequality than controls. We also found that participants in the ‘human 
supremacy is arbitrary’ condition (but not the human downfall condition), 
showed marginally significantly less endorsement of the drug addict inequality 
than controls. However, when analysing the data without vegetarians, the 
support for the interaction between condition and SDO became inconclusive 
using Bayesian analyses.  
Bangladesh inequality. All participants revealed a low level of support 
for the Bangladesh inequality. There was no main effect of condition, and there 
was inconclusive evidence for an SDO x condition interaction. The results 




inequality when excluding vegetarians and vegans. Participants in the human 
supremacy is arbitrary condition did display lower support for the Bangladesh 
inequality, however, the difference was not significant, or supported by 
Bayesian analyses. In addition, the difference between conditions was weaker 
when excluding vegetarians and vegans. Taken together, there was good 
evidence that SDO alone best predicted support for the Bangladesh inequality. 
Homeless inequality. Overall, there was a similar level of support for 
the Homeless inequality to the drug addict inequality. However, there was 
inconclusive evidence that there was an interaction between condition and 
SDO, and strong evidence against the null hypothesis, or condition alone 
predicting support for the Homeless inequality. Participants in the human 
supremacy is arbitrary condition did endorse the Homeowner-Homeless 
inequality less than the other three conditions, however, this difference was 
not significant. There was good evidence that SDO alone best predicted 
support for the Homeless inequality, and this difference was stronger when 
excluding vegetarians from the analyses. 
This study revealed that challenging human supremacy over animals 
can reduce the endorsement of human-animal and drug addict inequalities. 
One reason why the arbitrary condition, but not the downfall condition showed 
an effect may be due to the interplay of sample and manipulation. Because 
psychology undergraduate students are more left-wing than the general 
population, it is possible that the human supremacy is arbitrary condition was 
more effective than the human negative qualities as writing about the arbitrary 
nature of concepts may be more attractive and persuasive of an argument than 
for the more conservative and more male participants we had in study 1. 
Moreover, this is because challenging human supremacy may have tackled 
the foundational inequality (that of humans over animals), which lead to a 
reduced support for the next most supported inequality – the drug addict 
inequality. We think the reason why the downfall condition did not yield a 
similar result is because reminders of humans’ negative qualities could have 
perpetuated human outgroup stereotypes (i.e. towards drug addicts, a highly 




supremacy over animals intact. Such an interpretation could explain why the 
downfall condition did not show reduced support for either the human-animal 
or human inequalities. 
The lack of a downstream effect on the Bangladesh or Homeless 
inequality is interesting. It may be that endorsing human-animal inequality is 
only able to reduce support for the drug addict inequality, however we think 
this to be unlikely as all human inequalities correlate positively with support for 
human-animal inequality. What we think is more likely is that we observed a 
floor effect whereby all participants reported low levels of support for the 
inequality, and therefore we could not capture a reduction in support. Indeed, 
the scores for support for the homeless and Bangladesh inequality were close 
to the bottom of the scale. Moreover, it is interesting that participants reveal 
such a low level of support for the Bangladesh inequality, particularly when 
most participants in this sample – western women – are the very sample who 
consume the most sweatshop clothing in the world (Statista, 2019). This was 
an unexpected finding, however, it is a finding that can be explained by the 
dissonance reduction model proposed by Bastian and Loughnan (2017). That 
is, sweatshop clothing, like meat, is a morally troublesome product and so 
people who consume sweatshop clothing are likely to be motivated to justify 
their morally troublesome behaviour. Alternatively, participants may be 
unaware of the true cost of their consumer behaviour, and so do not even feel 
dissonance from writing in this study that they do not support the Bangladesh 
inequality, even when their behaviour highly likely suggests otherwise. Of 
course, we do not have a measure of participants’ consumer behaviour, and 
so these comments are speculative in nature. Future research could therefore 
benefit from including behavioural measures of sweatshop consumption, or 
consumption of other morally troublesome products and participants 
endorsement of those products. 
Moreover, we also found that challenging supremacy over drug addicts 
only reduced support for the drug addict inequality, and did not have a 
downstream effect on support for human-animal inequality, or human 




inequalities are foundational to human-animal inequality, or indeed other 
human inequalities. 
7.4.4 Limitations. There are limitations to study 3 that are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, we did not have a plan for exclusions in our studies. 
Specifically, we did not have a plan to only recruit meat eaters, or British 
people, whom some of the questions were specifically aimed at (e.g., “British 
people are superior to sweatshop workers from Bangladesh”). There are two 
reasons why we did not plan our exclusions. Firstly, when recruiting from the 
undergraduate participant pool at The University of Edinburgh where we 
recruited this sample from, researchers are not allowed to exclude participants 
based on gender or ethnicity so that all students have an equal chance to 
participate in studies. In addition, the most relevant previous literature on 
human-animal relations has not planned and theoretically justified their 
exclusions, and so there was no exclusion method for us to follow (Bastian, 
Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009). Indeed, we 
excluded vegetarian and non-British participants from analyses because 
theoretically the study questions were not aimed at non-British participants, 
and because we wanted to see whether the effects we observed held for meat 
eaters, or whether it was vegetarians in our sample that were driving the effects 
observed. The results revealed that removing the vegetarians and non-British 
participants weakened the observed effects. 
Secondly, we did not rigorously check the qualitative written responses 
from our manipulations. Indeed, the purpose of this thesis was to 
experimentally manipulate various forms of supremacy and measure the 
impact on support for various inequalities. However, such rigorous qualitative 
exploration of the data were beyond the scope of this thesis and the expertise 
of the researchers. We appreciate there may be additional subtle differences 
in the written responses of participants which could be further analysed and 
this would be fruitful work for future qualitative research. Please see the 
general discussion of this thesis for a more thorough discussion of the potential 
for future qualitative research arising from the results of this thesis. However, 




variables irrespective of the specific language used by participants to make 
their argument. These methods – while they have their limitations – are 
consistent with the most relevant research on the psychology of human-animal 
relations (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 
2009). 
7.5 Conclusion 
There are two key takeaways from study 3, both that surround the 
sample we employed. First, we found evidence for the foundational 
hypothesis, but only in an undergraduate psychology sample. That is, we 
found that challenging human supremacy could reduce support for both 
human-animal inequality and the drug addict inequality. In addition, 
challenging non-addict supremacy did not reduce support for human-animal 
inequality, further adding support to the foundational hypothesis. These 
findings are of course in contrast to the null findings in study 1. It is likely that 
the difference in the findings is down to a combination of the refined human 
supremacy manipulation employed in this study (human supremacy is 
arbitrary), and the profile of our participants. Because we found support for the 
foundational hypothesis only when participants were prompted with ‘human 
supremacy is arbitrary’ and not when prompted with the ‘negative qualities of 
humans’ suggests that the framing of human supremacy measures may be an 
important finding for future work on human-animal relations to consider. It is 
likely that the ‘human supremacy is arbitrary’ manipulation is more effective 
and appealing for left wing, young educated women (i.e., our sample) because 
questioning the legitimacy of supremacy is more so associated with left leaning 
people (Altemeyer, 1981). 
Second, for this sample of undergraduates, feelings of warmth towards 
outgroups is more strongly correlated with support for corresponding 
inequalities, and support for human-animal inequality is more strongly 
correlated with support for human inequalities than a sample from the UK 
public. That is, more so than the first two studies which were comprised of a 
more representative UK sample, the current study found that for young, 




attitudes towards human-animal and human inequalities are more closely 
aligned, thus possibly explaining why we found support for the foundational 
hypothesis in study 3, but not study 1. In other words, the more closely aligned 
people’s support for human-animal and human inequalities are, the more likely 
it is that changing attitudes towards one inequality will have an impact on 
attitudes towards another inequality. Indeed, the conceptual similarity between 
human-animal and human inequalities, and our consistent correlational 
findings that support for human-animal and human inequalities are related, is 
integral to the foundational hypothesis of this thesis.  
This finding complements the literature by Costello and Hodson (2009; 
study 1) which found in a sample of 19 year old Canadian psychology 
undergraduates (76% female) that stronger beliefs in the human-animal divide 
is associated with dehumanization of Canadian immigrants. Moreover, the 
current findings complement the research by Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and 
Hodson (2012) which found in another sample of 19 year old Canadian 
psychology undergraduates (82% female), that using a similar sample of 
experimentally reducing the human-animal divide (by drawing comparisons 
between animals and humans) can improve moral concern towards human 
outgroups (Black people, Asians, Muslims, Aboriginal, and immigrants). 
Overall, we have mixed evidence for the foundational hypothesis; study 
1 did not support the hypothesis whereas study 3 provided initial support. We 
now turn to chapter 7 and provide our fifth and final empirical chapter to shed 





Chapter Eight: Lack of Evidence for the Foundational 
Hypothesis 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter 7, we presented study 3 that provided initial evidence for the 
foundational hypothesis, but only in an undergraduate psychology sample. The 
purpose of study 4 was therefore to replicate study 1 and study 3, to further 
examine the foundational hypothesis. In addition, we also wanted to employ a 
behavioural measure of support for the inequalities, and so included a 
measure of charitable donations (to either a human or an animal charity) in 
study 4. We wanted to include a behavioural measure of support for 
inequalities, because in the previous studies we had measured support for 
inequalities (i.e., attitudes), however we had not measured participants 
behaviour directly. The charitable donation was a real world donation scenario 
whereby participants had the option of actually donating their study earnings 
to charity.  
We also wanted to include two measures (creativity and 
dehumanization) which could be potential mediators of the effects. The results 
of study 3 may be explained by challenging rigid stereotypical thinking (e.g., 
the idea of human supremacy) which then increases creativity and divergent 
thinking generally, which in turn has the downstream effect of reducing support 
for the drug addict inequality. Previous work has shown that reducing 
stereotypes can have a positive impact on outgroup attitudes via increased 
creativity. Goclowska and Crisp (2013) found that exposure to counter-
stereotypical people (e.g., a female mechanic), can not only decrease 
stereotyping of the target individual, but also lead to the generation of creative 
ideas on a subsequent divergent thinking creativity task. Another study found 
that encouraging participants to generate counter stereotypic role models 
reduces outgroup dehumanization via a reduced reliance on heuristic thinking 
(Prati, Vasiljevic, Crisp, & Rubini, 2015). Therefore, we reasoned that it is 
possible that the findings of study 3 may be explained by an increase in 
creativity or divergent thinking, and so we employed a measure of creative 




on cognitive flexibility and creativity, we hypothesized that one explanation for 
any changes in attitudes towards inequality stemming from reduced 
supremacist beliefs could be an increase in cognitive flexibility. Cognitive 
flexibility can be measured using creativity tasks, and so we employed a 
measure of creativity to test this hypothesis. 
Another possible explanation is that challenging supremacist ideas 
simply leads to a reduction in dehumanization (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). 
Because dehumanization is associated with thinking of outgroups (both human 
and animal) as being inferior and lacking humanity, reducing supremacist 
thoughts towards animals could lead to seeing animals in a more favourable 
and therefore more human light (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Because of the 
association between humanity and moral concern, seeing animals in a more 
human light could lead to reduced support for the human-animal and drug 
addict inequalities. We therefore also included measures of dehumanization in 
this study.  
8.1.1 Correlational hypotheses. We hypothesized that attitudes 
towards the human-animals, drug addict, Bangladesh, and homeless 
inequalities would all be positively correlated. That is, people who support one 
inequality are likely to support other inequalities (Costello & Hodson, 2014). In 
line with our previous findings, we did not expect that support for human-animal 
inequality would be asymmetrically correlated to support for human 
inequalities. 
8.1.2 Experimental hypotheses. We had reason to have two 
experimental hypotheses. On the one hand, we expected to replicate the null 
effect of study 1 that there would be no difference in the dependent variables 
by condition (i.e., no support for the experimental foundational hypothesis). 
However, on the other hand we expected that using University of Edinburgh 
students as participants would replicate the foundational findings of study 3. 
We also thought this would be the case because the most relevant research 
which has manipulated human-animal relations and measured attitudes 




students (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 
2009).  
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants. We wanted to again use University students, 
however, because we wanted to include a behavioural measure of charitable 
donations, we needed to use participants we could pay for their time. We 
therefore recruited Edinburgh University students from ‘MyCareer hub’, an 
advertising website for University of Edinburgh students. Sample size was 
determined a priori using g*power software. Using α = .05; power = .80; and f 
= 0.25 for an ANCOVA with three conditions suggested 158 participants (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 90 participants (61 female) completed the 
study during the time we had available for data collection. Participants were 
on average 22.5 years old (SD = 4.49). Participants were paid £5 for their time. 
Of the participants, 46 were White-European, 18 Indian, 14 East Asian, 4 
Black/African, 3 Multiracial, 3 ‘Other’, and 2 Hispanic. Thirty-seven participants 
were UK citizens, 3 were permanent residents, and 49 were on a UK student 
visa. Regarding the participants diet, 14 were meat eaters, 33 were omnivores, 
20 had limited meat intake, 20 were vegetarian, and 3 were vegan. The 
average time it took participants to complete the study was 25 minutes. 
8.2.2 Design. Study 4 was a two-part study. Participants initially 
completed a short 5-minute survey at home, consisting of our pre-measure of 
dehumanization. The second part of the study was completed two days after 
the pre-measure, in the psychology laboratories in 7 George Square, the 
University of Edinburgh. Participants were given informed consent and then 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. All participants completed one 
of three writing tasks and were then given the dependent measures. 
Participants were then debriefed and paid. Participants were then asked if they 
wanted to donate some of their money to a charity and were told it was not 
part of the study. Participants were then debriefed again and asked if they 
wanted to know anything about the study, or whether they had any questions 




8.2.3 Manipulations. Participants in all three conditions were instructed 
to take 2 or 3 minutes to write their argument. Participants could move on from 
the writing task after 2 minutes had passed, there was no maximum time limit 
for the manipulation. 
Human supremacy. The manipulation was the same as in study 3. 
Non-addict supremacy. The manipulation was the same as in study 3. 
Control condition. The manipulation was the same as in study 3. 
8.2.4 Measures 
The measures were identical to Study 3, with the addition of: 
Fluency and Flexibility coding. Fluency and flexibility were taken 
directly from Goclowska and Crisp (2013). We employed two research 
assistants to code the written responses for the creativity task, however, only 
one of the research assistants completed the task, and so we only report the 
results of one research assistant (RA). The RA was blind to hypotheses and 
conditions, and study design. The RA was asked to judge: creative fluency – 
the number of ideas generated by participants in two minutes, and creative 
flexibility – the number of different categories these ideas belonged to. For 
example, if someone says that a plastic bottle can be used to hold water, store 
olive oil, or store vinegar, they have generated three ideas, however, the three 
ideas are all from the one category – storing liquids. An example of a use for 
a plastic bottle in a different category would be cutting the top off and a plastic 
bottle to use as a vase for plants – growing plants. 
Originality coding. Originality coding was also taken directly from 
Goclowska and Crisp (2013). The RA infered oringiality based on how many 
other participants also gave x idea. For each example participants gave, we 
computed an originality score using the following equation: 1 – (percentage of 
participants that generated the same idea/100). We then computed a mean 
originality score by adding up each originality score for each example, divided 
by the total number of examples each participant gave. In other words, we 
made an average originality score for each participant. 
Dehumanization of animals. To measure the dehumanization of 




attribution of various mental states to animals. We used an existing measure 
taken from Piazza, Landy, and Goodwin (2014). Specifically, we asked 
participants to what extent they thought animals were intelligent, clever, 
inquisitive, creative, can suffer, can experience pain, can experience pleasure, 
are sophisticated, are sensitive, are powerful, are vigorous, are active, and are 
energetic. Particpants answered on a 1 (Not at all) – 7 (Extremely) Likert scale, 
whereby higher numbers equal more attribution of mental states, and lower 
numbers equal dehumanization of the target group. 
Dehumanization of drug addicts. To measure the dehumanization of 
drug addicts, we used the same within sibjects pre and post measure of 
participants’ attribution of various mental states to animal taken from Piazza, 
Landy, and Goodwin (2014). Specifically, we asked participants to what extent 
they thought drug addicts were intelligent, clever, inquisitive, creative, can 
suffer, can experience pain, can experience pleasure, are sophisticated, are 
sensitive, are powerful, are vigorous, are active, and are energetic. Particpants 
answered on a 1 (Not at all) – 7 (Extremely) Likert scale, whereby higher 
numbers equal more attribution of mental states, and lower numbers equal 
dehumanization of the target group. 
Dehumanization of Bangladesh workers. To measure the 
dehumanization of Bangladesh sweatshop workers, we used the same within 
sibjects pre and post measure of participants’ attribution of various mental 
states to animal taken from Piazza, Landy, and Goodwin (2014). Specifically, 
we asked participants to what extent they thought Bangladesh sweatshop 
workers were intelligent, clever, inquisitive, creative, can suffer, can 
experience pain, can experience pleasure, are sophisticated, are sensitive, are 
powerful, are vigorous, are active, and are energetic. Particpants answered on 
a 1 (Not at all) – 7 (Extremely) Likert scale, whereby higher numbers equal 
more attribution of mental states, and lower numbers equal dehumanization of 
the target group. 
Dehumanization of homeless men. To measure the dehumanization 
of homeless men, we used the same within sibjects pre and post measure of 




Landy, and Goodwin (2014). Specifically, we asked participants to what extent 
they thought homeless men were intelligent, clever, inquisitive, creative, can 
suffer, can experience pain, can experience pleasure, are sophisticated, are 
sensitive, are powerful, are vigorous, are active, and are energetic. Particpants 
answered on a 1 (Not at all) – 7 (Extremely) Likert scale, whereby higher 
numbers equal more attribution of mental states, and lower numbers equal 
dehumanization of the target group. 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Analysis strategy. We employed both frequentist (using SPSS 
software) and Bayesian analyses (using JASP software), and ran different 
models with and without SDO as a covariate. Unlike null hypothesis 
significance testing, Bayesian model comparison allows for tests in favour of 
the null hypothesis. Bayesian analyses also allows for model comparison 
between the null, the covariate, the independent variable, and the independent 
variable controlling for the covariate. We also ran our main analyses with and 
without the ethnic minorities and vegetarians/vegans. 
8.3.2 Preliminary data treatment. We had 102 people sign up to the 
study. We had 8 people not complete any of the pre-measures, and these 
participants were deleted, leaving 94 participants. Of those 94 participants, 90 
participants completed the written manipulation and the measures of the 
survey. There were no additional exclusions in this study. 
8.3.3 Missing data. There were 27 cases of missing data in this study, 
all of which were participants missing one or two questions. Missing data was 
transformed to the mean of the scale, as per previous studies.  
8.3.4 Manipulation check. We visually inspected the written responses 
of the participants. All participants completed the manipulation correctly, and 
no participants were removed from analyses. 
8.3.5 Correlational Results. Please see Table 8.1 for correlations 
between support for inequalities, feelings of warmth, and SDO in study 4 with 
frequentist p-values, and Bayes factors. As can be seen in the correlation 
tables, support for human-animal inequality was only modestly correlated with 




the charitable donations, creativity, support for inequalities, and SDO in study 
4. Table 8.3 shows correlations between support for inequalities, SDO, and 








Table 8.1. Showing Pearson correlations, p-values, and Bayes factors between support for inequalities, SDO, Political Orientation, and warmth 













2 r  0.35          
p  < .001          
 BF10 82.31         
3 r  0.40  0.69         
p < .001  < .001         
 BF10 538.96 2.05e+11        
4 r  0.34  0.71  0.70        
p < .001  < .001  < .001        
 BF10 58.58 3.24e+12 1.04e+12       
5 r  0.34  0.50  0.43  0.54       
 p < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001       
 BF10 52.77 6.26e+4 2183.83 1.01e+6      
6 r  0.25  0.42  0.27  0.41  0.38      
p .008  <.001  .005  < .001  < .001      
 BF10 4.72 1074.45 6.92 670.75 226.68     
7 r  -0.25  -0.19  -0.23  -0.15  -0.28  -0.04     
p .009 .037 .013 .082 .004 .353    
 BF10 4.00 1.22 2.94 0.62 9.10 0.18    
8 r  -0.09  -0.52  -0.38  -0.47  -0.24  -0.44  0.11    
p .203 <.001 <.001 <.001 .010 <.001 .160   
 BF10 0.29 1.69e+5 235.26 1.32e+4 3.73 3016.51 0.36   
9 r  0.10  -0.25  -0.31  -0.28  -0.17  -0.27  0.34 0.49   
p .835 .009 .001 .004 .059 .005 < .001  < .001   
 BF10 0.07 4.23 21.65 7.79 0.82 6.35 53.89 3.78e+4  
10 r  -0.06  -0.42  -0.36  -0.47  -0.18  -0.30  0.25  0.69  0.65   
p .292  < .001  < .001  < .001  .048  .002 .010  < .001  < .001   
 BF10 0.22 1170.06 115.81 1.46e+4 0.98 14.32 3.81 3.98e+11 7.41e+9  
Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 
Orientation; Human-animal, Drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless = inequalities; Workers warmth = warmth towards 









Table 8.2. Showing Pearson correlations, p-values, and Bayes factors between support for inequalities, charitable 
donations, and creativity in study 4. 
Variable  1.Donatio
n 





2 r  -.03        
p  .609        
 BF10 .11        
3 r  -.01 .77       
p .539 <.001       
 BF10 .12 2.27e+16       
4 r  .05 .19 .54      
p .305 .040 <.001      
 BF10 .21 1.15 6.55e+5      
5 r  -.24 -.06 -.14 -.25     
 p .010 .272 .098 .008     
 BF10 3.62 .23 .54 4.51 -    
6 r  -.14 .03 -.04 .01 -    
p .097 .621 .346 .519 -    
 BF10 .55 .11 .19 .13 -    
7 r  -.10 -.06 -.08 -.06 -    
p .170 .298 .229 .292 -    
 BF10 .34 .21 .27 .22 -    
8 r  -.07 -.13 -.25 -.08 -    
p .257 .104 .009 .218 -    
 BF10 .24 .51 3.96 .28 -    
9 r  -.16 .06 -.07 -.17 -    
 p .068 .701 .265 .054 -    








Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 
Orientation; Human-animal, Drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless = inequalities; Workers warmth = warmth towards 








Table 8.3. Showing Pearson correlations, p-values, and Bayes factors between outgroup mind attribution, SDO, and 
support for inequalities in study 4. 













2 r  .35        
p  <.001        
 BF10 72.23        
3 r  .43 .66       
p <.001 <.001       
 BF10 1755.58 1.75e+10       
4 r  .42 .78 .81      
p <.001 <.001 <.001      
 BF10 1177.92 1.35e+17 5.31e+19      
5 r  -.07 -.24 -.16 -.18     
 p .261 .012 .065 .048     
 BF10 .24 3.14 .76 .97     
6 r  -.23 .05 -.07 -.10 -    
p .014 .677 .268 .169 -    
 BF10 2.75 0.09 0.23 .34 -    
7 r  -.07 -.34 -.30 -.38 -    
p .257 <.001 .002 <.001 -    
 BF10 .24 45.41 15.56 212.05 -    
8 r  -.10 -.17 -.29 -.32 -    
p .176 .058 .003 <.001 -    
 BF10 .33 .84 11.72 31.71 -    
9 r  -.04 -.34 -.26 -.39 -    
 p .354 <.001 .007 <.001 -    








Note: r = Pearson correlation; p = p-value; BF10 = Bayesian support; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; PO = Political 
Orientation; Human-animal, Drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless = inequalities; Workers warmth = warmth towards 




Support for human-animal inequality was only moderately correlated 
with SDO, and there was inconclusive evidence that it was associated with 
political orientation. These results resemble the correlational findings from 
study 1, and are less similar to the results of study 3. That is, in study 3, support 
for human-animal inequality was strongly related to support for human 
inequalities, whereas in study 1 and study 4, and to a lesser extent study 2, 
support for human-animal inequality was less correlated with support for 
human inequality. 
However, like all previous studies, we again found that support for 
human inequality were all highly correlated. Moreover, we again did not find 
support for the correlational foundational hypothesis in that we found support 
for human inequality to be better predictors of human inequalities than human-
animal inequality. Unlike any other of our studies, we found that support for 
human-animal inequality was only weakly correlated with feelings of warmth 
towards animals. Participants who had stronger support for human-animal 
inequality did show more colder feelings towards animals, however, the 
correlation was only weak, and was not supported by Bayesian analyses.  
Feelings of warmth and support for human inequality were all 
moderately to strongly negatively correlated. That is, participants who more 
strongly supported the drug addict and homeless inequalities were very likely 
to also have cold feelings towards drug addicts and homeless men 
respectively. Participants support for the Bangladesh inequality and feelings of 
warmth towards Bangladesh workers were only moderately negatively 
correlated. In other words, participants who more strongly supported the 
Bangladesh inequality were only weakly more likely to have colder feelings 
towards Bangladesh workers. 
In short, we did not find support for the correlational foundational 
hypothesis. Similar to all our previous studies, we again found that support for 
human-animal inequality is correlated with support for human inequalities, 
however, to a lesser extent than our previous studies. In addition, we again 




(e.g., drug addict and Bangladesh inequalities) are strongly correlated with 
each other.  
Turning to our new measures, we found that dehumanization of each 
target group was correlated with the corresponding inequality. For example, 
the less mind participants attributed to animals, the more participants 
supported human-animal inequality. In addition, for all the human targets, 
dehumanization (e.g., of drug addicts) was similarly correlated with support for 
the corresponding inequality (e.g., the drug addict inequality). However, there 
was no evidence that the dehumanization of animals was in any way related 
to support for human inequalities. Similarly, dehumanization of humans did not 
predict support for human-animal inequality. 
Dehumanization of all targets after manipulation were positively 
correlated, people who attributed a lesser mind to animals, also attributed a 
lesser mind to drug addicts, homeless men, and sweatshop workers. In line 
with our consistent findings that support for human-animal inequality was not 
asymmetrically correlated with support for human inequalities, in study 4 we 
found that dehumanization of animals after the manipulation was not 
asymmetrically related to dehumanization of human targets. In fact, like 
support for human inequalities, dehumanization of human target groups after 
the manipulation were strongly correlated. 
In addition, donation to a charity (either the human or animal charity) 
was negatively correlated with SDO, and positively correlated with mind 
attribution of both humans and animals after the manipulation. Moreover, our 
measure of creativity revealed that creative fluency was strongly correlated 
with creative flexibility – the more examples of uses participants gave for 
plastic bottles (fluency) the more likely they were to give multiple categories of 
uses (flexibility). The number of examples (fluency) was only correlated weakly 
with originality – participants who wrote more examples of uses for a plastic 
bottle were not more likely to give more original ideas. In addition, people who 
were more likely to give different categories of uses of plastic bottles (flexibility) 
were also more likely to give more original ideas (originality). In addition, none 




or dehumanization of animals. Creativity was also unrelated to support for 
human inequality, with the exception that creative flexibility was weakly 
negatively correlated with support for the Bangladesh inequality. In addition, 
creative originality was weakly negatively correlated with SDO. However, the 
creativity results overall reveal that creativity is unrelated to support for 
inequalities, and dehumanization of both animals and humans. 
8.3.6 Experimental Results. To examine the impact the manipulations 
had on the dependent variables, we ran multiple ANOVAs, with and without 
controlling for SDO as a covariate. We also examined the Bayesian model 
comparison with and without vegetarians and vegans, to see whether the 
effects remained for omnivores. 
Human-animal inequality. See Figure 8.1 below for the mean level of 
support for human-animal inequality. To examine the impact that the 
manipulations had on the support for human-animal inequality, we ran an 
ANOVA which revealed no main effect of condition, F(2, 87), = 0.47, p = .627, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01, BFM  = 0.01. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not 
violated, F(2, 87) = .85, p = .432. When entering SDO into the model, SDO 
was a significant covariate, F(1, 86), = 10.56, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.11, BFM = 19.70, 
but the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 86), = 0.15, p = .862, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.00, BFM = 0.33.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed good support for SDO best 
predicting support for human-animal inequality. Bayesian model comparison 
also revealed inconclusive evidence against the null model predicting support 
for human-animal inequality, BFM = 0.09. We did not have the power to remove 





Figure 8.1. Showing no difference in the mean level of support for human-
animal inequality between conditions. Higher numbers equal more support. 
Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards animals. We ran a similar ANOVA model to examine 
any differences in perceptions of warmth towards animals. See Figure 8.2 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards animals per condition. The 
results revealed no difference in feelings of warmth towards animals between 
conditions, F(2, 87) = .61, p = .547, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.01, BFM = 0.07. Levene’s test of 
homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(2, 87) = .381, p = .684. When 
controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant covariate F(1, 
86) = 7.00, p = .010, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .08, BFM =8.71, and the overall model remained non-
significant, F(2, 86) = 0.42, p = .660, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, BFM = .35. Further, Bayesian 
model comparison showed inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 
0.45. Together, Bayesian model comparison suggests individual differences in 


































Figure 8.2. Showing no difference in the mean feelings of warmth towards 
animals between conditions. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars 
are +/- 1 standard error.  
Dehumanization of animals. We conducted a mixed model ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on mind attribution, and condition as a between 
subjects factor, to test for any differences in dehumanization of animals. We 
found there was a significant interaction between time and condition, F(2, 81), 
= 3.47, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08. We broke down the interaction by computing 
separate one-way ANOVAs on the dehumanization of animals, before and 
after the manipulation. An ANOVA revealed there was no difference in 
dehumanization of animals before the manipulation, F(2, 83), = 0.55, p = .578, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01. A second ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
dehumanization of animals after the manipulation, whereby participants that 
challenged human supremacy (M = 5.77, SE = 0.14), attributed significantly 
more mind to animals than control participants (M = 5.22, SE = 0.14), F(2, 89), 
= 3.85, p = .025, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08. There were no other significant differences between 
conditions. 
There was also a main effect of time, such that all participants attributed 
more mind to animals after the manipulation (M = 5.47, SE = 0.08) than before 
(M = 5.18, SE = 0.10), F(1, 81), = 28.36, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.26. There was no 
main effect of condition, overall participants attributed a similar level of mind to 
animals between conditions, F(1, 81), = 1.70, p = .188, 𝜂𝑝

























Figure 8.3 below for the means and standard errors of the dehumanization of 
animals per condition, before and after the manipulation. 
 
Figure 8.3. Showing participants in the human supremacy is arbitrary condition 
showed a decrease in dehumanization of animals after the manipulation. 
There was no significant difference in dehumanization after the manipulation 
for the non-addict supremacy or control conditions. Higher numbers equal 
more mind; lower numbers equal more dehumanization. Error bars are +/- 1 
standard error. 
Drug addict inequality. To examine the impact that the manipulations 
had on the support for the drug addict inequality, we ran an ANOVA which 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 87), = 6.76, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.13, BFM  = 3.03e 58. See figure 8.4 below for the mean level of support for 
the drug addict inequality. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not 
violated, F(2, 87) = 1.52, p = .223. When entering SDO into the model, SDO 
was a significant covariate, F(1, 86), = 33.13, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.28, BFM = 0.04, 
and the overall remained significant with very strong support from Bayesian 
analyses, F(2, 86), = 8.61, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.17, BFM = 218.07.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed weak support for SDO alone, and 
very strong support for the interaction between condition and SDO predicting 
support for the drug addict inequality. Bayesian model comparison also 
revealed very strong evidence against condition alone, or the null model (BFM 
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Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferoni adjustments for multiple 
comparisons revealed that participants in the drug addicts condition (M = 
13.55, SD = 14.95) supported the drug addict inequality significantly less than 
either the human supremacy (M = 30.12, SD = 18.85, p = .001, BF10, U = 69.76), 
or control conditions (M = 25.52, SD = 19.89, p = .003, BF10, U = 4.44). As can 
be seen, the Bayesian post hoc comparisons revealed very strong support for 
the difference between the human supremacy and the non-addict supremacy 
conditions, and moderate evidence for the difference between the non-addict 
supremacy and the control conditions. The difference between the human 
supremacy and control conditions was not significant (p = 1.00, BF10, U = 0.37).  
 
Figure 8.4. Showing participants in the non-addict supremacy condition 
revealed significantly less support for the drug addict inequality than the 
human supremacy and control conditions. Higher numbers equal more 
warmth. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error.  
Warmth towards drug addicts. We ran an ANOVA to examine any 
differences in perceptions of warmth towards drug addicts. See Figure 8.5 
below for the mean feelings of warmth towards drug addicts per condition. The 
results revealed a significant difference in feelings of warmth towards drug 
addicts between conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.48, p = .090, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.05, BFM = 0.41. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(2, 87) = .35, p 
= .705. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was a significant 
covariate F(1, 86) = 5.05, p = .027, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .06, BFM = 2.28, and the overall model 
became non-significant, F(2, 86) = 2.24, p = .113, 𝜂𝑝




































Bayesian model comparison showed inconclusive evidence for the null model, 
BFM = 0.40. Together, Bayesian model comparison suggests individual 
differences in SDO best predict warmth towards drug addicts. 
 
Figure 8.5. Showing participants in the non-addict supremacy condition 
displaying higher feelings of warmth towards drug addicts than the human 
supremacy and control conditions. Note: this effect was reduced to non-
significance when controlling for individual differences in SDO. Higher 
numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Dehumanization of drug addicts. We conducted a mixed model 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on mind attribution, and condition as a 
between subjects factor, to test for any differences in dehumanization of drug 
addicts. We found there was no significant interaction between time and 
condition, F(2, 81), = 1.04, p = .358, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03. However, there was a main 
effect of time whereby all participants attributed more mind to drug addicts after 
the manipulation (M = 4.74, SE = 0.10) than before (M = 4.59, SE = 0.09), F(1, 
81), = 4.60, p = .035, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05. There was no main effect of condition on 
dehumanization of drug addicts, F(2, 81), = 1.07, p = .348, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03. Please 
see Figure 8.6 below for the means and standard errors of the dehumanization 


























Figure 8.6. Showing dehumanization of drug addicts pre and post 
manipulation, between conditions. Higher numbers equal more mind, lower 
numbers equal more dehumanization. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Bangladesh inequality. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was 
violated, F(2, 87) = 7.58, p < .001. To examine the impact that the 
manipulations had on the support for the Bangladesh inequality, we ran a 
Welch’s ANOVA which showed no main effect of condition, F(2, 55.18), = 2.27, 
p = .113, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05, BFM  = 0.00. See figure 8.7 below for the mean level of 
support for the Bangladesh inequality per condition. When entering SDO into 
the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 86), = 20.08, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.19, BFM = 5.73, and the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 86), = 
2.08, p = .131, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05, BFM = 1.56.  
To sum, Bayesian model comparison revealed SDO was the best 
predictor of support for the Bangladesh inequality, and inconclusive support 
for the interaction between condition and SDO predicting support for the 
Bangladesh inequality. Bayesian model comparison also revealed evidence 
against condition alone, or the null model (BFM = 0.00) predicting support for 
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Figure 8.7. Showing no significant difference in the mean level of support for 
the Bangladesh inequality between conditions. Higher numbers equal more 
support. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers. We ran another 
ANOVA model to examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers See Figure 8.8 below for the mean feelings of 
warmth towards Bangladeshi workers per condition. The results revealed no 
difference in feelings of warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop workers 
between conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.01, p = .140, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.04, BFM = 0.73. Levene’s 
test of homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(2, 87) = .12, p = .887. 
When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA showed SDO was not a significant 
covariate F(1, 86) = 2.60, p = .110, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, BFM = 1.07, and the overall model 
remained non-significant, F(2, 86) = 2.08, p = .131, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .05, BFM = 0.47. 
Further, Bayesian model comparison showed inconclusive evidence for the 
null model, BFM = 2.04. Together, Bayesian model comparison showed 
inconclusive results when predicting warmth towards Bangladesh sweatshop 
workers. In short, neither SDO nor condition predicted warmth towards 





































Figure 8.8. Showing no significant differences in the mean feelings of warmth 
towards Bangladesh workers between conditions. Higher numbers equal more 
warmth. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Dehumanization of Bangladesh workers. We conducted a mixed 
model ANOVA, with repeated measures on mind attribution, and condition as 
a between subjects factor, to test for any differences in dehumanization of 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers. We found there was no significant interaction 
between time and condition, F(2, 83) = 0.41, p = .666, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01. However, 
there was again a main effect of time whereby all participants attributed more 
mind to Bangladesh sweatshop workers after the manipulation (M = 5.16, SE 
= 0.08) than before (M = 5.03, SE = 0.08), F(1, 83) = 6.83, p = .011, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08. 
In addition, there was a significant main effect of condition, whereby 
participants in the non-addict supremacy (M = 5.38, SE = 0.13) attributed 
significantly more mind to Bangladesh workers than controls (M = 4.85, SE = 
0.14), F(2, 83) = 4.02, p = .022, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.09. No other pairwise comparisons were 
significant; please see Figure 8.9 below for the means and standard errors of 



























Figure 8.9. Showing no interaction of time and condition on dehumanization of 
Bangladesh workers; Main effect of time whereby all participants attributed a 
significantly more mind to Bangladesh workers after the manipulation; 
participants in the non-addict supremacy condition showed overall less 
dehumanization of Bangladesh workers than controls. Higher numbers equal 
more mind, lower numbers equal more dehumanization. Error bars are +/- 1 
standard error. 
Homeless inequality. To examine the impact that the manipulations 
had on the support for the Homeless inequality, we ran an ANOVA which 
showed no main effect of condition, F(2, 87), = 1.46, p = .238, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03, BFM  
=1.80e - 6. See figure 8.10 below for the mean level of support for the 
homeless inequality per condition. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance 
was not violated, F(2, 87) = 0.94, p = .396 When entering SDO into the model, 
SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 86), = 37.33, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.30, BFM 
=7.28, and the overall model improved but remained non-significant, F(2, 86), 
= 1.82, p = .169, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.04, BFM =1.24.  
Bayesian model comparison revealed evidence for SDO predicting 
support for the Homeless inequality, and inconclusive support for the 
interaction between condition and SDO predicting support for the Homeless 
inequality. Bayesian model comparison also revealed very strong evidence 
against condition alone, or the null model (BFM = 5.72e -6) predicting support 
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Figure 8.10. Showing no significant difference in the mean level of support for 
the homeless inequality between conditions. Higher numbers equal more 
support. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Warmth towards homeless men. We ran another ANOVA model to 
examine any differences in perceptions of warmth towards homeless men. See 
Figure 8.11 below for the mean feelings of warmth towards homeless men per 
condition. The results revealed a marginally significant difference in feelings of 
warmth towards homeless men between conditions, F(2, 87) = 3.08, p = .051, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.07, BFM =1.23. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was not 
significant, F(2, 87) = 0.05, p = .947. When controlling for SDO, an ANCOVA 
showed SDO was a marginally significant covariate F(1, 86) = 3.14, p = .080, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, BFM =0.74, and the overall model became significant, F(2, 86) = 3.24, 
p = .044, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .07, BFM = 1.00. Further, Bayesian model comparison showed 
inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 1.06. Together, Bayesian 
model comparison provided inconclusive evidence for feelings of warmth 





































Figure 8.11. Showing participants in the non-addict condition displaying higher 
feelings of warmth towards homeless men than the human supremacy and 
control conditions, however, this effect was not supported with Bayesian 
analyses. Higher numbers equal more warmth. Error bars are +/- 1 standard 
error. 
Dehumanization of homeless men. We conducted a mixed model 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on mind attribution, and condition as a 
between subjects factor, to test for any differences in dehumanization of 
homeless men. We found there was no significant interaction between time 
and condition, F(2, 82) = 1.10, p = .338, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03. However, there was again 
a main effect of time whereby all participants attributed more mind to homeless 
men after the manipulation (M = 4.72, SE = 0.09) than before (M = 4.50, SE = 
0.10), F(1, 82) = 11.47, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.12. In addition, there was also a 
significant main effect of condition, whereby participants in the non-addict 
supremacy (M = 4.91, SE = 0.15) attributed significantly more mind to 
homeless men than controls (M = 4.33, SE = 0.15), F(2, 82) = 3.68, p = .030, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08. No other pairwise comparisons were significant; please see Figure 
8.12 below for the means and standard errors of the dehumanization of 




























Figure 8.12. Showing no significant interaction between time and condition on 
dehumanization of homeless men; a main effect of time whereby all 
participants showed less dehumanization (more mind) after the manipulation; 
the non-addict supremacy condition displayed overall more mind attribution 
towards homeless men than controls. Higher numbers equal more mind, lower 
numbers equal more dehumanization. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Charitable donations. Participants were asked to donate money to 
either Action on Addiction (a drug addiction charity), or the Scottish SPCA (an 
animal welfare charity). Participants in the human supremacy condition were 
asked whether they would donate to Action on Addiction, whereas participants 
in the non-addict supremacy condition were asked whether they wanted to 
donate to the Scottish SPCA. The purpose of this was to test the foundational 
hypothesis. More specifically, we wanted to see whether challenging human 
supremacy would have an impact on donations to an animal welfare charity 
(compared to controls), and we wanted to see whether challenging human-
animal supremacy would have an impact on donations to a human charity 
(compared to controls).  
To examine the impact of our manipulations on the donations given to 
charity we first conducted an ANOVA condition predicting charitable donations. 
Homogeneity of variance was violated, F(2, 87) = 3.58, p = .031. A Welch’s 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition on charitable donations 
whereby participants in the non-addict condition (M = £0.71, SD = £0.73) 
donated less of their study earnings to a charity, compared to both participants 
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£1.28, SD = £1.38), F(2, 52.08) = 3.54, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .05, BFM = 0.38. When 
entering SDO into the model, SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 86) = 6.05, 
p = .016, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .07, BFM = 2.00, and the overall model became non-significant, 
F(2, 86) = 2.72, p = .071, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .06, BFM =1.43. Please see Figure 8.13 below 
for the amount of charitable donations per condition. Bayesian model 
comparison also revealed inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 
0.59. Overall, Bayesian analyses provided inconclusive evidence for all 
models.  
 
Figure 8.13. Showing participants in the non-addict supremacy condition giving 
less to charity than the human supremacy and control conditions condition, 
however, this effect was reduced to non-significance when including SDO in 
the model. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
We then wanted to test whether overall participants donated more to 
the human or the animal charity. A between subjects t-test revealed that 
irrespective of condition, participants donated more money on average to the 
drug addiction charity (M = £1.38, SD = £1.41) than to the animal welfare 
charity (M = £0.84, SD = £1.01), t(79.92) = 2.11, p = .038, 95%CI [-1.06, -.03]. 
However, this difference was not significant when adjusting for Bonferoni 
multiple comparisons, nor had support from Bayesian analyses, BF10 = 1.52. 
Taken together, there is no frequentist or Bayesian evidence that participants 
donated more money to the human charity than the animal charity. 
Next, we wanted to compare whether participants in the human 






























Action on Addiction than participants in the control condition who donated to 
Action on Addiction. We also wanted to compare whether participants in the 
non-addict supremacy conditions donated more money to the animal welfare 
charity the Scottish SPCA than participants in the control condition who also 
donated to the Scottish SPCA. To make these comparisons we conducted two 
t-tests.  
A t-test between participants in the human supremacy condition and the 
control condition (who were asked to donate to Action on Addiction) revealed 
no difference in donations, t(43) = .19, p = .848, 95%CI [-.98, .81]. Participants 
in the human supremacy (M = £1.34, SD = £1.45) and the control condition 
(who were asked to donate to Action on Addiction) (M = £1.34, SD = £1.45) 
donated a similar amount of their study earnings to the drug addiction charity 
Action on Addiction. 
A t-test between participants in the non-addict supremacy condition and 
the control condition (who were asked to donate to the Scottish SPCA) 
revealed no significant difference t(16.09) = .97, p = .347, 95%CI [-1.28, .48] 
(df adjustments made for violation of homogeneity of variance). Participants in 
the non-addict supremacy (M = £0.71, SD = £0.73) and the control condition 
(who were asked to donate to the Scottish SPCA) (M = £1.11, SD = £1.47) 
donated a similar amount of their study earnings to the animal welfare charity 
the Scottish SPCA. 
Creative Fluency. To examine whether there were any differences in 
the amount of creative uses for a plastic bottle, we ran an ANOVA which 
revealed no difference between conditions, F(2, 89) =  0.47, p = .624, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, 
BFM = 0.33. Levene’s test was not significant, F(2, 87) = 0.02, p = .977, and 
SDO was not a significant covariate, F(1, 89) = 0.47, p = .496, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, BFM = 
0.66. Please see Figure 8.14 for uses for a plastic water bottle generated in 
two minutes (creative fluency). In short, participants in all conditions gave a 
similar number of examples of uses for plastic bottles. In addition, Bayesian 





Figure 8.14. Showing no difference in the amount of uses for a plastic water 
bottle generated in two minutes (creative fluency) between conditions. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Creative Flexibility. To examine whether there were any differences in 
the amount of creative categories people gave examples of, we ran an ANOVA 
which revealed no difference between condition, F(2, 87) =  0.40, p = .673, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, BFM = 0.27. Levene’s test was not significant, F(2, 87) = 0.56, p = 
.576, and SDO was not a significant covariate, F(1, 86) = 2.00, p = .161, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.02, BFM = 1.12. Please see Figure 8.15 for the amount of different categories 
of uses for a plastic water bottle generated in two minutes (creative flexibility). 
In short, participants in all conditions gave a similar number of examples of 
uses for plastic bottles. In addition, Bayesian model comparison also provided 




























Figure 8.15. Showing no difference in the amount of different categories of 
uses for a plastic water bottle generated in two minutes (creative flexibility) 
between conditions. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
Creative Originality. To examine whether there were any differences 
in the originality of the examples people gave for uses of a plastic water bottle, 
we ran an ANOVA which revealed no difference between condition, F(2, 87) =  
1.24, p = .296, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, BFM = 0.15. Levene’s test was not significant, F(2, 87) 
= 0.40, p = .674. SDO was a significant covariate, F(1, 86) = 7.47, p = .008, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .08, BFM = 3.48, but the overall model remained non-significant, F(2, 86) 
= 1.99, p = .143, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, BFM = 0.92. In addition, Bayesian model comparison 
also provided inconclusive evidence for the null model, BFM = 0.66. Please see 
Figure 8.16 for the average originality score of uses for a plastic water bottle 
generated in two minutes. In short, individual differences in SDO best 
predicted the average originality of the examples participants gave for uses of 




























Figure 8.16. Showing no difference in the average originality score of uses for 
a plastic water bottle generated in two minutes between conditions. Error bars 
are +/- 1 standard error. 
8.4 Discussion 
8.4.1 Correlational Results. The correlational results supported both 
our correlational hypotheses. Support for human-animal inequality is strongly 
correlated with support for all three human inequalities measured. That is, 
supporting our first correlational hypotheses, the attitudes towards all four 
inequalities (human-animal, drug addict, Bangladesh, homeless) were all 
positively correlated. In addition, corroborating study 3, support for the 
homeless inequality was strongly related to both human-animal and human 
inequalities.  
Once again, SDO was correlated with support for human-animal 
inequality. However, SDO was more strongly correlated with support for the 
human inequalities than human-animal inequality. Conservative political 
orientation was correlated positively with support for human-animal inequality, 
but like SDO was more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the human 
inequalities than human-animal inequality. 
In addition, and supporting our hypotheses, human-animal inequality 
was not foundational to other inequalities. That is, human inequality were 
correlated more strongly with each other than with human-animal inequality. 
As expected, support for the homeless and drug addicts inequality were very 



























inequalities were also very strongly correlated. Departing from study 3 and in 
line with studies 1 and 2, attitudes towards human-animal inequality were only 
moderately correlated with support for all the human inequalities. 
To sum, we again found evidence that support for human-animal 
inequality is correlated with support for human inequalities. However, support 
for human-animal inequality is not asymmetrically correlated to support for 
human inequalities. That is, support for human inequalities is best predicted 
by support for other human inequalities. 
Our new measure of charitable donations was correlated negatively 
with SDO (e.g., the higher the SDO, the less likely to donate to either charity), 
however charitable donations were unrelated to support for the human-animal 
or human inequalities. In addition, our measures of creativity revealed that 
SDO was unrelated to creative fluency (number of examples) and creative 
flexibility (number of categories of examples), but was significantly negatively 
correlated with creative originality (how original or unique the examples were). 
In other words, people higher in SDO tended to write less original or unique 
ideas compared to low SDO people. 
Further, the creativity measures were uncorrelated with support for 
inequalities, except for a small negative correlation between creative flexibility 
and support for the Bangladesh inequality. That is, participants who gave more 
examples of different uses for a plastic bottle were less likely to support the 
Bangladesh inequality. Importantly, we found no other significant correlations 
between creativity and support for inequalities. In short, there is no good 
evidence that creativity is correlated with support for either human-animal or 
human inequalities.  
8.4.2 Experimental Results 
Human-animal inequality. Participants endorsed human-animal 
inequality more than any of human inequality. We found no difference in 
support for human-animal inequality between conditions. This effect persisted 
when controlling for individual differences in SDO. In addition, we found good 
evidence that challenging non-addict supremacy did not have a downstream 




find a significant increase in mind attributed to animals after the human 
supremacy manipulation, compared to the control condition (there was no 
significant difference between the human supremacy and non-addict 
supremacy conditions). We did not have the power to exclude the vegetarians 
from analyses, and so based off the results from study 3, it is likely that the 
effects of the manipulations are less effective for meat eaters than they are for 
vegetarians who tend to have more moral concern for animals. 
Drug addict inequality. We found a main effect of condition in the 
endorsement of the drug addict inequality. We found that participants who had 
just written a paragraph arguing that non-addicts are not superior to drug 
addicts showed significantly less endorsement of the drug addict inequality 
than both participants in the human supremacy and control conditions. We also 
found no difference in endorsement of the drug addict inequality between 
participants in the human supremacy condition and controls. Bayesian 
analyses provided additional evidence that the interaction between condition 
and SDO best predicted support for the drug addict inequality. Bayesian 
analyses also revealed very strong evidence against the null model. Given the 
results of study 3, it is possible that these results would be less pronounced 
when excluding vegetarians, however, we did not have the power to analyse 
the data without vegetarians. 
Turning to the results of the dehumanization of drug addicts, while there 
was a trend for participants in the non-addict supremacy condition to attribute 
more mind to drug addicts, there was no significant difference. It is interesting 
then that participants in the non-addict supremacy condition supported the 
drug addict inequality less than the participants in the other conditions, but did 
not show a significant reduction in dehumanization. However, this finding is 
less surprising when taken alongside the only moderate relationship between 
dehumanization of drug addicts and support for the drug addict inequality, as 
evidenced in the correlational results of this section. In other words, because 
dehumanization and support for a inequality are two different things, it is 
possible that the manipulation is able to shift one (e.g., support for the drug 




In addition, a larger sample size would have been able to provide clearer 
evidence for these findings, however, we were unable to do so due to time 
constraints. 
Bangladesh inequality. Like previous studies, all participants revealed 
a low level of support for the Bangladesh inequality. There was no main effect 
of condition, and there was inconclusive evidence for an SDO x condition 
interaction. Taken together, there was good evidence that SDO alone best 
predicted support for the Bangladesh inequality. Turning to dehumanization of 
Bangladesh sweatshop workers, we found that participants in the non-addict 
supremacy condition attributed significantly more mind to Bangladesh 
sweatshop workers than control participants, but not participants in the human 
supremacy condition. This finding suggests that it is possible that challenging 
supremacy over drug addicts could have the potential to translate into reduced 
dehumanization of other oppressed groups of people. However, because we 
did not find a significant interaction between time (pre vs post manipulation), 
we cannot say this with confidence.  
Homeless inequality. Overall, the trend across conditions for support 
of the Homeless inequality was similar to the trends found in the support for 
the drug addict inequality. However, there was inconclusive evidence that 
there was an interaction between condition and SDO, and strong evidence 
against the null hypothesis, or condition alone predicting support for the 
Homeless inequality. There was good evidence that SDO alone best predicted 
support for the Homeless inequality.  
Turning to our measures of dehumanization, although we did not find a 
significant interaction between time and condition, we did find main effects for 
both. More specifically, we found that participants in the non-addict supremacy 
condition displayed more humanization of homeless men than control 
participants. However, it is also possible that the difference in dehumanization 
between conditions is due to the pre-existing differences in mind attribution, as 
evidenced in the lack of finding a significant interaction between time and 
condition (i.e., control participants had lower mind attribution scores than the 




Taken together, the results of the current study provided no evidence 
for the experimental foundational hypothesis. That is, compared to the other 
two conditions, challenging human supremacy did not reduce support for the 
human-animal or any human inequalities. We did however, find that 
challenging non-addict supremacy reduced support for the drug addict 
inequality. Looking at the means and standard errors of the data, we found 
trends that the non-addict supremacy condition also translated to a reduction 
in support for the homeless and the Bangladesh inequality, however these 
trends were not significant. It is possible that future studies employing a similar 
demographic of sample (but with more power) would show these trends to 
either persist or even out, however, it is unlikely that one would find evidence 
for the experimental foundational hypothesis using a sample of general 
international University students. It is therefore possible that challenging 
human forms of supremacy such as non-addict supremacy could translate to 
a reduction of support for other human inequalities, such as the homeless and 
the Bangladesh inequalities. In addition, it is important to consider that these 
effects may be less pronounced when removing vegetarians from future 
studies/ analyses, as was evident in the results of study 3.  
The fact that we did not find support for the experimental foundational 
hypothesis contrasts with the results of study 3, and supports the results of 
study 1. When taking the findings of all three studies which examined the 
experimental foundational hypothesis (studies 1, 3, and 4) together, we 
provide evidence that the findings of study 3 are likely due to the participant 
sample (largely white British, 19-year-old psychology students). The two 
studies which employed a more diverse range of participants (study 1: UK wide 
participant pool; study 4 University of Edinburgh student wide participant pool) 
are the studies which did not provide evidence for the experimental 
foundational hypothesis. 
Charitable donations. We found no difference in charitable donations 
between conditions. We did find a trend that participants in the non-addict 
supremacy donated less money to charity on average than participants in the 




for SDO. In short, we found no evidence that challenging human supremacy 
or non-addict supremacy had an impact on real world charitable behaviour. It 
is possible that these results are limited because of the lack of power in this 
study, and research on human-animal relations would therefore benefit from 
employing behavioural measures of the impact of supremacist thoughts and 
ideologies in the future. 
Creativity. We found no differences in any of our three creativity 
measures between conditions. When taken alongside our finding that 
participants in the non-addict supremacy condition displayed less support for 
the drug addict inequality, this suggests that it is not necessarily an increase 
in creativity divergent thinking / a reduction in heuristic thinking that is causing 
the shift from challenging non-addict supremacy to reduced support for the 
drug addict inequality. 
Dehumanization. We found that participants in the human supremacy 
condition showed a significant increase in the mind attributed to animals (a 
significant reduction in dehumanization) after their manipulation. This finding 
is interesting because it occurred despite participants not showing a reduction 
in support for human-animal inequality. This finding supports our correlational 
results that support for human-animal inequality and dehumanization of 
animals are not strongly correlated, whereas the correlation between 
dehumanization and support for human inequalities are negatively correlated, 
with strong evidence for the correlation between dehumanization and support 
for inequalities for drug addicts and the homeless. 
8.4.4 Limitations. The two key limitations of study 4 are the sample 
size and the participant demographics. We were not able to collect the desired 
amount of participants due to time constraints, in that we could not recruit 
enough participants as our power analyses suggested. Consequently, we 
could not exclude the vegetarians from analyses. However, we were still able 
to detect the difference in support for the drug addict inequality between 
conditions, supported with Bayesian analyses that is not limited to sample size 
restraints as frequentist statistics is. Therefore, it is unlikely that we would 




The second limitation of study 3 is that the participants were largely 
comprised of non-white international students, and therefore some of the 
dependent measures were not as theoretically relevant as in previous studies 
using white British nationals. For example, support for the drug addict, 
homeless, and Bangladesh inequalities all surround the UK, and therefore the 
results from this study, are not as generalizable to the previous findings of this 
thesis. The reason why we employed nonwhite international students was 
because we advertised for participants on a University wide platform, and we 
therefore did not foresee that it would be mostly international students which 
signed up for the study. In saying that, the fact that we did use many 
international students still provides a novel examination of human-animal 
relations, and how foreign people (i.e., the international students in this study) 
support another country (e.g., the UK) oppressing animals, drug addicts, the 
homeless, and Bangladesh sweatshop workers. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The key takeaway from study 4 is that we did not find evidence of the 
experimental foundational hypothesis. In addition, we did not find evidence that 
our manipulations influenced our new behavioural measure of support for 
inequalities - charitable donations. We also did not find any effects of our 
manipulations on creativity, but we did find that participants in the human 
supremacy condition showed a decrease in dehumanization (an increase in 
mind attribution) of animals after the manipulation compared to the other two 
conditions. Taken together, these findings support the findings of study 1, and 










Chapter Nine: General Discussion 
In this chapter we provide an overview of the aims, rationale, and 
findings of this thesis, before outlining the strengths and merits of this work. 
We then discuss the contribution of this thesis to the existing literature on the 
psychology of human-animal relations and finish by considering the limitations 
of the thesis and avenues that future research could explore. 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether human-animal inequality 
is foundational to human inequalities. In other words, we wanted to test 
whether human-animal inequality was foundational to human inequalities. The 
overall aim of this thesis was driven by a burning question about the 
connectedness of harmful behaviour in society. We see there are many 
parallels between human-animal inequality and the inequality of particular 
human groups in society, and we wondered whether support for these 
inequalities was psychologically connected.   
Many thousands of people around the world dedicate their lives and 
careers to understanding suffering and exploitation in the world. Whether it is 
the exploitation of animals, shed light on the current injustices in the world, in 
a bid to reduce them. From the literature, we noticed that there were important 
conceptual similarities in how humans exploit animals, and how humans 
exploit or persecute other groups of people both directly or indirectly. 
We reasoned that if human-animal inequality was foundational to other 
forms of inequality, then reducing support for human-animal inequality might 
by extension reduce support for human inequalities. That is, if the inequality 
between humans stems from human-animal inequality, then inhibiting the 
foundational inequality – the human-animal system – should also inhibit 
inequalities that are psychologically related. Such a finding would have the 
potential to greatly advance the global fights for justice in the world today. If 
human-animal inequality is psychologically foundational to human inequalities, 
then it would be important for human rights activists and scholars to consider 
how the perpetual exploitation of animals might be psychologically 




evidence that human-animal inequality is foundational to human inequalities. 
We did, however, find that support for human-animal inequality and support for 
human inequalities was consistently positively correlated with each other.  
An important point to note is that participants may have experienced 
small amounts of psychological distress from writing about harmful 
inequalities, such as the harmful ways some humans treat some animals, or 
how society treats drug addicts.  Accordingly, we received ethics from the 
University of Edinburgh Ethics Board for our experiments. It may be that 
participants are sensitive to information about animals being harmed, or they 
even may have family members who have experienced trouble with drug 
addiction-  indeed some participants may themselves have a history of drug 
addiction. Consequently, it may be that some participants found the writing 
task difficult. Anticipating this, we included a debrief at the end of each study 
which outlines that the study was hypothetical (i.e. we weren’t suggesting any 
groups were inferior to other groups), and we were interested in looking at the 
relation between various forms of inequality. We also reminded participants in 
the information sheet before the study began that all of their responses were 
anonymous, and reminded participants that they were not obliged to complete 
the experiment, and that at any point they could cease participating in the 
study. We now provide a summary of each chapter. 
9.2 Summary of Thesis Chapters 
9.2.1 Chapters One, Two, and Three. Before examining our research 
question, chapter 1 covered the psychology of human-animal relations, and 
chapter 2 outlined how human-animal relations are similar to human relations. 
Chapter 3 then showed how human-animal and human inequalities are 
psychologically related, and posed the central research questions of this 
thesis: is human-animal inequality foundational to human inequalities? Our 
literature review gave a wide overview of human-animal relations, and 
provided novel speculations about the consequences of human-animal 
relations for human relations. For example, we brought together literature on 
the psychological consequences of pet ownership; the veterinary profession; 




previously not been reviewed together. Covering a wide range of human-
animal relations in the introductory chapters was important to give an accurate 
portrayal of current human-animal relations in the UK today, and then allowed 
us to compare those human-animal relations with human inequality discussed 
in chapter 3. 
9.2.2 Chapter Four. The overall aim of chapter 4 was two-fold. First, 
the two pilot studies were used to determine which human inequalities 
produced a similar principal component analysis (PCA) result as human-
animal inequality PCA result. We used Prolific Academic, a UK wide participant 
pool to recruit our participants. In chapter 4, we presented our scale that 
captured individual differences in the endorsement of various forms of human 
and human-animal inequalities. The results of the pilot studies revealed that 
the drug addict inequality was supported the most by participants, and 
produced the same PCA result as human-animal inequality. Secondly, the pilot 
studies were used to provide a test for our correlational foundational 
hypothesis: that support for human-animal inequality will be foundational to 
human inequalities. However, we found no evidence of the correlational 
foundational hypothesis. Instead, we found that support for human-animal and 
human inequalities was correlated, but support for human-animal inequality 
was the weakest predictor of human inequalities, compared to the other human 
inequalities. For example, support for the drug addict inequality was best 
predicted by support for the homeless inequality, not human-animal inequality. 
The inclusion of the pilot studies are a strength to the overall thesis. Our 
pilot studies enabled the development of our 4-item scales that have strong 
face validity, consistently good internal reliability, and convergent validity with 
existing validated scales of SDO and System Justification. It was important to 
develop our own measure because, to the best of our knowledge, there does 
not exist a measure of support for inequalities that can be used to compare 
across human-animal and human systems. While the 4-item scale was useful 
for the purposes of this thesis, we believe that future work could expand on the 
development of the scale, and utilize exploratory factor analyses and 




Nonetheless, the scale developed in this thesis is a good starting point for 
future research.  
Identifying the ideal human inequality to use as a comparison was 
crucial to the design of this thesis because we wanted to examine whether 
challenging human supremacy over animals was foundational to human 
inequalities. However, to properly test the Foundational Hypothesis, we also 
wanted to determine whether challenging a human form of supremacy would 
have a positive downstream effect on support for human inequality. Our pilot 
studies provided good empirical evidence that participants supported human-
animal inequality the most out of all inequalities explored. In addition, our pilot 
studies identified that the ideal human inequality to use as a comparison to 
human-animal inequality was the drug addict inequality, because participants 
supported this inequality the most. The drug addict and the human-animal 
inequalities share important overlaps. For example, they both involve a 
concerted effort by the government, the private sector, the media, and the 
public, to persecute (in the case of drug addicts) or kill (in the case of animals) 
vulnerable beings, while most of the public is apathetic towards the plight of 
both groups. We therefore needed to ensure that challenging a human form of 
supremacy did not have downstream benefits for reducing support for human 
and human-animal inequalities. Therefore, we wanted to challenge human 
supremacy over animals but also in another condition challenge supremacy 
over drug addicts and measure the impact of support for inequalities. 
9.2.3 Chapter Five. Now that we had created our measures and 
identified the comparison human inequality, the aim of chapter 5 was to 
examine our experimental foundational hypothesis. We wanted to see whether 
challenging human supremacy over animals would reduce support for both 
human-animal and human inequalities. We wanted to confirm that challenging 
non-addict supremacy over drug addicts would not have the same downstream 
effects by reducing support for human-animal inequalities. Study 1 developed 
a novel self-persuasion manipulation to challenge supremacy over three 
different groups; human supremacy over animals, non-addict supremacy over 




used a UK wide participant pool to recruit our participants for chapter 5. We 
found no evidence of the experimental foundational hypothesis. We did 
however, confirm that support for the human-animal and human inequalities 
are correlated. In addition, replicating pilot study 2, we did not find evidence of 
the correlational foundational hypothesis. Instead, we found that support for 
human-animal inequality was not a foundational predictor of human 
inequalities.  
A qualitative analysis of the written component of the results revealed 
that participants in the human supremacy condition were challenging human 
supremacy using a wide variation of arguments during their written 
manipulation. For example, in the human supremacy condition, some 
participants wrote that humans can be cruel and are therefore not superior to 
animals, whilst others focused on animals being better skilled at hunting and 
outdoor skills, and thus meaning humans are not superior to animals.  
The quantitative results revealed that the non-addict supremacy 
manipulation effectively changed participants’ support for the drug addict 
inequality. Given that this manipulation proved effective, we did not spend 
resources trying to improve it. As before, qualitative analysis of the non-addict 
supremacy condition revealed that participants write about a variety of things, 
albeit with less variability than the human supremacy condition. For example, 
participants wrote about drug addicts having adverse childhood experiences, 
people being addicted to less harmful drugs, and even questioned the arbitrary 
notion of supremacy itself. Control participants also wrote about different ways 
in which book readers were not superior to TV watchers. Taken together, these 
findings reveal that there are qualitative differences in what participants are 
thinking about whilst carrying out the same task (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, 
& Hodson, 2012). Having a qualitative component to our study was a strength 
because we could capture this difference between participants. The variability 
in our qualitative findings raised interesting questions for future work on 
human-animal relations that we discuss in the Limitations and Future 




9.2.4 Chapter Six. Because we did not find evidence for the 
experimental foundational hypothesis, the purpose of chapter 6 was to frame 
the human supremacy measure in three different ways in an attempt to identify 
the most effective way of prompting participants to challenge human 
supremacy. We again found a null result – there was no evidence of a 
difference in support for either the human-animal or human inequality as a 
function of what participants chose to write about. We again used a UK wide 
participant pool to recruit our participants that included an even number of men 
and women, participants from a wide range of ages, occupations, and political 
affiliations. However, the most relevant research on the psychology of human-
animal relations has only found that changing animal attitudes has an impact 
on human outgroup attitudes using a particular sample: 19 year old, mainly 
female, Canadian psychology undergraduates (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, 
Hodson, 2012; Costello and Hodson, 2009). We therefore wondered whether 
the null findings of chapter 4 and chapter 5 were due to differences in the 
participant samples between the current work and previous work (Bastian, 
Costello, Loughnan, Hodson, 2012; Costello and Hodson, 2009). 
9.2.5 Chapter Seven. In chapter 7, we found empirical support for our 
experimental foundational hypothesis using first year undergraduate students 
from the University of Edinburgh. As per recent research, the majority of these 
participants were 19 years of age, and were female. We found that participants 
who challenged human supremacy, using the idea that supremacy is arbitrary, 
displayed significantly reduced support for human-animal inequality. Further, 
they showed marginally reduced support for the drug addict inequality, 
compared to control participants. These effects were less pronounced when 
excluding vegetarians and vegans from analyses. This suggests that the 
downstream effects we found, by arguing that human supremacy is arbitrary, 
was driven largely by our vegetarian and vegan participants. 
We found that participants who challenged the idea that non-addicts are 
superior to drug addicts showed a reduced support for the drug addict 
inequality, however there was no downstream effect on support for the human-




human-animal inequality was foundational to support for human inequality. At 
the end of chapter 7, we had initial evidence both for (chapter 6) and against 
(chapter 4) the experimental foundational hypothesis. 
9.2.6 Chapter Eight. The purpose of chapter 8 was to provide a final 
examination of the experimental hypothesis. We also wanted to examine 
potential mediators in the model, and employed a measure of creativity and a 
measure of dehumanization. We also wanted to include a behavioural 
measure of support for inequalities, and included a measure of charitable 
donations to either an animal welfare charity or a drug addiction charity, and 
measures of creativity to explore potential mediators. Corroborating the 
findings of chapter 4, we found no evidence for the experimental foundational 
hypothesis, no evidence of an effect on the behavioural measure of charitable 
donations, and no effect on creativity. We therefore did not have the requisite 
correlations to test for mediation. We did, however, find that participants who 
challenged human supremacy over animals attributed more mind to animals 
(dehumanized animals less) following their manipulation, compared to 
controls. We also found that participants in the non-addict supremacy condition 
supported the drug addict inequality significantly less so than participants in 
the other conditions. We did not have the power to remove the vegetarians 
and vegans from analyses and so it is likely that these effects would be 
reduced in future research replicating this thesis. 
9.3 Thesis Strengths  
There are numerous strengths of this thesis that contribute to the 
psychology of human-animal relations. While the individual studies have their 
own merits, there are also more general merits to this work. When taken 
together, this thesis has revealed important insights about human intergroup 
relations in society, and how human-animal relations might be connected to 
them. We now provide examples of how this thesis adds to the wider literature 
on the psychology of human-animal relations, and how the ideas and findings 
in this thesis can be examined in future research.  
In this thesis, we examined an important research question which itself 




and advance our understanding of the connection between various human and 
human-animal injustices in society. In addition to the importance of the overall 
research question itself, there are methodological strengths that are found 
throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis. Below we will discuss aspects 
of this thesis, such as the participants, study design, measures, and statistical 
analyses, which contribute to the development of the psychology of human-
animal relations. 
9.3.1 Participants. We used a variety of UK participants in this study, 
including three different participant populations. For example, we used a UK 
wide sample in the pilot studies, and study 1 and 2; University of Edinburgh 
Psychology 1st year undergraduates in study 3; and University of Edinburgh 
undergraduates and postgraduates from a variety of nationalities in study 4. 
Employing a diverse range of participants allowed us to examine whether our 
findings held cross-culturally, or whether (as with study 3) our findings were 
dependent upon the demographic of participants employed. Employing a 
variety of participants gave us confidence in interpreting the inconsistent 
results found in study 3.  
9.3.2 Study Design. In addition to the participants, we also used a 
variety of research methods including online and laboratory based studies. Our 
online samples allowed us to include a diversity of participants from around 
the UK – which we could not have recruited otherwise, given our resources. In 
addition, study 4 – our laboratory-based study – gave us more experimental 
control. For instance, one recognised downfall of online data collection is that 
the experimenter has no control over the circumstances in which someone will 
survey. Participants could begin filling out the survey, then have a break for an 
unknown time and then return to complete the survey.  
9.3.3 Measures. We employed a variety of measures in this thesis. 
Primarily, we used surveys to collect data, however we also employed a 
behavioural measure (charitable giving; study 4). Doing so allowed us to 
examine whether our manipulations had any effect on real world behaviour. 
We also developed our own scale that was used in all experimental chapters. 




first measure of support for both human-animal and human inequalities. We 
also included a measure of SDO that is a reliable and valid measure of support 
for group inequality in society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
Using SDO throughout our studies provided convergent validity for our 
own measure of support for inequalities, and additionally allowed us to control 
for individual differences in SDO in each of our studies. This was important as 
previous work has shown that SDO is consistently a strong predictor of both 
prejudice towards humans and animals (Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). 
Including SDO was a strength of this thesis as all our empirical studies show 
that for most dependent measures, SDO alone was the best predictor of 
support for both human-animal and human inequalities; over and above any 
effect our manipulations had on the dependent measures. This finding 
complements the Social Dominance – Human Animal Relations Model (SD-
HARM) by Dhont, Hodson, and Leite (2016). The SD-HARM posits that it is 
individual differences in social dominance orientation that explain the 
association between speciesism and ethnic prejudice. Complementing this 
research, we have shown that individual differences in SDO were often a better 
predictor of our dependent measures than were our manipulations. Moreover, 
the findings of this thesis show that in addition to ethnic prejudice and 
speciesism, SDO also predicts support for the human-animal, Bangladesh, 
and drug addict inequalities. In study 4, we also included measures of 
dehumanization and a measure of creativity to explore potential mediators, if 
the results replicated study 3. However, we did not replicate study 3, and 
further, we found that the potential mediators were not correlated with the 
dependent measures, and therefore we could not test for mediation. Despite 
this, the inclusion of the dehumanization and creativity measures allowed us 
to examine the correlations and main effects between these pre-existing and 
validated relevant measures, and our own dependent measures.  
9.3.4 Statistical Analyses. We applied both frequentist and Bayesian 
analyses to our data. First, unlike null hypothesis significance testing 
(frequentist analyses) Bayesian analyses uses prior knowledge about the 




across studies to update one’s beliefs about the world in accordance with the 
findings from previous research (informed priors) (Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). 
However, we did not have the expertise to conduct these analyses, and used 
the factory prior settings on the JASP software to compute our Bayes factors 
(uninformed priors). Future research would benefit from employing informed 
Bayesian priors in research on human-animal relations (Dienes & Mclatchie, 
2018). Using Bayesian analyses also allowed us to make post hoc analyses 
without adjustments for multiple comparisons, such as when excluding 
vegetarians and vegans in study 3 (Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). That is, we 
could make post hoc comparisons without increasing the likelihood of Type II 
errors, as is the case with frequentist analyses. Further, Bayesian model 
comparison, unlike null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), allow testing 
of the null hypothesis (Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). This is an important feature 
of Bayesian analyses and allows us to have confidence in interpreting when 
there is support for the null model, versus a lack of support for the alternative 
hypothesis. Whereas NHST can only provide (or fail to provide) evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis, Bayesian model comparison provides a continuous 
measure of support for both the alternative model(s) and the null hypothesis. 
Further, Bayesian model comparison provides a continuous measure of 
support for competing models predicting the dependent variable. Doing so 
allowed us to compare 1) the main effects of the Independent Variable with 2) 
the interaction with SDO as a covariate, and 3) SDO alone predicting the 
Dependent Variable. We therefore had more confidence in interpreting the 
inconsistent results of study 3 because we could see that while the frequentist 
post hoc comparisons were marginally significant for support for the drug 
addict inequality, the Bayesian model comparison revealed that SDO alone 
best explained the data. The model comparison feature of Bayesian analyses 
therefore provides a more rigorous analysis of what model best predicts the 
dependent measure compared to frequentist statistical analyses. For an 
overview of Bayesian analyses, see Dienes (2014); Dienes and Mclatchie 




9.3.5 Quantitative and Qualitative methods. Finally, the inclusion of 
both quantitative and (post-hoc) qualitative analyses allowed us to fully 
examine all aspects of our data. While we did not initially intend on properly 
examining the qualitative data (as relevant previous research has not), our 
post-hoc analysis of the qualitative component of the participants’ results 
provides a rich insight into how people think about supremacy over animals, 
and supremacy over drug addicts. Our qualitative findings were encouraging, 
benefited future experimental chapters, and aided our insight into potential 
psychological mechanisms behind the relationship between supremacy and 
support for various inequalities. We believe qualitative analyses in the 
psychology of human supremacy, and supremacy over drug addicts would be 
a fruitful area for future research to explore. 
9.4 Contribution of this Thesis to the Literature 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide 
evidence of the correlational and experimental findings of our empirical 
chapters, and discuss the ways in which each contributes to the advancement 
in the understanding of the psychology of human-animal relations. 
9.4.1 Correlational findings. The existing literature on the relationship 
between human-animal relations and human relations has focussed solely on 
perceptions of local racial or religious outgroups (e.g., ethnic outgroups, 
religious outgroups, and refugees). For example, the Interspecies Model of 
Prejudice by Costello and Hodson (2009; 2014) posits that prejudice towards 
humans and animals are related, and that the source of ethnic outgroup 
dehumanization is the subjugation of animals. Moreover, the Interspecies 
Model of Prejudice suggests that reducing prejudice towards animals (i.e., 
reducing the human-animal divide) can improve outgroup prejudice (i.e., 
increase immigrant humanization).  
As previously mentioned, the SD-HARM model by Dhont, Hodson, and 
Leite (2016) also found that it is individual differences in SDO that connect 
ethnic prejudice towards humans and animals. Specifically, the authors 
suggest that it is the common hierarchical intergroup relations between ethnic 




humans and prejudice towards animals. These two theories represent 
important advancements in the psychology of human-animal relations, and the 
current research draws on their theorizing and findings for inspiration in this 
thesis.  
This thesis extends and adds to those theories by illustrating that the 
subjugation of animals is not only associated with ethnic prejudice, but that the 
whole human-animal inequality is associated with support for a variety of 
human inequalities including the persecution of drug addicts in the UK and the 
exploitation of Bangladesh sweatshop workers. Therefore, this thesis has 
highlighted that the exploitation of animals is related to human relations in a 
wider sense than previously considered (Amiot & Bastian, 2014; Costello & 
Hodson, 2014; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). This thesis is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first quantitative work to link the exploitation of animals to 
human outgroups who are treated with apathy, not antipathy. All previous 
quantitative psychological research on the connection between human-animal 
relations and human relations has been focussed on human outgroups that 
people hold direct prejudice towards  (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, 
Hodson, & Leite, 2016). More specifically, this thesis contributes to the BIAS 
map work by Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2008), and shows that the exploitation 
of animals is related to the inequality of human groups seen as low in 
comptenece, and who are treated with apathy and indifference, such as drug 
addicts and Bangladesh sweatshop workers. This is an important finding of 
this thesis which is likely to advance the scope of future psychological research 
on human-animal relations and inequalities. 
Contribution to the psychology of human-animal relations. Our 
initial correlational foundational hypothesis was that support for human-animal 
inequality would be the strongest predictor of human inequalities. In contrast 
to our initial hypotheses, we found repeatedly that it is other human inequalities 
that are the strongest predictors of human inequalities. In short, we found no 
support for the correlational foundational hypothesis in any of the five empirical 
studies (pilot study 2; studies 1-4). The finding that support for the Bangladesh 




support for human-animal inequality is of interest. Firstly, it challenges 
previous work (Costello & Hodson, 2014).We found that for some human 
targets at least (e.g. drug addicts), it is support for other human inequalities 
(e.g. support for the Bangladesh inequality), not support for human-animal 
inequality which best predicts support for human inequalities (i.e. the drug 
addict inequality). 
So—what might this mean? Specifically, what does it mean that people 
who support human-animal inequality are also likely to support the drug addict 
and the Bangladesh inequality? We suggest that these correlational findings 
suggest that the way psychologists think of and study the impact of human-
animal relations could be broadened. Indeed, the persecution of drug addicts 
by the state, and the purchasing of Bangladesh sweatshop clothing from a 
retail store on the high street are two very different things, and yet they 
correlate reliably with each other, and with support for exploiting animals. 
These findings will be valuable to both academics and to activists promoting 
animal rights and human rights. One of the key differences between the 
previous work and the current work is that previous work has explored how 
prejudice towards animals is related to prejudice towards religious and ethnic 
outgroups in a national context, whereas this thesis has examined the 
connectedness of human-animal inequality and the inequality between human 
outgroups fuelled by apathy, not antipathy. While the drug addict inequality is 
a local inequality, the Bangladesh inequality is an international inequality that 
has gone unstudied in quantitative social psychology.  
What we have shown in this thesis is that people who support human-
animal inequality also support human inequality. This is an important extension 
to previous human-animal relations work because the consequences for 
exploiting and oppressing animals may have far wider consequences than 
direct prejudice towards people in our daily lives, and social locations. 
Compared to last century, the level of direct and violent racist and prejudice 
behaviour in the west has dramatically fallen (Pinker, 2011). However, there 
remains gains to be made. For the most part, most people in the West do not 




remains prejudice and bigoted thoughts - violence has reduced (Pinker, 2011). 
In contrast, our support for the exploitation and inequality between overseas 
countries has dramatically increased in the same time frame. For example, in 
the 1960’s Bangladesh did not produce any clothing for export, and everyday 
people in the West therefore did not oppress Bangladeshi people via their 
consumption. However, currently, most people in the West do support the 
inequality between the Bangladeshi people inadvertently via their consumption 
of sweatshop clothes. As more production is outsourced to impoverished 
nations, the everyday consumer is likely to increasingly exploit people in 
foreign countries, indirectly via their consumption, and not necessarily because 
of prejudice. It is therefore important for future work on human-animal relations 
to consider more geographically distant, and more indirect forms of harm that 
might be related to human-animal inequality. More broadly, psychologists 
could examine more thoroughly those groups in society who are deemed 
incompetent and who people are often comfortable with exploiting, such as 
developing world labour (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008).  
Suggestions for future research. We believe that future research will 
benefit from including a more diverse range of human inequalities in the 
research on human-animal relations, and explore how the exploitation of 
animals is related to phenomenon beyond direct prejudice. Indeed, the two 
inequalities, the persecution of drug addicts and the consumption of 
Bangladesh sweatshop clothing are both behaviours which people relate to 
only indirectly. Many clothing consumers, like many meat consumers, are 
blissfully unaware of the true cost of their consumption. And it is for this reason 
that those inequalities which are out of sight and out of mind – like the 
Bangladesh inequality and like the consumption of other morally troublesome 
products such as conflict minerals from war torn Congo – are both likely to be 
related to the exploitation of animals.  
A lot of social psychological research has been dedicated to examining 
direct and overt examples of prejudice, however, the psychological 
mechanisms behind more distant forms of exploitation, such as the exploitation 




though such behaviour has real and fatal consequences for millions of people 
worldwide, such as the 1134 Bangladeshis who died when the sweatshop they 
were working in collapsed in 2013 (UK Parliament, 2019). This thesis therefore 
contributes to the psychological literature beyond the domain of human-animal 
relations, and has the potential to stimulate research on the indirect ways in 
which everyday people contribute to morally troublesome behaviour; the 
psychological processes at play during consumption of morally troublesome 
products; and interventions to reduce peoples apathy towards the plight of 
those who are out of sight and out of mind, and generally be more mindful of 
the consequences of their day to day behaviour. 
In addition, we consistently found that participants’ individual 
differences in Social Dominance Orientation was a reliable predictor of support 
for both human-animal and human inequalities. Indeed, this thesis has good 
evidence that the best predictor of human inequalities are in fact other human 
inequalities (or at least those measured). These findings both add to and 
contrast with the existing literature. The finding that all inequalities are 
correlated, sits well with the literature on generalized prejudice (e.g., SDO and 
RWA), and with the existing models of human-animal relations and human 
relations (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). For 
example, the idea that people who are prejudiced towards, or support the 
inequality between numerous groups is well documented in the literature on 
generalized prejudice.  
However, the finding that SDO nor human-animal inequality is the best 
predictor of human inequalities conflicts with the main two human-animal 
relations models, namely the Interspecies Model of Prejudice (Costello & 
Hodson, 2014) and the SD-HARM theory (Dhont, Hodson, & Leite, 2016). The 
Interspecies Model of Prejudice suggests that the dehumanization of ethnic 
outgroups gets its sting (so to speak) from the devaluing of animals. That is, 
seeing others as less than human is only concerning when being less than 
human (i.e., an animal or machine) is a bad thing. This thesis, however, found 
no correlational support for the notion that it is specifically human-animal 




the discrepancy between previous work and our findings are due to the 
difference in measures (i.e. dehumanization versus support for inequalities), 
and the fact that previous work (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, Hodson, & 
Leite, 2016) did not include perceptions of drug addicts – the most derogated 
and dehumanized human groups in the West. 
It is also noteworthy that across all studies, we found that participants 
supported the drug addict inequality more than the Bangladeshi inequality. 
This is interesting because most participants play a more direct role in the 
Bangladesh inequality than the drug addict inequality. Further, they likely also 
benefit from that inequality whereby the sweatshop workers provide clothes 
and other textiles for the West. In comparison, people do not get any tangible 
reward for supporting the war on drugs or the persecution of drug addicts, and 
only tend to support the war on drugs indirectly in their voting behaviour every 
few years. We think that the negative stereotypes of drug addicts being 
unclean and dangerous criminals will play a significant role in people 
condoning the drug addict inequality. It is also likely that because drug addicts 
are not a social group normally afforded a great deal of moral concern, 
participants do not care about the persecution of drug addicts. Whereas, on 
the other hand, it is not socially acceptable to be racist or display disdain for 
ethnic outgroups (e.g. Bangladeshi’s) and so it is possible that participants 
wanted to seem socially desirable by claiming not to support the Bangladesh 
inequality, even if they themselves do not actually care about their welfare. It 
is also possible that participants who claimed not to support the sweatshop 
inequality, like meat eaters who do not have strong negative feelings towards 
animals, do not feel the need to endorse the exploitation of sweatshop workers 
because they do not feel dissonant about their sweatshop consumption in the 
first place. This is quite striking considering that half of our participants in all 
studies – Western women – are the demographic who consume the most 
sweatshop clothing in the world. We suggest that it is likely that, like the meat 
paradox, there is a consumption paradox to be solved –one that is often solved 
by society. The consumption paradox likely has a set of dissonance reduction 




from awareness of the pain and suffering that one’s behaviour causes others. 
It is also likely that, like meat consumption, most people rarely feel a sense of 
dissonance because the clothing industry operates in such a way that 
consumers never come face to face with the production line. For most people, 
both meat production and clothing production is out of sight and out of mind. 
9.4.2 Experimental findings. 
Experimental Foundational Hypothesis not supported. Overall, we 
did not find support for the experimental foundational hypothesis. In study 1 
and study 4, we found no evidence that challenging human supremacy over 
animals had an impact on either support for the human-animal or human 
inequalities. In other words, in two separate studies using two different 
samples (one UK-wide and one university students) having participants 
challenge the notion that humans are not superior to animals did not have the 
hypothesized effect on changing participants support for human-animal 
inequality. It is therefore unsurprising that we also did not find a change in 
support for human inequalities; we expected that it would be the change in 
support for human-animal inequality that would facilitate the change in support 
for human inequality.  
Our test also needed to rule out the inverse foundational direction – 
whether support for human inequality were foundational to human-animal 
inequality. In both study 1 and study 4, we found that participants who 
challenged the notion that non-addicts are superior to drug addicts, showed 
(marginally) significantly reduced support for the drug addict inequality 
compared to both the human supremacy and control conditions. There was 
also very strong Bayesian support for the study 1 and study 4 models when 
SDO was included as a covariate to predict support for the drug addict 
inequality. However, there was no downstream benefit of reducing support for 
the drug addict inequality for either human or human-animal inequalities. What 
these findings suggest is that our non-addict supremacy manipulation was 
effective in reducing support for the drug addict inequality, but was not effective 
in reducing the downstream supremacy over drug addicts. Taken together, 




hypothesis, we also found no evidence that the drug addict inequality is 
foundational to human-animal inequality, or other human inequalities. 
Explaining Experimental Inconsistencies. The results of study 3 are 
inconsistent with the results of study 1 and study 4. In study 3, we found our 
only case of evidence for the. Specifically, we found that participants that 
argued that human supremacy is arbitrary displayed less support for human-
animal inequality than participants in the non-addict supremacy condition, the 
control participants, or participants in the human downfall condition (who wrote 
about the harmful things that humans do). These results remained when 
excluding vegetarians and vegans from analyses. In addition, we found that 
participants in the arbitrary condition displayed marginally less support for the 
drug addict inequality than control participants, however, this effect was not 
significant nor supported by Bayesian analyses when removing vegetarians 
and vegans from analyses. In short, it was vegetarians and vegans (who more 
so opposed human-animal inequality) driving the reduced support for the drug 
addict inequality, compared to control participants. Consequently, the 
manipulation did not have a significant downstream effect on the drug addict 
inequality for meat eaters. In other words, the experimental foundational 
hypothesis was not found for meat eaters in study 3, and these effects are 
therefore not generalizable to the public who largely consist of meat eaters. 
Moreover, by excluding vegetarians and vegans from analyses, we have 
shown that the people who support human-animal inequality the most (meat 
eaters), are the least likely to show a downstream reduction in support for 
human inequalities after challenging human supremacy. Therefore, future 
research could benefit from exploring whether there are ways of challenging 
human supremacy for those with the highest pre-existing support for human-
animal inequality. For example, it is possible that for meat eaters who more 
strongly support all inequalities, challenging human supremacy by arguing 
about the positive aspects of animals (or perhaps the similarities between 
humans and animals as per previous work by Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, 
and Hodson (2012)), as opposed to the negative aspects of humans could be 




effect for the negative human condition on support for the drug addict 
inequality, it may be that using examples of the negative things that some 
humans do could promote human outgroup bias, thus inhibiting the 
downstream effect from animals to humans. 
We explain the discrepancy between study 3, and studies 1 and 4 with 
respect to the different samples employed, the differences between frequentist 
and Bayesian analyses, and in the context of the replication crisis in social 
psychology. Firstly, the key difference in study design between the studies is 
the participant demographics. In the pilot studies, and study 1 and 2 we 
employed a UK-wide sample of adults; study 3 employed University of 
Edinburgh first year undergraduate psychology students; and study 4 
employed University of Edinburgh students from various disciplines including 
both undergraduates and postgraduates. The only study that showed 
marginally significant effects for the experimental foundational hypothesis was 
study 3 using University of Edinburgh first year undergraduate psychology 
students. We employed this sample specifically because the most relevant 
psychological research on human-animal relations also used this sample 
demographic (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, Hodson, 2012; Costello and 
Hodson, 2009). 
WEIRD participants. Recent theorizing by Henrich, Heine, and 
Norenzayan (2010) called into question the generalizability of using 
undergraduate psychology students as participants in psychological research 
– particularly social psychological research. The authors suggest that 
psychology undergraduates are too limited of a population to draw meaningful 
conclusions about wider society. Moreover, research suggests that American 
university undergraduates are more likely than the general population to give 
more favourable responses to other groups in society; have higher degrees of 
self-monitoring (Reifman, Klein, & Murphy, 1989); are more susceptible to 
attitude change (Krosnick, & Alwin, 1989); and are more susceptible to social 
influence compared to the general population (Pasupathi, 1999). 
It therefore may be that we could find the marginally significant support 




participants were more susceptible to the manipulation than in any of our other 
studies (none of which employed psychology undergraduates). The 
participants in study 3 may also be more likely to find a message about the 
arbitrary nature human supremacy to be more effective because such 
questioning of authority and social hierarchies fits with the political viewpoints 
characterized by undergraduate psychology students (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). 
Taking all experimental results together, we conclude that we did not 
find reliable evidence for the experimental foundational hypothesis. 
Considered with the lack of support we found for the correlational foundational 
hypothesis, it provides good evidence against the overall experimental 
hypothesis: we did not find evidence that challenging human supremacy 
reduces support for human-animal or human inequalities. The question 
therefore remains: are our findings due to there being no foundation of 
inequality, or are their limitations to the design of the studies that could explain 
the null results? We provide an answer to this question, and propose further 
research ideas, by discussing each of the limitations of this thesis in the 
following section. 
9.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
There are numerous limitations to the methods in this thesis that are 
important to take into consideration when interpreting our findings. However, 
the limitations of this thesis also reveal new avenues for future research to 
explore and therefore contribute to the advancement of the psychology of 
human-animal relations. There are limitations in the participants we employed, 
and in the manipulations and measures we designed and used. We now 
discuss each of these limitations in detail, providing our rationale for the 
choices we made, and suggesting how future work might use this thesis as a 
useful step on the path to better understanding the psychology of human-
animal relations, and how human-animal relations might relate to human 
relations. 
9.5.1 Manipulations. We designed all the manipulations for chapter 5 




Firstly, following a recommendation from Hodson, Kteily, and Hoffarth (2014) 
we wanted to challenge the widely-held view that humans are superior to 
animals. In their review, Hodson, Kteily, and Hoffarth (2014) suggested that 
the human-animal divide (HAD) – the idea that humans are different from and 
superior to all other animals is the key psychological justification used to 
maintain human-animal inequality. The laypersons’ concept of the human-
animal divide involves the idea that humans are meaningfully different to all 
other species (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012). Previous 
research has shown that such a belief predicts the dehumanization of human 
racial and religious outgroups (e.g., Muslims, refugees, Black people, and 
Aborigines), and that experimentally reducing people’s beliefs in the human-
animal divide can foster more humanizing perceptions of those same human 
outgroups, although only with 19 year old largely female Canadian first year 
psychology students (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello 
& Hodson, 2014). However, no research has examined whether challenging 
the notion that humans are superior to animals – the second key component 
of the lay conception of human-animal relations – might have an impact on 
human relations (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). We therefore had to 
produce our own manipulations for reducing human supremacy. Because of 
the nature of our research question, we wanted to use a manipulation that 
could challenge human supremacy over animals, but also a manipulation that 
could be easily adapted to challenge supremacy over other humans. 
Limitations of our experimental instructions. In study 1, chapter 4, 
we decided to use a manipulation with an open prompt. That is, following 
previous research which asks participants to challenge the human-animal 
divide (but does not give instructions on what examples participants should 
use), we also decided to give participants free reign over how they challenged 
the supremacy (either human supremacy, non-addict supremacy, or book 
reader supremacy). In hindsight, we could have refrained from giving 
participants the choice to use their own examples. We gave these instructions 
so that if there was an example that participants wanted to give which was not 




example. However, it is possible that encouraging participants to write using 
either the examples provided, or their own examples, could have prompted 
participants to provide too many different examples of why humans are not 
superior to animals.  This could have resulted in participants in the same 
condition experiencing a different psychological process. This is what we found 
in study 1 where many participants gave multiple different reasons for why 
humans are not superior to animals. Unfortunately, we did not rectify this issue 
in the thesis, and all studies included the same instructions; indicating that 
participants could write their argument using either the examples given, or 
using their own ideas. We recognize that this is a limitation to this thesis, and 
see that further research can examine whether providing more strict writing 
instructions leads to more effective change in the dependent measures. 
Despite this, we do not believe that changing the writing instructions would 
have changed the interpretation of the results of the studies. Our manipulations 
were adapted from previous research on human-animal relations, which used 
very similar instructions in their studies  (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & 
Hodson, 2012). Such previous research did not publish the qualitative results 
of their studies, and so it is unclear as to whether the qualitative findings of this 
thesis are consistent or inconsistent with previous work. We suggest that it will 
be advantageous to the field of human-animal relations if future research 
provides a discussion of their qualitative findings when employing self-
persuasion tasks so that the field can develop more effective manipulations in 
the future. 
A related limitation is that we also gave participants multiple examples 
that they could write about in the manipulations. For example, participants in 
the human supremacy condition were asked to imagine they had to convince 
a friend that humans are not superior to animals, and we gave participants a 
few examples to help them get started (e.g., humans can do harmful things, 
and some animals have unique skills), but told participants they could also use 
their own ideas if they wanted. Participants in the non-addict supremacy group 
were asked to imagine they had to convince a friend that non-addicts were not 




write about (e.g., drug addiction and adverse childhood experiences, and the 
idea that some people are addicted to ‘softer’ drugs like coffee), and told them 
they could also use their own ideas of they wanted. Participants in the control 
condition were instructed to imagine they had to convince a friend that people 
who read books were not superior to people who watch TV, again they were 
given examples of what to write (e.g. that watching TV can be more sociable 
than reading, and that watching TV can be more enjoyable than reading), were 
also told that they could use their own ideas. 
 The qualitative results of study 1 revealed that participants in the 
human-animal condition wrote a wide variety of justifications as to why humans 
were not superior to animals, which provided the rationale for study 2. 
However, in hindsight, the design of study 1 was limited because we could 
have given participants specific examples to write about, instead of giving them 
multiple different examples, and telling participants they could also write about 
another example if they wanted. The rationale behind this decision to give 
multiple examples was that we did not realise that there would be so much 
variability in how people think about human supremacy over animals, or that 
that difference might impact the dependent measures. We thought that it would 
be enough for participants to challenge human supremacy, whichever way 
they chose to do it. What may have been better, and what future research can 
build on, is more fully exploring and identifying the best way to challenge 
human supremacy over animals. While it could have been a better option for 
us to do that in the first place, study 2 revealed no difference in the dependent 
measures as a function of the framing of the human supremacy manipulations, 
and so it is likely that further refinement of the study manipulations could be 
used in future research. 
A further consideration of the manipulations is that we gave participants 
in each condition various examples to write about, which could have added 
noise to the results. For example, participants in the human-animal condition 
were given examples of various traits that animals have that could be 
considered better than humans. Quite differently, we gave participants in the 




morally responsible for their behaviour because they may have had a troubled 
upbringing. Quite simply, we were comparing the moral responsibility of 
behaviour in one condition (drug addicts), with different physical characteristic 
(unrelated to morality). Therefore, it is possible that this difference may have 
added noise to the results of the study. Future research will benefit from 
carefully constructing their manipulations so they are consistent across 
conditions. 
It was only in study 3 that we found that one human supremacy 
manipulation in particular (human supremacy is arbitrary, but not that humans 
are harmful) had an effect on the dependent measures. As we have already 
discussed, the effect in study 3 is likely due to a combination of the 
manipulation used and the participant demographics. We therefore believe 
that future research will benefit from examining whether certain human 
supremacy manipulations are more effective in influencing dependent 
measures in different types of people. While study 3 revealed that 
undergraduate psychology students might be more susceptible to the idea that 
human supremacy is arbitrary, it is possible that different manipulations aimed 
at male, more conservative, and more socially dominant people will need to be 
developed to promote the reduction of human supremacy in the general UK 
population. This is an exciting avenue for future research, and illustrates how 
this thesis has provided an important contribution to the methods used in 
human-animal relations research.  
Another factor which could have influenced the results is the degree to 
which participants took the writing task seriously (i.e. were writing compelling 
arguments). Indeed, the qualitative analyses of the data revealed there was 
variation in the quality of the arguments given, in terms of length, complex 
language used, development of arguments, and depth of philosophical 
engagement with the task. Upon reflection, it is likely that the qualitative 
differences in the written arguments partly reflect differences in the extent to 
which participants took the task seriously. Further refinement of the current 
research methods, or indeed, alternative methods, would be useful for future 




argumentation also highlight the usefulness of employing qualitative research 
methods. 
Another important consideration is the role of personal responsibility 
attributed towards the various groups in the dependent measures. For 
example, participants may have seen drug addicts as being personally 
responsible for their position in society (i.e. they choose to take drugs and 
therefore are responsible for the consequences) whereas animals are not 
personally responsible for their position in society (i.e. farm animals are 
destined to be used for meat because of how humans see and treat them – 
not because of any choices the farm animals made). Future research will 
benefit from taking personal responsibility into consideration in future research. 
Limitations of the use of ‘Animals’ in the manipulation. A further 
limitation of the human supremacy manipulation is the choice to use animals 
(in general) as opposed to using a particular species or subgroup of animals. 
Our rationale for using animals was derived from previous theorizing by 
Hodson, Kteily, and Hoffarth (2014) which suggests that human supremacy 
over animals is a core aspect of human-animal inequality. While this thesis 
provides an initial exploration of challenging human supremacy over animals, 
suppose we had used the manipulation ‘humans are not superior to pigs’, or 
‘humans are not superior to farm animals’, it is possible that we may have a 
more effective (and perhaps also more clear and simple) manipulation. It is 
also likely that such a manipulation would lead to more consistent qualitative 
results possibly having a greater effect on the dependent measures. 
We suggest that future research on challenging human supremacy 
might benefit from exploring the use of comparing humans to single animals 
(e.g., pigs, chickens, or cows; common meat animals) or comparing humans 
to subgroups of animals (e.g., farm animals raised for food). In addition, 
research could explore the effectiveness of manipulations that challenge the 
idea that humans are not superior to animals used in laboratory testing or 
trained in circuses. However, this thesis nevertheless provided a sound initial 
examination of the usefulness of challenging human supremacy over all 




have compared a specific group of humans to animals. This is discussed in 
the next section. 
Limitations of the use of ‘Humans’ in the manipulation. Future 
research could examine whether asking participants to compare a specific 
human outgroup, rather than just ‘humans’ in general, to animals has an impact 
on support for inequalitiess. That is, what would be the result of asking British 
participants to argue that Chinese people are not superior to animals (or a 
specific species such as pigs)? Or asking Chinese participants to argue that 
British people are not superior to animals (or a specific animal species such 
as pigs)? It is possible that this would draw on pre-existing racist beliefs and 
the result might be increased support for human or human-animal inequalities. 
The current research therefore has the potential to stimulate numerous 
different research projects from various intergroup perspectives (e.g., British 
people are not superior to pigs) as well as from a superordinate perspective 
(e.g., humans are not superior to animals). 
Additional alternative manipulations. We could have explored the 
merits of framing the supremacy manipulations as humans and animals are 
equal, or animals are in some ways to superior to humans, and measured the 
subsequent impact on support for various human-animal and human 
inequalities. One final avenue for alternative manipulations is that we could 
have examined the impact of having participants argue the dominant ideology 
that humans are superior to animals, to examine the impact of the mainstream 
human-animal ideology on support for human-animal and human inequalities. 
As with the other limitations of the manipulations, this thesis provides a good 
starting point for future research exploring different manipulations designed to 
challenge human supremacy over animals.  
Limitations of refining our human supremacy manipulation. 
Another aspect to note about the manipulations is that we decided to refine 
only the human supremacy manipulation in study 2. The rationale for doing so 
was that in study 1 we found that the non-addicts’ manipulation was effective 
at reducing support for the drug addict inequality. Accordingly, we decided to 




was not effective, in study 2. In saying that, it is entirely possible that future 
research could explore different ways to improve and refine the non-addict 
supremacy manipulation, which could lead to an improvement in the 
effectiveness of the manipulation. In short, the non-addict manipulation works, 
but it likely could be improved. Therefore, it is possible that future research 
could identify a non-addict supremacy manipulation that is more effective in 
different demographics of people. For example, in conservative populations 
and among people high in SDO that are more likely to have negative 
stereotypes of drug addicts in the first place (Altemeyer, 1988). Mentioning that  
the ‘war on drugs’ is wasting government resources could be a more effective 
way to reduce supremacist thoughts over drug addicts, and could reduce 
support for the drug addict inequality among conservative people (Altemeyer, 
1988; Hari, 2015). However, given the findings of the current research, we are 
less confident that future work will show that challenging non-addict 
supremacy has a downstream effect on support for human-animal inequality.  
Limitations of the human comparison group. The choice of non-
addict supremacy as the comparison human group is also a potential limitation 
of this thesis. The rationale for doing so was because we wanted to identify a 
human inequality that participants openly supported, so that there was enough 
variability in the measure to allow for a reduction in support. For instance, had 
we chose to use the male-female, or White-Black inequality, it is unlikely that 
many people would (openly) support these inequalities in the UK. Therefore, 
we were somewhat constrained in our choices for human inequality. In 
addition, the outcome of the drug addict inequality PCA was the same as the 
outcome of human-animal inequality PCA. The drug addict inequality was 
human inequality that participants most endorsed in our pilot studies and 
further, drug addicts are the most dehumanized human group in the West 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). 
Additional future directions. We also considered the extent to which 
human inequality was conceptually similar to human-animal inequality. We 
opted to employ the drug addict inequality for a few reasons. Firstly, they are 




vulnerable population routinely persecuted by the state, and thirdly, they are 
beyond the realm of moral concern for most of the UK public. Reflecting on the 
choices made in this research, we realise that the drug addict inequality was 
not the only option we could have chosen. We think that future work would 
benefit from exploring other human inequalities, and particularly the 
exploitation of developing world labour. For example, it is possible that future 
work examining the impact of challenging supremacy over Bangladesh 
sweatshop workers, or miners from war torn Congo is more fruitful due to the 
widespread consumption of morally troublesome products, as  outlined in this 
thesis, and the similarities this troublesome consumption has the meat 
paradox.  
Beyond future work utilizing the current study’s design, future work 
exploring the relationship between the meat paradox and the consumption 
paradox are likely to be fruitful avenues of future research (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017). For example, it is likely there are justifications for consuming 
morally troublesome products (such as sweatshop clothing and conflict 
minerals) which people use to reduce dissonance about their morally 
troublesome consumption. It would also be interesting to examine whether 
people who are likely to eat meat are also more likely to consume sweatshop 
clothing. Or alternatively, whether support for the fast fashion industry and the 
meat industry is related, although not necessarily predictive of each other. The 
limitations to the manipulations employed in this thesis therefore provide 
numerous avenues for future research to build on. 
9.5.2 Measures. Just as there are ways to improve our manipulations, 
there are also limitations to the measures we used in this thesis. 
 Principal Components Analysis. We chose to design our own 
measure of support for inequalities because, to the best of our knowledge, 
there are no existing measures of this kind. We needed a measure of support 
for inequalities that could easily be adapted to capture support for both human-
animal and human inequalities. Because we had limited resources to spend 
on creating our scale, we chose to conduct principal component analysis with 




capturing support for inequalities. A better alternative might be to employ both 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to inform the creation of the 
measure.  
Specifically, we could have conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
with a large sample size (N = 500) and included many different aspects of 
inequalities. We could have explored the dimension structure of the questions 
and produced a scale more accurate at measuring inequalities than was used 
in this thesis. We then could have conducted a confirmatory factor analysis in 
a separate sample (N = 500) to confirm the exploratory factor analyses. Whilst 
we believe that exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are important 
statistical tools to consider when creating a scale, we chose to use principal 
component analysis for the following reasons. Firstly, we did not have the 
resources to run the two large studies that would be essential in factor 
analyses. However, at the very least, if we were to replicate this work we would 
want to employ more participants in our pilot studies as this would ensure that 
the results that will inform the creation of the scale are robust. Further, the aim 
of this thesis was not to produce the perfect measure of support for 
inequalities, but instead to examine the Correlational and Experimental 
Foundational Hypotheses. Thus, this research only required a scale that would 
sufficiently capture support for inequalities. To that end, we developed our 4-
item measure of support for inequalities that can easily be adapted to capture 
support for both human-animal and human inequalities.   
Our human-animal inequality measure has strong face validity, and 
includes questions on whether humans are superior to animals, whether it is 
ok that humans benefit from harming animals, and whether participants accept 
the way humans treat animals. In short, we had a scale with good face validity 
and good internal reliability across all our studies, as measured by the internal 
consistency measure of Cronbach alpha. In creating our scale, we also 
included measures of SDO and System Justification that provided good 
convergent validity; participants who supported inequalities were higher in 




enough as to warrant concern that our new measure was simply a different 
version of either SDO or System Justification.  
We could not have solely used measures of dehumanization of animals 
and humans throughout this thesis, as measures of dehumanization alone do 
not capture support for the overall inequality, instead capturing the type of mind 
that participants think entities possess. We believe that the measure we 
created meets the requirements of this thesis, and provides a solid foundation 
for future work to develop a new measure of support for inequalities.   
 Focus of questions. There are limitations to this research that 
concern the focus of the dependent measures. Much like the limitations of the 
manipulations, our dependent measures could also have benefited from being 
more specific. For example, in human-animal inequality measure we asked 
participants what they thought about ‘humans’ and ‘animals’. As discussed in 
our section on limitations of the manipulations, we also could have asked 
participants what they think about humans and ‘farm animals’, or humans and 
‘pigs’. These more specific dependent measures mentioning particular 
subgroups of animals could be beneficial in capturing subtle differences in 
support for inequalities. That is, participants may be more likely to change their 
mind about a particular species or subcategory of animals, compared with 
‘animals’ in general. However, such a change in measures would likely not 
have changed the Foundational results of this research as participants’ 
downstream change in support for human inequalities would be influenced by 
the manipulations, and not by the measure of support for human-animal 
inequality. Future research could examine this empirically. 
Human-animal inequality. Instead of asking about humans and 
animals generally, we could have given specific inequalities such as the meat 
industry, the clothing industry, the entertainment industry, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the cosmetics industry. It is possible that participants are more 
susceptible to changing how they think about certain treatment of animals. For 
example, do they feel differently about using animals for testing make up 
compared with using animals for food? We chose to ask about human-animal 




support for human-animal inequality in aggregate was susceptible to change. 
In hindsight, asking about specific instances of human-animal inequality could 
capture more subtle changes. Therefore, we are confident that future work will 
be able to expand on the findings of this thesis, and build on our measure of 
support for inequalities.  
Nuances of human inequality.  Future work may find it useful to 
explore more nuanced aspects of human inequalities, such as support for 
different components of the drug addict inequality (i.e., differentiating support 
for the decriminalization versus legalization of drug use). Decriminalization of 
drug use is where it is not a crime to use drugs, but it is not legal to sell drugs 
– drug dealing is still punishable, but drug addicts who are caught with drugs 
for their personal use would not be imprisoned (as they are now in the UK), 
and instead would be given medical treatment (as they do in Switzerland and 
Portugal) (Hari, 2016). It is possible that future research could illustrate that 
support for the drug addict inequality can be separated into finer aspects of the 
inequality. A more nuanced measure of the drug addict inequality might 
therefore be more effective at capturing change in support. 
Alternative inequalities. Another interesting line of future research 
would be to include measures of numerous other inequalities. This thesis only 
examined support for three human inequalities: the drug addict, the homeless, 
and the Bangladeshi sweatshop inequality. Admittedly, support for the drug 
addict and the homeless inequality are highly correlated and possibly too 
highly correlated. This is in part because people stereotype homeless people 
to be drug users, and because sometimes people also stereotype drug addicts 
to be homeless. This is not an entirely unreasonable association for people to 
have for the evidence also suggests a link between drug addiction and 
homeless (Buchanan & Young, 2000), but nevertheless, future research would 
likely benefit from employing various additional inequalities. Our measure of 
support for the Bangladesh inequality is to the best of our knowledge the first 
empirical study of people’s attitudes towards the Bangladeshi sweatshop 
workers inequality. This measure is also a good example of support for the 




previously, future work could expand on our measures by measuring a wider 
variety of inequalities including support for the exploitation of African miners 
who mine minerals in war zones (e.g., conflict minerals), and the general 
support for the exploitation of developing world labour. Further, future work 
could also examine peoples support for the exploitation of the lower classes 
for domestic labour. For example, does peoples’ support for human-animal 
inequality also predict support for a living wage, social benefits or progressive 
taxation? 
Wording of the dependent measures. A final limitation of the 
dependent measure we created is the slightly different wording used between 
measures. This was purely done in error and in future research we would 
recommend that the dependent measures are as similar as they can be across 
conditions. In the current research, one item from human-animal inequality 
dependent measure read “It is okay humans benefit from the current order of 
society”, whereas the same item from the drug addict dependent measure read 
“It is okay that non-addicted persons benefit from their treatment of drug 
addicts”. We acknowledge that the difference between the scales is less than 
ideal, however, we believe it is very unlikely that this would have greatly 
influenced the interpretation of our findings. Future work will only benefit from 
employing more concise measures of support for inequalities. 
Timing of manipulation task. A further limitation of this thesis is that 
in the early studies (1-3) we did not control how long participants could spend 
on writing their manipulations. Thus, we allowed participants to continue to the 
dependent measures once they had written a few sentences in the writing task. 
In study 4, we instructed participants to spend at least two minutes on the 
writing task, however, we yielded the same results as study 1. Despite this, 
future research could employ a minimum time limit, if they use a similar 
manipulation, to encourage greater depth of thought.  
Additional future research ideas. Future research could examine the 
natural variation in meat eating behaviour to determine whether it has any 
relationship with support for human inequalities. For example, an interesting 




and consumption of morally troublesome products. Specifically, research could 
explore support for the drug addict inequality between India (the country with 
the highest proportion of vegetarians at 30-40%; Kumar & Kapoor, 2014) and 
the Western world. It is possible that because of the association between 
vegetarianism, Hinduism, and purity in India, that vegetarians in India are even 
more likely than their Western meat-eating counterparts to support human 
inequalities. Whereas for Western cultures such as the UK, it is likely that 
vegetarianism is associated with decreased support for the Bangladesh and 
drug addict inequality, as trends in this thesis suggest. While currently 
speculative, such cross-cultural research would contribute well to the 
psychology of human-animal relations, and has the potential to show the 
complexities and cross cultural nuances between human-animal inequality, 
and human inequalities. 
9.5.3 Summary of limitations. To summarise, we prefaced the 
limitations section by questioning whether our inconsistent experimental 
findings were attributable to limitations in the research design, or evidence that 
there is no foundational inequality. After considering the evidence supporting 
and opposing the experimental foundational hypothesis, we conclude that we 
do not have any robust evidence to support our alternative hypothesis. 
However, should future research make improvements to the current measures 
and manipulations, we think it is possible to find evidence that would support 
our experimental foundational hypothesis. Despite our optimism, we also 
recognise that it is possible that challenging beliefs on human supremacy has 
no meaningful effect on support for human inequalities in the wider adult meat 
eating public.  
In addition, future research may reveal that challenging human 
supremacy can lead to a reduction in support for both human, and human-
animal inequalities. However, whilst this is possible it is not probable, as 
challenging human supremacy is likely to prime thought and feelings of 
‘humanity’. This may further perpetuate the distinction between humans and 
animals, and consequently perpetuate support for human-animal inequality, 




In short, future research on the experimental foundational hypothesis needs to 
be conducted and replicated before any clear and meaningful conclusions are 
drawn concerning the relationship between human-animal inequality and 
human inequalities. However, the possibility that the null results are not due to 
limitations of the methods and are legitimate null results is also an important 
consideration. For example, it may be that there isn’t support for the 
foundational hypothesis simply because there is no real-world effect to detect. 
Considering that we found quite consistent null findings in this thesis, there 
may well be a true null effect. Future research utilizing an internal Bayesian 
meta-analysis will add further clarification of whether there is overall support 
for a null effect. 
9.6 Conclusion 
 Humans harm animals in numerous ways; from food (e.g. meat and 
dairy products), to fun (e.g. circuses and fox hunting) and fashion (e.g. leather). 
Cumulatively, these harmful practices constitute a inequality. The majority of 
the animals we choose to kill are unthreatening and represent a vulnerable 
population that pose no immediate threat to humans (e.g. cows, pigs, sheep, 
and chickens). However, instead of caring for these harmless animals – as we 
do pets – we systematically treat those animals in violent and cruel ways. 
Further, our society facilitates these behaviours and thus they are not just 
accepted, but have become the norm.  
Central to this thesis, we noticed that the inequality between particular 
human groups share important parallels with human-animal inequality. For 
instance, the persecution of drug addicts in the UK, and the exploitation of 
labour in the developing world both constitute inequalities characterized by an 
apathetic public that are indifferent to the suffering of vulnerable human 
populations. However, because human-animal inequality is more violent and 
arguably causes more suffering than the inequality between drug addicts and 
the rest of society and those who make versus those who purchase sweatshop 
clothes, we reasoned that human-animal inequality would be foundational to 




Previous work (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014) explored this question, 
and found that belief in the human animal divide was a predictor of prejudice 
towards both humans and animals. That is, the belief that humans are both 
fundamentally different from, and superior to, animals. Other research 
(Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Costello & Hodson, 2009) has 
similarly shown that challenging the idea that humans are different from 
animals can reduce prejudice towards animals, immigrants, and racial and 
religious outgroups. However, this research only employed 19 year old 
Canadian first year undergraduate psychology students. To our knowledge, no 
research has examined the impact of challenging human supremacy over 
animals on prejudice towards animals and other human ‘outgroups’. Nor has 
any quantitative psychological research examined the relationship between 
human-animal and human inequalities. This purpose of thesis was to explore 
beliefs surrounding human supremacy, and to determine the psychological 
connection between the human-animal and human inequalities. 
We predicted that support for human inequalities would correlate more 
strongly with support for human-animal inequality, than with other human 
inequalities – our correlational foundational hypothesis. That is, we believed 
that people who were indifferent to the suffering of other human groups, would 
care even less about the suffering of animals. In addition to our correlational 
hypothesis, we also had an experimental hypothesis: we predicted that 
challenging human supremacy would reduce support for human-animal 
inequality, and by extension reduce support for human inequalities.  
Across three experiments, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions; (1) challenging human supremacy over animals (2) 
challenging non-addict supremacy over drug addicts, or (3) challenging book 
readers’ supremacy over TV watchers (control condition). We then measured 
support for the human animal and human inequalities. However, we found no 
strong evidence for our experimental foundational hypothesis. In study 3 – our 
only study using 19 year old first year undergraduate Psychology students - 
we found marginal evidence that challenging human supremacy over animals 




faced by drug addicts.. However, these findings changed when vegetarians 
and vegans were excluded from the analyses. The analyses showed that 
participants who challenged human supremacy displayed a reduction in 
support for human-animal inequality, but did not show a reduction in support 
for the drug addict inequality. We also did not find any evidence of the 
correlational foundational hypothesis. Instead, across all studies support for 
human-animal inequality was strongly correlated with – but not foundational to 
– support for human inequalities. That is people could be indifferent to the 
plight of animals, but could care about other human groups.   
The variability in participants’ qualitative responses suggests that future 
qualitative research exploring the different justifications that participants 
employed would be valuable. We believe that more research is needed in this 
area – both quantitative and qualitative – to fully understand the important, but 
relatively understudied psychological relationship between human-animal and 
human inequalities. This thesis contributes an initial, but important, step in 
understanding the relationships between inequalities. That is, support for 
human-animal inequality is psychologically related – but not foundational – to 
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